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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book had humble beginnings. It was born out of a meeting of the minds 
of two (as yet) doctoral students who shared a concern about the dearth in 
critical studies of security in the Middle East. Our thoughts about the field did
not correspond with the availability of literature on the library shelves. The end
of the Cold War brought about fundamental shifts in the international political
system, which many scholars and practitioners believed would have ripple
effects in all regions and fields of interest, including what may be termed
‘national security’. Literature on security during the Cold War era was focused
primarily on the military, the state system and superpower rivalry. However,
with the end of the Cold War, the theory and practice of security has been
subject to widespread rethinking, taking into consideration a larger range of
issues and contexts that were previously neglected. A substantial literature 
has developed that offers critiques of the orthodoxy of strategic studies as well
as means to broaden and deepen the study of security in the global system.
Unfortunately, this current has been slow to reach the Middle East, one of the
most volatile, yet strategic, regions of the post-Cold War era.
Sometimes, with a lot of effort, ideas come to fruition. For the reasons 
outlined above, we organized an international conference entitled ‘Redefining
Security in the Middle East: Effects of the Peace Process’ at McGill University 
in Montreal, Quebec, on 23–24 June 2000. In order to undertake such an 
ambitious project, on such a controversial subject as security in the Middle 
East, it was necessary to do major fundraising as well as solicit advice 
from a large number of colleagues: academics, practitioners and administra-
tive staff.
The individuals who assembled at this conference came from a variety of
backgrounds, in respect of race, nationality, religion and ethnicity, from three
different continents (America, Europe and the Middle East), and from different
‘sides of the fence’ so to speak in the Arab–Israeli context, whose common 
interest was in dialogue in support of peace in the Middle East. The main 
objective of the conference was to investigate the impact of the Middle East 
peace process on the development of Middle East security agendas, focusing on
alternative methods and philosophies of conflict and conflict resolution in the
region.
The conference was organized around panels intended to serve as chap-
ters of the book: conceptual issues of redefining military/strategic security, 
environmental–economic security, multilateral security issues, and gender and
social–cultural issues. The papers were submitted prior to the conference and
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were given extensive comments and critique by a discussant on each panel. The
conference attracted a sizeable audience of scholars, practitioners and members
of the public at large. A roundtable discussion provided an opportunity for each
contributor to determine how the peace process has influenced the definition and
practice of security in the Middle East and how his or her paper fitted in with the
overall theme. Each of the papers addressed one or more of the following themes
as central to the objective of redefining security in the Middle East:
1 issues of knowledge, power, inclusion, and exclusion in the definition and
redefinition of ‘security’;
2 the inability of the traditional security concept to explain contemporary
concerns and interests of different state and non-state actors in the Middle
East;
3 the changing nature of security concerns in the Middle East as a facet of
the altered strategic context of the peace process era; and
4 the intersections of political, social, environmental, cultural, gender, and
other collective identity issues in redefining security in the Middle East.
The spirit of optimism that underpinned this project was literally shaken by
the outbreak of the second intifada, which began at the end of September 2000
(three months after the conference took place). We observed the chain of violent
incidents with horror and utter disappointment. From that point on, the idea 
of analysing the effects of a peace process that ceased to exist (or was termin-
ally ill for quite some time) became problematic, to say the least. Not only 
did the configuration of circumstances on the ground change fundamentally,
but the attitudes, fears and hopes of the participants themselves were 
challenged to the core, particularly as most, if not all, of them are deeply 
passionate about and connected to the region through family, friends and other
significant bonds.
As the region continued to descend into violence and chaos, a project 
such as ours became a difficult sell. Observers pointed out that a redefinition 
of ‘security’ could not take place during a time of such flux and confusion.
Nevertheless, as editors and contributors of the volume, we stand firm in our
belief that now is precisely the time to think about new concepts, new policies
and new discourses about security since it has become quite obvious that 
the old ones are not working. We do not provide a singular alternative or
magical approach that is intended to ‘solve’ the Arab–Israeli conflict. Our goal
is simply to provide a broader terrain for discussion, debate and analysis of the
possibilities and constraints for and on conflict and conflict resolution in the
region, to consider the complicated reality in alternative ways and to continue
– even in times of crisis – to envisage an alternative, more peaceful, future for
all the parties involved. Our hope is that students and scholars of the politics of
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the Middle East, in particular, and the global arena, in general, will employ this
book as a means by which to think differently about the meaning and practice
of security.
This book would not have been possible without the contributions of many
people. We are deeply appreciative of the financial support given by the
Department of National Defence (Canada), the University of Manitoba’s Centre
for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), Department of Political Studies 
and Faculty of Arts, and McGill University’s Research Group on International
Security, Department of Political Science and Faculty of Arts. This support
allowed us to finance the travel, accommodations, ground transportation and
meals of the participants in the conference. We thank Geoffrey Aronson from
the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, DC, for giving an excellent
keynote address. We are also grateful to Rex Brynen and James Devine, who
offered valuable comments on the papers as chairs/discussants of panels at the
conference. We appreciate the participation by members of the audience, some
of whom came from afar.
On the administrative side, Pat Kruchak (CDSS) was indispensable in pro-
viding assistance on a daily basis for over three years, particularly through 
the reimbursement quagmire following the conference. Also, our assistants,
Lindsey Troschuk and Ariann Kehler, contributed their organizational and
interpersonal skills, and their creativity during the conference itself. Lenore
Martin offered valuable advice throughout the process of publication, for which
we are grateful. We are indebted to the two anonymous readers designated 
by Manchester University Press who provided critical comments on the initial
prospectus. Also thanks to Tony Mason, Commissioning Editor for Politics,
International Law & Economics (MUP) for continuous critical guidance on the
organization and submission of the typescript for the book, as well as to Marilyn
Cresswell for specific advice on contractual issues. The Department of Political
Science at the University of Melbourne, Australia, provided a second home 
for Tami for the last four months of the project, during which time ample
administrative support was given.
Our gratitude is also due to all the contributors – some who became involved
at short notice in the latter stages of publication, and particularly to those whose
chapters were submitted early on – for their continued hard work. We thank
also those participants at the conference whose papers were not included in the
book, but whose involvement deepened our perspectives a great deal. If not for
the Internet, this project would have been near impossible, as we communi-
cated across several continents and saved what may have otherwise been a very
lengthy paper trail.
Finally, we thank and dedicate this book to our families. This project
impinged on three years of time that were as much theirs as our own. Brent
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expresses deep appreciation for Yael’s infinite patience, and without whose
support and understanding the long hours on this project would not have been
possible. And Tami expresses gratitude to Gady, Edden and Uma for being her
ultimate source of inspiration and balance.
Tami Amanda Jacoby
Brent E. Sasley
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In its  formative stages, the study of the theory and practice of securityin all the world’s regional subsystems, including that of the Middle East, wasdefined primarily by the logic of superpower rivalry. For over five decades,
the Cold War security agenda was distinguished by the principal strategic
balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the
Soviet Union (USSR). It also served as the core framework of analysis. In that
respect, the ‘core’ was prioritized, both analytically and politically, over what
were considered local or regional disputes raging in an area broadly defined as
the ‘Third World’, now more widely known as the developing world. The latter
category was considered theoretically insignificant insofar as conflict in the
‘periphery’ did not escalate to the point of threatening superpower relations 
and international stability in the core. For this reason, conflicts in the develop-
ing world, whether as proxy wars, internationalized civil conflicts or disputes
local in character, were considered either as secondary or superfluous to the
international system as a whole. 
This exclusion of the developing world from mainstream analysis in inter-
national relations (IR) was based on a particular understanding of ‘the politcal’
in international affairs. Structures representing significant political authority
were rendered equivalent to the state system, the military – industrial complex,
inter-state war and the diplomatic arena. In particular, the international system
and its component parts were defined, for the most part, by the nation state as
it developed historically in Europe and was institutionalized through the hege-
mony of academic and policy-oriented elites in the United States in the post-
Second World War era. These Eurocentric and, later, American hegemonic
origins were developed as a field of study by, first, realist (Morgenthau, 1973;
Carr, 1964) and, later, neorealist (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979) scholars who
occpied the dominant schools of thought in the field of international relations.
According to the realist worldview, security is defined as the protection of the
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the threat of conventional warfare, plus nuclear weapons proliferation and
superpower rivalries. The idea that superpower nuclear deterrence was a stabi-
lizing function of the international system during the Cold War rendered devel-
oping world conflicts invisible insofar as their forms, use of armaments and
actors did not fit the established paradigm. 
However, the United States and the Soviet Union no longer vie with each
other for dominance in the developing world, including their Middle East client
states. Although the United States still seeks to maintain influence in that
region, the Middle East conflict, as it has been traditionally defined, is ‘over’
(Thomas, 1999: 278). In other words, inter-state war backed by proxy rivals no
longer takes place. This change does not suggest that inter-state conflict in the
Middle East can no longer occur – that would be to neglect historical and current
realities. However, because of the shift in the international system, inter-state
violence is no longer the predominant type of security concern. Other forms of
conflict in the Middle East are proliferating at an unprecedented rate, with local
and international implications, which cannot be understood using traditional
variables. 
As a result, it is essential to conceptualize these new conflicts using levels
of analysis and conceptual frameworks that are fundamentally different from
the conventional realist–neorealist perspective. Including the developing world
as a central unit of analysis, or what Amitav Acharya (1997) has termed ‘the
periphery as the core’, significantly alters the process of theorizing the bound-
aries of the subfield and its principal units of analysis. This type of thinking is
essential for exploring issues of security in the Middle East as both dependent
and independent variables with respect to the post-Cold War international
arena. 
Since the end of the Cold War, along with the disintegration of much of its
rules, power relations and paradigms, the field of security studies has faced a
serious challenge, with input from scholars positioned variously in the areas of
Marxism–neomarxism, historical materialism, feminism, environmentalism,
postcolonialism and postmodernism. This dissident trend, a broad canvas
referred to as ‘critical security studies’, has shed light on some of the emerging
patterns of conflict that have dramatically altered both the contours of security
and the possibilities for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. The task 
of revisiting the subject of security has involved a broad range of issues 
with respect to the state and its function as a protection system and a collec-
tive identity structure, and has raised questions of an epistemological and onto-
logical nature, as well as other levels of analysis between the local and the
global. By challenging the unified, abstract and ethnocentric bias of mainstream
security studies and its realist–neorealist paradigm, critical scholars have
opened up space for new understandings of conflict and security in non-
Western regions. In particular, the issues they have raised are directly relevant
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to the Middle East, itself a pivotal regional subsystem in world politics and what
Bassam Tibi has referred to as ‘a mirror of its changes’ (1998b: 216). 
This volume seeks to draw from current developments in critical security
studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the
Middle East. The Middle East has always been considered a region of global
strategic significance, situated at a crossroads between the continents of Europe,
Africa and Asia, bordering the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and site of the
world’s largest deposit of oil. However, analysis of Middle East security in 
the current era has been imprisoned in old concepts and outdated paradigms,
transplanted from elsewhere, that do not register both the consequence and
complexity of conflict in that region. The goal of redefining security in the
Middle East is not only to better understand events and processes in that 
particular geographical area, but to help shed light on other, hitherto margin-
alized, spaces throughout the world (both within the West and elsewhere) 
that have been excluded from mainstream analysis. Moreover, our intention is 
not simply to transport concepts and debates emanating from mainstream 
IR to the Middle Eastern context, but to capture the complex interface of global
and local dialogues as they pertain to the changing circumstances and in-
digenous understandings of conflict in this region. Our focus is squarely on 
the Arab–Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian–Israeli context in par-
ticular, as these conflicts are yet to be resolved and form the most intractable
core of geopolitical relations, issues and transformations in the region as a
whole.
Traditional security studies in the Middle East
Until the 1990s, strategic studies of the Middle East have been particularly
opposed to the notion of ‘redefining security’. Even during the last decade, the
literature on this subject has remained small. In comparison to Western regions
and states where, it is argued, liberal capitalist democracies do not go to 
war, especially with each other (Mueller, 1990; Doyle, 1986), the Middle East
remains an area in which protracted militarized, armed conditions of conflict
are staples of the political process. For that reason, the study of international
politics in the Middle East has been characterized as the study of inter-state war.
As a result, much of the literature on the Middle East has focused on the
chronology of the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 1991 Gulf War. These wars have been used
as benchmarks in the history of the region (see, for example, Bickerton and
Klausner, 1991) and as signifiers of collective identities frameworks and loyal-
ties (see, for example, Karsh, 1996; Sicker, 1989).
These methods of studying Middle Eastern politics are predicated upon the
Cold War realist logic described above. Superpower rivalry over the region did
3
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not begin in earnest until the 1960s, when American support for Israel began
to increase significantly.1 At that time, the Soviet Union began actively support-
ing the more radical Arab states opposed to Israel and Western, especially
American, involvement in the region, encouraging opposition to Washington
and its policies. While American policy centred on defending Israel against
threats to its state security and ensuring continued, safe and reliable access to
Persian Gulf oil supplies, Soviet goals were to prevent the use of the region as a
staging area by the West in an attack on the Soviet Union’s ‘soft underbelly’ of
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and to extend Communist influence both in the
Middle East as a whole and within each country. Many analysts interpreted 
the Arab–Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 as proxy wars between the USSR 
and the US on account of the use by Israelis and Arabs of their patrons’ wea-
pons in battle and their attempt to advance the roles of their benefactors in the
area.
The imposition of superpower competition on the Middle East (Ovendale,
1992; Bar-Simon-Tov, 1987) had the effect of bringing the focus of conven-
tional security studies to the region. However, events within the region itself
contributed to the spread of realist ideas of conflict and security. On the Arab
side, leaders and regimes sought to unite their discontented and/or disparate
ethnic, religious and linguistic communities under a patriotic banner defending
the country (see, for instance, Hiro, 1989). This type of unity required em-
phasis on an external enemy to deflect attention away from internal concerns.
On that basis, domestic demands could be shunted aside in the name both of
national security interests and of regaining, by force, Arab lands lost to Israel 
in 1967 (el-Shazly, 1986). This process had the effect of generating political
legitimacy for otherwise undemocratic and/or illegitimate rulers (Sela, 1998;
Safran, 1969). Israel, for its part, felt itself beset by hostile countries on all sides,
and thus was concerned primarily with defence matters by virtue of that geo-
graphical circumstance (Safran, 1978). For this reason, Israeli resources were
directed towards securing the country from external threat, the most prominent
and serious concern. Partly as a result of these concerns, tensions and disputes
over borders – an important aspect of traditional security concerns – became
an issue of paramount importance between states. Israel’s relations with Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan (until 1994) and Egypt (until 1979) were partly conditional
on the resolution of where the border between the countries would fall. A 1975
Brookings Institution report on the prospects of peace in the region reiterated
this focus on sovereignty, territorial integrity and secure borders – all realist
notions – while neglecting other facets of security. Security studies of the 
Middle East seemed, therefore, to be a natural method of understanding state
behaviour. 
Since much of the analyses of security studies took as their empirical 
reference the more advanced industrial countries of the world (including
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democracies and also non-democracies), the end of the Cold War brought 
to light the inability of such analyses to properly address security concerns of
non-developed countries. Scholars began to point out that although war and
conflict seemed to be disappearing from the developed world, they remained a
constant in the developing world, including primarily Africa, parts of Asia, and
the Middle East (Holsti, 1996). Moreover, conflict took place not only between
the traditional referent points (i.e. states), but within states themselves, between
various communal linguistic, religious or ethnic groups, or between the state
itself and individuals or societal groups (Holsti, 1998). The restraint imposed by
the Cold War competition, which dampened national and subnational rivalries
in favour of aligning with and following the lead of one camp or another, was
gone. There was nothing in its place. Instead, those groups whose particular
interests had hitherto been repressed in the name of Cold War politics realized
they could freely pursue their own interests in ways that did not coincide with
the inter-state system. 
Undoubtedly, one cannot underestimate the influence of these events and
theories on the politics of the region. However, since the end of the Cold War,
the types of conflict characterizing the Middle East have undergone a profound
transformation, requiring new ways of thinking about threat, danger and pro-
tection. The challenge of redefining Middle East security is both theoretical and
political. Theoretically, new concepts of security in the Middle East have much
to offer critical analysis insofar as changes in that region provoke new under-
standings of trends of conflict and conflict resolution in a globalizing world.
Politically, new concepts of security challenge the status quo in the region and
offer alternative visions of the Middle East that are more peaceful and optimistic
than those of today.
Two of the most significant political events that have served to revise think-
ing about security in the Middle East are the Palestinian intifada from 1987 to
1993, and the start of the Middle East peace process since 1991. Both events
altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in profound and unlimited
ways, and have provoked scholars and practitioners alike to devise new methods
of conflict and conflict resolution in the region. 
The Palestinian intifada2 began in 19873 as a case of an internal conflict
that was irresolvable by military means. Since the 1967 War, Israeli occupation
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, although condemned by the international
community, has sustained itself with little internal resistance. The uprising 
was clearly a popular insurrection that defied the conventional rules of war 
in which soldiers fight soldiers on the battlefield. Instead, the Israeli military 
faced an ‘enemy’, composed largely of Palestinian women and youth (shabab),
that protested within civilian areas, neighbourhoods and the private sphere,
spaces that are conventionally understood to lie outside the range of military
combat. 
5
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Moreover, the discourse of ‘enlightened occupation’ that had sustained the
legitimacy in Israeli public opinion of Israeli control over the West Bank and
Gaza since 1967 was exposed during the intifada as oppressive and unjust.
Additionally, the question arose about the degree to which military occupation
served the interests of Israeli security in the first place. Many analysts, includ-
ing the majority of the general staff of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) (quoted
in Thomas, 1999: 252) stated that territory did not necessarily hold strategic
value, and could even, as this case demonstrated, become a burden to the occu-
pying society and a risk to Israeli security. Indeed, the increasingly oppressive
nature of the Israeli occupation served only to fuel a cycle of violence con-
stituted by Israeli belligerence followed by Palestinian anger, discontent 
and radicalization. Bassam Tibi suggests that this new pattern of ‘irregular
warfare’ problematizes the civilian–military distinction and the role of the 
military–industrial complex in conflict resolution in post-Cold War conditions
(Tibi, 1998b: 215).
The Middle East peace process4 (MEPP) was an additional factor in prob-
lematizing the military–strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The
MEPP fundamentally altered the structures and symbols of security and state-
hood in the region, rendering the military option less popular, at least in the
view of the international community. A more propitious climate for diplomatic
negotiations in the 1990s resulted from a series of international pressures and
realignments. Along with the intifada, popular opinion in other Middle Eastern
societies expressed an increasing dissatisfaction with the human cost of mili-
tarized conflict.
The Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 was the first instance in which
parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict engaged in direct bargaining at the nego-
tiating table. Madrid set the stage for a series of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations that would reflect renewed desire for peace in the region and recog-
nition that the realities of the international system that had contributed to the
continuation of inter-state hostilities were no longer part of the predominant
framework. In addition to the momentum established at the Madrid conference,
a Labour Government, traditionally seen as more willing to engage in peace
negotiations, came to power in Israel in 1992 (the first since 1977). That
Government entered into secret talks with Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) officials in Oslo, Norway. The Oslo process, as it has come to be known,
had the effect of bypassing the very public Madrid agendas and allowed for 
concrete efforts and results between the Palestinian and Israeli sides without 
the glare of publicity and attention or the opportunity for hard-liners opposed
to such negotiations to derail them. While the secrecy of these talks raised 
questions about the democratic nature of the peace process, they did manage to
produce a series of agreements, namely the Oslo Accord of 13 August 1993,
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the Declaration of Principles signed on the White House lawn on 13 September
1993, the Oslo II Accord of 28 September 1995, and the Wye River land-
for-peace Accords of 23 October 1998. 
These agreements have resulted in modest advances in Middle East peace.
However, at the same time, the different parties to negotiations have become
embroiled in the most intractable final status issues such as: the exact contours
of Palestinian statehood; borders; Palestinian refugees; Jewish settlements; and
Jerusalem. In terms of the broader Israeli–Arab peace negotiations, the talks
have continually broken down over Israel’s position in southern Lebanon (until
the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000), Israeli–Syrian relations, and wider issues
related to the positions of other regional actors. That these issues are ongoing
reveals the precarious nature of the peace process as a whole. The assassination
of Prime Minister Rabin by an Israeli right-wing extremist in 1995, the election
of right-wing governments in Israel in 1996 and 2001, and the outbreak of the
second intifada since September 2000, further exemplify the unstable nature 
of negotiations, and perhaps, more importantly, the flawed understandings of
peace and security that underpinned the Oslo process. Recently, rejectionist and
radical fundamentalist movements have mobilized on both sides, and have
increased their popularity as negotiations at the leadership level failed to bear
fruit. 
As a result of the peace process, and the debates it has engendered, increas-
ing political polarization and radicalization has occurred, both between state
and society, and between different social groups. On the one hand, there has
been increasing intransigence and potential for violence among a diverse mul-
titude of regional interventions, actors and cleavages. On the other hand, the
peace process has challenged conventional taboos about Arab–Israeli relations
and has placed on the agenda a variety of new security issues related to 
environmental issues, economic development, democratization and internal
cleavages based on political, social, religious, ethnic and other identities. These
unresolved issues resulting from the Palestinian intifada and the MEPP demon-
strate the futility of conventional thinking about security from a statist–military
perspective. The need for new and more inclusive security frameworks has
become readily apparent.
A multi-dimensional approach to security in the Middle East does not 
seek to ignore traditional military security issues, such as the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, arms purchases,
counter-terrorism, traditional balance of power calculations, interaction with
external influences, borders and territorial disputes, and inter-state wars.
However, a deepening of the subject matter would involve consideration of the
non-traditional variables that have arisen as security issues in Middle Eastern
politics. Critical security has served as a prominent point of reference for new
7
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approaches to conflict in all geographical regions, with particular implications
for redefining security in the Middle East.
Critical security studies – a source for revision
Critical security studies is a body of nascent experimental and exploratory
knowledge that, as Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker argue, serves to ‘trans-
gress arbitrary limits, open up hitherto closed off connections, and enable the
construction and circulation of new ways of knowing and doing politics’
(Ashley and Walker, 1990: 264). Despite the considerable diversity of critical
voices in IR, a commonality lies in their desire to pry open ‘thinking space’
(George and Campbell, 1990: 269), in an otherwise unyielding paradigm that
focuses, almost exclusively, on state sovereignty and its underlying configura-
tion of authority and political identity. The challenge of critical security is to
reframe some of the most basic epistemological, ontological and political ortho-
doxies of the field and include, according to Christine Sylvestor, ‘activities we do
not often study as IR, and people we think of having no place there’ (1994: 193).
This type of thinking is essential for the Middle East, a region where funda-
mental changes emanating from both international and local politics refocus
the gaze on new actors, new concerns and new areas of conflict and conflict
resolution.
Critical security would help to transform the meaning of and possibilities
for security in the Middle East in two fundamental ways. First, it seeks to broaden
the field to include the new issues, challenges, actors, relations and units of
analysis that have arisen in the post-Cold War era. New threats and dangers 
in the Middle East are articulated in relation to environmental risk, terrorism,
fundamentalist movements, structural violence, neo-colonialism, migration
and refugees, economic scarcity, ethnic and racial conflict, domestic abuse/
violence against women, and political and human rights. These issues both
exceed and render problematic the limited boundaries of the field as they take
place across and beyond state boundaries and cannot be resolved by any par-
ticular state structure on its own. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, critical security attempts to deepen
the field by considering epistemological and ontological issues, for example, 
the relationship between security and its underlying claims to knowledge and
images of reality. Theorizing security at this metatheoretical level opens up 
practical questions about identity, prospects for emancipation, change, justice,
political authority and the character of the human sciences. In this way, 
security can be analysed not as a transparent reflection of ‘national interest’
(broadly defined) or citizenship rights and duties, but as a discursive site of con-
testation. As Simon Dalby (1997) argues, critical security is ‘an essentially 
contested concept’, as well as a repository of other meanings and affiliations.
DEF1  7/31/02  10:31 PM  Page 8
Introduction
From a critical perspective, security can be regarded as a site for the transmis-
sion of values, the legitimization of claims to knowledge, and the production
and reproduction of collective identity formations. If the origins of fear and
perceptions of threat fluctuate along socio-temporal lines, then the agent and
nature of security cannot simply be linked to the state as an abstract entity, but
must be regarded as both historically variable and contextually specific (Krause
and Williams, 1997). In that respect, the determinants of security, as a theory
and as a practice, relate to cultural, religious,5 national, social, economic, and
familial and other factors. Barry Buzan (1983: 363) reinforces this point in
stating that ‘attempts to treat security as if it was confined to any single level or
any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding’. By broadening
and deepening its agenda, critical security opens a vast and more inclusive
terrain for the reposing of questions, long considered resolved in the field, about
what it means to be ‘secure’ in the Middle East.
To deepen the field, critical security borrows substantially from the sociol-
ogy of science debates in such diverse disciplines as sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, cultural studies and women’s studies. These areas have under-
gone profound transformations in recent years as a result of the influence of
New Left thinking (with residual elements of Hegelian Marxism) since the
1960s, feminist theory, constructivism, and the poststructuralist turn since the
1980s. 
Influenced to a great extent by the works of German social theorist Juergen
Habermas and Italian Marxist writer Antonio Gramsci, critical theory acknow-
ledges the political interests driving theory itself and the unity of empirical
research with human emancipation. The concept of emancipation has featured
in Kenneth Booth’s work on security in which he proposes that security be 
co-terminous with ‘the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those
physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they
would freely choose to do’ (1991: 319). While some are critical of this broad
definition of security because of its perceived lack of conceptual coherence (see
Ayoob, 1997), a more inclusive study of security would take seriously the diver-
sity of peoples and the basic, and the more elaborate, means by which humans
attain fulfilment and happiness. The orientation of critical security as a people-
centred, rather than state-centred, approach renders it necessary to focus on the
relationship between theory and political praxis. 
The constructivist school of thought in IR (Wendt, 1999) has made a sig-
nificant contribution to understanding and theorizing the security of people
rather than of states. Constructivism’s two most significant contributions to
redefining security are in its more interpretative approach, which focuses on
ideas, norms and intersubjective meanings, and also on its capacity to study
security from the perspective of the participant and his/her perceptions of threat
and danger based on his/her relationships and affiliations.
9
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Taking this interpretative focus a step further, postmodernist perspectives
in IR find evidence of the power to define security in identity construction 
and language (Madar, 2000). Radical forms of postmodernism preclude the
existence of a unified identity in any form. However, postmodern deconstruc-
tion of security ‘texts’ have been useful in demonstrating ways in which national
security writing is used to justify defence of the state through the production of
domestic consensus and repressive hierarchies at home, while perpetuating 
conflict abroad against the overseas enemy – broadly defined (Madar, 2000: 82).
Postmodern analysis in critical security studies has considered the role of
language in determining security agendas. For example, Buzan, Waever and de
Wilde analyse security in terms of a ‘speech act’ or what they call ‘securitiza-
tion’, to denote the process in which an existential threat and special measures
designed to meet that threat are created by uttering particular discourses
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). 
Influenced to a large extent by Lacan’s definition of ‘the symbolic order’
(1977) and Foucault’s notion of discourse as a ‘social practice’ (1972), critical
security studies scholars have demonstrated that security is itself a discourse, or
‘text’, that can be read and interpreted in a variety of ways. Those who wield
power and command resources to both define and combat a particular threat
have the greater capacity to implement dominant security discourses and thus
set the policy agenda. In other words, issues are ‘securitized’ by those in power,
despite the fact that threats are tentatively constituted and subject to interpreta-
tion by individuals and groups within a particular socio-historical conjunction. 
The intervening influence of language in critical security studies demon-
strates that representation in any context, or the relationship between the 
object (threat) of security and knowledge (fear) about it cannot be neutral. As
a representational practice, security has been associated with various world-
views, cultures, civilizational consciousnesses, theologies and lifeways. From a
critical perspective, these forms of representation are treated as neither mono-
lithic nor as aggregate of individual beliefs. Instead, they form an overall picture
of mediating claims over the social construction of threat and danger based on
various interpretations of indigenous laws, popular customs, social taboos,
material circumstances and external influences.
Scholars studying the developing world have contributed a significant set 
of culturally specific variables to the study of security. Security studies in these
regions demonstrate that the predominant diplomatic–strategic conception 
of security as the physical protection of nation states from external military 
threats is Eurocentric and inapplicable to many of the quandaries of insecu-
rity in developing and/or non-Western societies. Developing-world security
quandaries result from differential patterns of state formation that were 
often constructed out of colonial power. The colonial element affected elite
recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance (Ayoob, 1983–84). In
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particular, primary sources of developing-world insecurity are linked to prob-
lems of legitimacy, resulting from a lack of congruence between a state’s terri-
torial boundaries and its underlying social composition. This pattern of state
development has resulted in the protracted social and civil/ethnic conflicts of
today (Azar and Moon, 1984). 
Popular dissent in developing societies amplifies the contradictions between
regime self-preservation (regime security) and social welfare (human security).
Developing-world scholars have established the contextual and historical evi-
dence that states often constitute a greater threat to the lives and well-being of
their citizens (lack of democracy) than does the threat from external enemies
(war). Widespread poverty, underdevelopment, ecological scarcity and over-
population compound the problem of internal security in the Middle East. 
These issues are non-military in nature and cannot be contained within the
state system or resolved by military action (Azar and Moon, 1984). A focus on
context and historical specificity further develops the study of security in the
Middle East, itself a crossroads between the developed and the developing world.
As such, Middle East security exhibits characteristics from both worlds, and 
in many ways serves as a meeting point between Western and non-Western 
dialogues.
Feminist scholars have also made a significant contribution to critical secu-
rity, articulating new theoretical and practical implications of danger and pro-
tection. The field of IR as a whole has been particularly hostile to feminist
interventions. This exclusion is a result in part of the nature of its subject 
matter, i.e. war, security and the state system, spaces that have historically been
occupied almost exclusively by men. Feminist scholars have offered strong 
critiques of the prevailing orthodoxy by pointing out that the depiction of
states as rational–unitary actors seeking national security prioritizes military–
strategic issues (Sylvestor, 1994; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 1989;
Elshtain, 1987). The construct of the male citizen–warrior predominates in
accounts of state making and its protection systems in relation to the exclusion
of women from the capacity to control the conditions of their own protection.
This dichotomy of protector versus protected represents a prominent, albeit 
gendered, structure in IR that reinforces the authority of men and states over
women, who have traditionally been defined as vulnerable and in need of
protection. By establishing the male citizen–warrior as the primary model of
citizenship (via his representation of the state’s legitimate monopoly over the
means of coercion), men become the more significant foundation for analysing
strategic studies. As a result, the most pervasive forms of structural and direct
physical violence in society by men against women, i.e. domestic violence and
sexual assault/rape, are rendered invisible in dominant accounts (Roberts,
1984: 196). On account of the dominant position of the military in the Middle
Eastern region, issues of gender violence and the connection between gender
11
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and security have only recently begun to surface in public discourses, largely
because of the politics of women’s resistance and the debates about women’s
right to fight. 
As a whole, this broad terrain of critical security scholars has opened up
the field of security studies to new thinking. The context-specific mode of analy-
sis holds important implications for the theory and practice of security in the
Middle East. The contributors to this volume draw in one way or another from
the cache of tools given by critical security scholarship outlined above. In so
doing, they further the debate about critical security studies through different
case studies, methodologies and contextual specificities associated with the
Middle East.
Implications for security studies of the Middle East
While the development of critical security studies has taken place largely 
outside the Middle Eastern context, many of its concepts, theories, debates and
practices are significant for redefining security in the Middle East. This volume
employs critical security studies tools to reframe political, social, gender and
environmental issues as security issues.
First, the book considers security in relation to the political sector in terms
of processes of democratization in the region and demands of new groups for
wider and more meaningful access to political decision making. The notion of
political security would address the accountability of governments and public
liberties and freedoms, including possibilities for dissent. Leaders in the Middle
East have demonstrated clearly an inability to either discern or to accept the
desires for change taking place at the popular level and to execute appropriate
policy initiatives. By deflecting energies away from domestic issues, political
leaders have obstructed the development of a more robust civil society and 
the involvement of social movements and protest groups with the political
process.
Second, the book explores security in relation to the construction of social
groups and collective identities. The Middle East consists of a wide range of
ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological and cultural groups that have, for the
most part, been collected together in state organizations with little regard for
their differences and historical enmities. These reciprocal misgivings and tradi-
tional contrarieties have problematized attempts at co-operation in the name of
higher interests affecting all sectors and have resulted in discrimination against
minorities and political persecutions. The social dimension of security must
include issues related to cultural integration, confidence-building measures,
inter-ethnic dialogue, people-to-people contacts, religious and other collective
identifications, discourses and perceptions based on class, gender, religion, ethni-
city, nationality, and so on. 
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Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agen-
das in the Middle East. Essential natural resources such as water, food, energy
and dependence on foreign suppliers are environmental issues that affect not
only Middle Eastern national security agendas but human security agendas
worldwide. However, by contrast to concerns about macro-environmental
issues, such as global warming, prevalent in studies of ecopolitics in the West,
the Middle East is plagued by more micro-environmental concerns that 
affect people’s immediate livelihoods and chances for survival. Within this geo-
graphical unit, there are shared surface and subsurface water basins, shared
seas and bodies of water, and flora, fauna and other natural resources. Conflict
is closely related to access to clean water and its distribution. Recent develop-
ments have indicated that the age of the oil war may be supplanted by that of
the ‘war for water’, the scarcest resource in the area (Anderson, Siebert and
Wagner, 2001: 256). In addition, the Arab–Israeli conflict has brought about
environmental questions related to land confiscation, waste management, agri-
culture, deforestation and air pollution.
The areas of political, social, religious, cultural and environmental security,
are all subject to contestation, power relations and collective affiliations.
Moreover, these areas have changed dramatically since the start of the Middle
East peace process. However, they have been complicated by several factors in
the Middle East, and these need to be addressed in terms of a broad security
framework. 
To summarize, the commitment of this volume is twofold. First, the collab-
orators seek in various ways to challenge the orthodoxy of security thinking by
employing different critical security concepts in relation to the Arab–Israeli
context. It is not the purpose of this book to deny the importance of security
threats grounded in military or strategic concerns. It is neither assumed that
such security concerns should be subsumed beneath non-military facets, nor
asserted that the state is no longer an actor of significance: studies based on
those facets, as well as on the future of military security in the region, are impor-
tant for both practical and theoretical reasons. Rather, the book maintains that
non-military, non-realist, notions of security are also notable aspects of secu-
rity studies. There is a small, but growing, literature on this subject,6 but few
volumes are comprehensive in scope.
Second, the collaborators seek to broaden and deepen the definition of secu-
rity in the Middle East as a means by which to develop alternative approaches
to security that take into consideration the range of issues tackled in this
volume. The contributors come from a variety of different social, national, reli-
gious, ethnic, and racial backgrounds. The differing epistemologies and politi-
cal purposes reflected here disavow any common goal on the part of the
contributors to develop a single alternative approach to security in the Middle
East. That would be counterproductive considering the diversity of identity
13
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expressed in this project. Instead, the goal is to promote a more inclusive dia-
logue within the framework of a ‘critical project’ on the meaning and practice
of security in the Middle East. This intervention is regarded as part of an emerg-
ing and ongoing debate about security in the world in general, and in the Middle
East in particular. The Middle Eastern component provides a useful laboratory
for raising scholarly and practical issues, but also for promoting peace in Middle
Eastern security agendas in a way that includes the diversity of peoples, identi-
ties, interests and shared hopes for a better future. In that sense, this study 
is designed as a heuristic tool for furthering our theoretical understanding of
concepts of security, which can help provide more effective models of conflict
resolution.
Breakdown of chapters
The first four chapters of the book establish a theoretical context for redefining
security in the Middle East by considering a range of concepts, debates and the-
ories that have traditionally been absent from the field. This shift in analysis from
national security to human security (the security of groups and individuals)
reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with
non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest (refugees,
rebellion and revolution), economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender
inequity and radical fundamentalism. The Middle East is an excellent laboratory
in which to investigate these transitions, having acquired new significance 
in the global arena as an area of concern in itself, yet one still undergoing 
conditions of protracted conflict. 
In chapter 2, Lenore Martin provides an analytical model for redefining
national security as a theory and as a practice in the post-Cold War era. This
model defines ‘national security’ as the ability of a state to deter or counter
threats to its three components: territory; society; and regime. By way of con-
trast to realist IR theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different
set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states, where
threats emanate from internal, transnational and external sources. Martin 
proposes a set of five interacting variables with which to analyse security: 
military capability; political legitimacy; ethnic and religious tolerance; natural
resources; and economic capabilities. The explanatory power of the paradigm
derives from the integration of these variables, with particular reference to the
relationship of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. 
In chapter 3, Jonathan B. Isacoff adopts a historical constructivist per-
spective for revisiting the concept of security. The main argument is that the
character of Arab–Israeli relations can be measured in large part by the evolu-
tion of Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s, in particular,
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the competition within Israeli politics and society between the opposing doc-
trines of militarism and moderation. This foreign policy lens on the Arab–Israeli
conflict suggests that a fully consolidated peace agreement will follow only 
the waning of militarism and the waxing of moderation as the dominant Israeli
doctrine guiding both Israel’s position in the peace process and the establishing
of national and personal security within Israel.
Chapter 4, by Bassam Tibi, undertakes a dialogue between Islam and
Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and
post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood. He argues that 
political Islam, as the prominent (rejectionist) front against the official peace
process and Western influence in the region, has gained the capacity to destabi-
lize, create disorder and participate in the realm of political conflict. However,
he points to fundamental differences between Islam as a spiritual faith and
Islamism as a politicized form of religion with tendencies to neo-absolutism and
violence. This chapter explores fundamental issues related to Islamophobia and
the West, the relationship between Islam and democracy, and circumstances for
groups and parties to gain political power and effect social change through
indigenous tools and symbols. The intricate distinctions are presented between
Islam, political Islam, other forms of religious fundamentalism, and terrorism
in relation to the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Mediterranean region and the 
diaspora.
In chapters 5–8 the emphasis is on issues related to gender, environmental,
religious, political and societal security. In chapter 5 Tami Amanda Jacoby
rethinks the relationship between gender and security in the Middle East, with
a particular focus on the politics of women’s resistance in Israel. The Middle East
peace process between Israel and the Palestinians since 1991 has problematized
struggles for gender equality. First, the predominant understanding of security
at the diplomatic level has been become a matter of agreements among states,
promoting a limited cessation of hostilities backed by armed force. Second, the
focus on diplomatic negotiation not only increased the status of military leaders
but usurped the momentum of popular struggle during the occupation era and
the Palestinian uprising when women were prominent at the grassroots level.
Women have responded in two major ways to the gender boundaries underly-
ing diplomacy, national security and state building in Israel. On the one hand,
women have struggled for equal access to the right to fight in the Israeli mili-
tary. On the other, women have struggled for a negotiated settlement to the con-
flict within the context of the Israeli women’s peace movement. These divergent
roles occupied by women in the peace process era hold different implications for
an understanding of gender and national security in Israel.
Jeffrey Sosland introduces, in chapter 6, the notion of environmental secu-
rity, suggesting that security studies scholars have long objected to the inclusion
15
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of the environment in their research agenda. However, regions such as the
Arab–Israeli one suffer from seasonal drought, if not continual water crises. As
a result, distribution and discrimination are highly sensitive questions that
become viewed by the affected riparians as threats to national security. Tradi-
tional concepts such as deterrence and verification, employed in treatments 
of other security issues, fall short of providing peaceful solutions to environ-
mental insecurity. This chapter suggests that violent conflicts in the Middle East
often result from resource scarcity. It provides an empirical case study of water
scarcity between Israel and the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip prior to, and as a factor in, the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising against
Israeli occupation (intifada). Conclusions are then drawn for the present Middle
East peace process.
In chapter 7, Thomas J. Butko examines the role of political Islam in the
Middle East peace process through a case study of Hamas, the Islamic resistance
movement, in the West Bank and Gaza, one of the most significant Palestinian
forces opposed to the peace process and thus the only viable, albeit problematic,
alternative to the PLO–PNA’s hegemony over Palestinian society. This case of
Hamas is employed to demonstrate that, in examining issues of security in the
Middle East, it is important to consider the politicization of religion as a critical
discourse positioned against the state system and an important influence over
the development of national security agendas in the Middle East. Extremists 
and rejectionists on either side seek to exploit the weaknesses inherent in the
security apparatus to further their own interests. He argues that it is only by
including previously excluded groups and their constituencies, such as Islamist
movements, and considering the penetration of politics by their belief systems
that a concrete and durable peace can be established in the Middle East. 
Brent E. Sasley investigates the effects of political liberalization on security
in the Middle East. The growth of civil society in the Middle East has occurred
in tandem with underlying processes of political and economic liberalization.
These changes, examined in chapter 8, have placed increasing demands on the
state. Previously, demands for social security and political rights were either
ignored or easily placated by focusing attention on foreign policy agendas, par-
ticularly the Arab–Israeli conflict. However, and particularly since the start of
the Middle East peace process, the pressure to democratize has led governing
elites to become concerned for their own position and safety, thus turning 
their attention from external enemies toward (perceived) internal enemies. This
effect of political liberalization not only calls into question the referent object 
of security (i.e. the distinction between the security of rulers/elites, states and 
societies), but contributes to debate about threat perception, the appropriate
agent responsible for policy development vis-à-vis national security and a better
understanding of policy options that include the security and protection of the
diversity of actors in the region. 
DEF1  7/31/02  10:31 PM  Page 16
Introduction
notes
1 However, alignment with the moderate Arab states of the region, particularly in the
Persian Gulf, had been a plank of US foreign policy since the late 1940s.
2 The Palestinian intifada (literally, ‘shaking off ’) was ignited on 8 December 1987 by an
auto accident in Gaza that sparked rioting, first in Gaza and then throughout the West
Bank. For more on the Palestinian intifada, see Lockman and Benin, 1989.
3 The second intifada started in September 2000, and is still raging at the time of writing.
4 For more on the Middle East peace process see Peleg, 1998.
5 For further discussion of the role of political Islam and the state see Tibi, 1998a.
6 For an examination of various facets of national security in the Arab world, see Korany,
Noble and Brynen, 1993 and Martin, 1999. For an exploration of societal security con-
cerns within Israel see Bar-Tal, Jacobson and Klieman, 1998. 
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In a world that has recently undergone seismic change with the collapse of the Cold War and is still uncertain as to the ramifications of the New World Order, it is scholars who have become of key importance to devel-
oping theories or paradigms to comprehend changing relationships in the 
international arena. Novel concepts gain acceptance within the academic 
community as they attract contributors to their intellectual development and
proponents who urge their utility for policy makers. For the careful scholar, the
worth of any new conceptualization must be proven through testing, typically
by applying it to factual situations in defined periods, and comparing its
explanatory power against competing theories. For the prudent policy maker, the
validity of any novel construct or worldview lies in its utility for making effective
choices among competing policy options. If ultimately successful, these analy-
tical constructs will create questions and goals that develop agendas for both
policy makers and academics.
The novel paradigm proposed for conceptualizing ‘national security’ uses
an integrated approach that should prove useful for both academics and policy
makers in one of the more turbulent regions in the world, the Middle East
(Martin, 1999).1 This chapter will outline the paradigm and apply it to a pre-
liminary analysis of the national security of Israel and a nascent Palestinian
state, vis-à-vis each other.2
The concepts
What is the new paradigm, and why call it an integrated approach? At the heart
of every definition of national security is the concept of threat – and the con-
comitant three questions: what are the kinds of threats faced, what are their
sources, and what are their targets? The two general approaches to answering
those questions in the discipline of political science, or the subdiscipline of
security studies, are those of the realists (or neorealists) and the liberals (or
2
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neoliberals). For the realists, threats are predominantly military threats; their
sources are primarily external states; and their targets are the state, either at 
its boundaries, i.e. its territorial integrity, or at its core, i.e. its very existence or
sovereignty. For the liberals, the threats include military and non-military
threats, indeed ranging widely to economic, environmental and ideological
threats; their sources are external nations and transnational groups, as well as
internal groups; and their targets are not merely the State, but its inhabitants
as well.3
The problem with the realist approach to conceptualizing national security
was vividly demonstrated by the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War. None of these events had been predicted or were predictable from
the realist focus on the military balance of power and the mutual deterrence
policies of the global superpowers. The problem with the liberal theorists is that,
by avoiding the realist practice of explaining too little, they seek to explain too
much. There are too many variables, with inter-relationships too complex for
policy makers and scholars to take into account and to prioritize in order to
produce policy guidelines or powerful explanations.
Dissatisfaction with realism and liberalism led to the development of alter-
native approaches to conceptualizing national security (see Walt, 1998;
Katzenstein, 1996).4 One of these third approaches has been favoured by
scholars of developing-world international politics, who are aware of the
inadequacies of the global or Western orientation of realism and liberalism.
These include Ayoob 1995; Korany, Noble and Brynen 1993; Buzan 1991; Azar
and Moon 1988. This third approach accepts the need for military security, but
focuses on a few non-military factors that address the threats to the fragile
economies and unstable internal politics of developing nations. Thus Buzan
1991: 116–34 offered five ‘sectors’ or types of threats: military, political, societal,
economic and ecological (or environmental).5 Ayoob (1995: 8) emphasized
‘political security’, recognizing threats emanating from a range of variables.
Where the novel paradigm differs from this third approach is in its selection
of a set of components of national security that can be treated as variables and
integrated. Thus, national security is treated as a dependent variable – the result
of the interaction of a set of five integrated independent variables. Integration
is critical to deriving the explanatory power from the interactions of this limited
set of variables. It is also necessary in order to derive policy prescriptions from
an analysis of the consequences of these interactions. Without an integration
of these variables, the analyst presents merely a list of ‘factors’ or ‘aspects’ of
national security to the researcher or policy maker. This is much like giving a
chef a recipe with only a list of ingredients but without instructions on quan-
tities and how to mix them.
In creating a paradigm, one must first determine the level of analysis at
which it will operate. The choices in the field of international relations are
21
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global, regional, statal, societal and individual. The novel paradigm selects the
state, still the predominant level of analysis within the field (Carlo, 1998).6 How
then do we define the state? The state has three components: territory, society
and regime (Halliday, 1987).7 Each of these components of the state can be the
target of threats. National security, therefore, as a dependent variable, repre-
sents a continuum. At one extreme, a wholly insecure state faces threats to the
continuing existence of its territory, society and regime – for example, Lebanon
during the civil war in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, or Kuwait facing Iraqi
attack in August 1990. At the other extreme, a more secure state has very few
threats or it has the capability to deter most such threats – some would give the
United States as the example; but, in any event, there are no such secure states
in the Middle East today.
What, then, are the critical variables that enable a state to deter threats to
its territory, society and regime, i.e. provide it with a greater degree of national
security? Clearly a state needs military capabilities. It also needs four other types
of capability: political legitimacy; ethnic and religious tolerance; economic
capabilities; and available essential natural resources.
Why not include other variables discussed in the liberal literature, such 
as population growth rates, population migrations, environmental hazards, 
or even diffusion of knowledge and technology (Holsti, 1995: 43)? Certainly 
these variables contribute to the pressures on regimes and societies, and the 
territories they occupy. However much they affect human security, they are not
independent variables that directly affect the national security of the state in the
same way as the five variables selected for the paradigm.
On the other hand, there may be some regional bias in the selection of the
five variables. States in other regions of the globe may not face threats to the
same degree within certain variables, such as political legitimacy or economic
capabilities in the established democracies in Europe. Only regional and ulti-
mately global testing of the paradigm will provide a real measure of the value
of the selected variables. In the meantime, their use at least for the Middle East
region can be tested. What is the utility of the paradigm, accordingly, for secu-
rity relations between Israel and a Palestinian state?
Applying the paradigm in the context of Israel and a Palestinian state
Adopting the state as the level of analysis creates a problem for exploring 
the national security of the Palestinian entity, which at time of writing has 
not achieved de jure recognition as a state. Still, the nascent Palestinian state,
represented by the Palestinian Authority (PA), is clearly an international 
actor; however, the PA’s status is uncertain in the face of the collapse of the peace
process.8 The peace process reached a crisis in the latter part of 2000 and 
the winter of early 2001 when Palestinians and Israelis were unable to resolve
DEF2  7/31/02  10:32 PM  Page 22
Israel and a Palestinian state
final status issues, and the second intifada broke out.9 If the peace process were
to collapse completely, without likelihood of revival, it may still be possible to
refer to a Palestinian state, even if there were no PA. However, it would be diffi-
cult to predict the territorial reach of that state. Similarly, it would be difficult 
to predict the nature of the regime that might emerge as a result of a final 
collapse of the peace process. Currently, the PA is governed by the autocratic
regime of Yasir Arafat with the assistance of the ruling elite within his 
dominant party, Fatah, and within the larger Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) (Rubin, 1999: 4–26; Robinson, 1997a: 177–88). However, Arafat is over
70 and at times ailing. He has not formally designated a successor. And,
although the likely contenders for power after Arafat are within the ruling elite
of Fatah and the executive committee of the PLO, there is no assurance that one
of the contenders, or a group of the elite, will come to power or will succeed in
continuing in power in the face of strong challenges from outside the ruling
elite.10
On the other hand, it is still reasonable to assume that at some point in time
a Palestinian state will emerge within the territorial boundaries of the West
Bank and Gaza. For the national security analyst, this hypothetical Palestinian
state raises the issue as to how it will preserve its own security, and what will be
the impact of a Palestinian state on Israeli national security?11
The paradigm will be used to generate answers to those national security
policy issues. First, however, let us explore how conceptualizing the national
security of a proto-Palestinian state as well as Israel, vis-à-vis each other, can be
used to demonstrate the utility of the variables integrated with the paradigm.
The five variables
Political legitimacy
Political legitimacy is defined herein as the willingness of the society to obey the
authority of its regime. Regimes seek to inculcate legitimacy in a number of
ways, most commonly by associating the regime with the state and inculcating
loyalty to the state with the symbols of patriotism and nationalism, such as flags,
anthems and political myths.12 To maintain their legitimacy, all regimes must
be viewed by the society as providing effective government, and, in the case of
revolutionary regimes, as achieving the goals of social change. For example, a
revolutionary regime would be expected to liberate its society from the vestiges
of colonial or pre-revolutionary social oppression. There are multiple Middle
Eastern examples here, from the revolutionary Arab nationalist regimes that
replaced monarchies with autocracies in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, to the Khomeini
regime that installed a theocracy in Iran, and to the Atatürk regime that
installed democracy, albeit of a uniquely praetorian model, in Turkey.
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If the society comes to view the regime as delivering ineffectual or corrupt
government, or, as might be the case with revolutionary regimes, failing to
achieve declared goals, the regime will face serious challenges from vocal critics
and political rivals offering alternative theories of political legitimacy. To counter
such risks, the regime may adopt even more authoritarian measures to suppress
dissent and engage in more rampant corruption to sustain loyalty among its
supporters and co-opt its opponents. Ultimately, without sufficient political legit-
imacy, regimes may collapse, revolutions occur, and states succumb to outside
conquest.
a palestinian state
The Arafat regime, after the PLO’s return from Tunis and the establishing of the
PA after the Oslo Accords in 1993, faces substantial challenges to its political
legitimacy. It has generated considerable criticism for ineffectual and corrupt
government (see Robinson, 1997).13 The regime often seeks to defend itself for
its inadequacies by laying blame on Israel for imposing restrictive economic
measures and demanding the apprehension of terrorists. On the other hand, the
regime depends for much of its income on foreign subsidies, some of which may
be siphoned into private pockets; and it has organized its delivery of govern-
mental services to maximize patronage and in ways that foster corruption.
These include establishing governmental monopolies on basic commodities and
requiring multiple licenses for goods and services, all of which lend themselves
to exploitation for personal gain.
Furthermore, as the leadership of a revolutionary movement, the Arafat
regime was expected through the peace process to fulfil the aspirations of the
Palestinians for liberation from Israeli occupation and full sovereignty for a
Palestinian state over all of the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza. However, during
the final status negotiations, the various compromises that would have been
required to conclude peace looked to many Palestinians as if those goals would
be thwarted (Shikaki, 1998). These compromises included the need to satisfy
the Israelis’ concerns for strategic access through the West Bank and Gaza
through Israeli-controlled routes and the preservation of large swathes of Israeli
settlements that would have undermined the full sovereignty of a Palestinian
state. Other apparently intractable issues included the right of return for
Palestinian refugees and the sharing of sovereignty over the holy places in
Jerusalem. Palestinian opposition to the continuation of the peace process
intensified, and Arafat may have held back from full participation in the process
after January 2001 in order to shore up the legitimacy of the regime in the face
of such opposition (Sayigh, 2001: 47–60).14
There are four principal sources of opposition to the Arafat regime that 
can take advantage of its ineptitude and corruption, or its failure to achieve
Palestinian aspirations to build support within Palestinian society, and so 
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challenge its political legitimacy. One consists of factions inside of Fatah and the
PLO that have rejected the peace process. Within Fatah these range from senior,
old-line, officials, such as Faruq Qaddumi, who refuse to return to the West Bank
and Gaza while any areas remain under Israeli occupancy, to more militant
armed groups which seek to fill the vacuum of leadership in providing local
security or attacking Israel (Robinson, 2000; Roy, 2001).15 Outside of Fatah, but
within the PLO, the rejectionists include the leftist nationalist opposition 
consisting predominantly of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (Shikaki,
1998: 30–1).
A second source of opposition to the regime consists of radical Islamists,
primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which also challenge its secularism and offer
a competing set of legitimacy principles based upon Islamic precepts.16 A third
source of opposition to the Arafat regime emanates from the so-called ‘insiders’:
Palestinians who participated in the first intifada of 1987–93 before the return
of the PLO from Tunis. Insiders who have not been co-opted by the regime resent
its favouring the returnees from Tunis (see Robinson, 1997a: 19–37, 94–131,
174–88). Finally, there are challenges from those demanding increased demo-
cratization – Western educated or influenced elites (see Brown, 2000: 25–43).17
israel
The breakdown of the peace process and the second intifada has had a similar
impact on challenges to the Israeli regime. Although Israel has a more en-
trenched democracy than the Palestinian state, the regime has been vulnerable
to violent incidents initiated by political extremists opposed to the peace process.
These are exemplified by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995
and ongoing settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Still, the divisions among Jews within Israeli society over the peace process 
that have led to a quick succession of coalition governments have not created
fundamental opposition to the democratic regime itself.
On the other hand a potential source of opposition to the regime arises from
the increased politicization of Israel’s Palestinian population, almost 20 per cent
of its total population.18 The political leadership within this population has been
fragmented among the Israeli Communist Party, Arab nationalists, Islamists and
others, and displays varying degrees of acceptance of the political legitimacy of
a democratic regime that discriminates against Arabs in what is self-defined as
the Jewish State (Rouhana, 1997: 94–107; see Stendel, 1996: 80–147). There
have been occasional violent incidents from major Israeli Palestinian protests
against governmental activities, such as in the general strike opposing land
expropriations on Land Day in 1976 and demonstrations on subsequent 
anniversaries, or the widespread demonstrations in support of the second
intifada.19 The Israeli use of bullets to suppress the Palestinians’ October 2000
25
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demonstrations symbolized for the Israeli Palestinians their second-class status
within Israel and confirmed that the regime takes the same view of them as it
does of Palestinians across the so-called Green Line. As this minority population
grows it is likely to become increasingly dissatisfied with its second-class
citizenship, in contrast to the full rights which they expect to be afforded to
Palestinians in the Palestinian state. On the other hand, it is not clear what
protection for personal rights the nascent Palestinian State will develop. Nor is 
it clear that the PA has any interest in encouraging disaffection of Israeli
Palestinians with the Israeli regime (Amara, 2000).20 So the Palestinian
minority within Israel could become alienated from both political communities.
Ethnic and religious tolerance
National security does not require ethnic and religious homogeneity or cohe-
siveness. What it does require is that differentiated ethnic and religious groups
avoid internecine conflict and practise tolerance of each other’s rights to exist
and flourish. Yet ethnic and religious tolerance is a somewhat scarce commo-
dity in the Middle East. In addition to the religious intolerance encountered by
Jews in most Arab countries, there are numerous examples throughout the
region of intolerance, such as that for (Christian) Copts in Egypt, (Shiite) Alevis
in Turkey, Shiites in Saudi Arabia, and Bahais in Iran; and there is considerable
ethnic intolerance for Kurds in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Iran, Syria and
Turkey, as well as for Turcomen in Iraq. Without tolerance there will be ethnic
and/or religious dissension, and threats generally to the security of the state
from civil strife, demands for secession, or external subversion or intervention –
as occurred with the Kurdish crises in Iraq and Turkey.
a palestinian state
In contrast to a number of Middle Eastern states that have serious ethnic 
divisions, the Palestinian state is blessed with a relatively homogeneous ethnic,
i.e. Arab, population. Nonetheless, the Palestinian political community does
encounter challenges to its mainly secular culture from the more Islamist
groups. Hamas, in particular, has sought to Islamize Palestinian society, offer-
ing welfare and educational programmes and other communal services, thus
competing with welfare programmes offered (or not) by the PA. Hamas receives
support for its programmes from within the Palestinian population as well as
from Islamic regimes outside of the State. Iran is a potential source of support,
as is its client Hezbollah in Lebanon, and as also are the more radical religious
groups and individuals in the Gulf.
There has been, as a result, a complex history in the co-operative and 
competitive co-existence of the Arafat regime and Hamas (Mishal and Sela,
2000: 3; Rubin, 1999: 114–37; Robinson, 1997a: 149–73). Consequently,
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there is considerable ambivalence over the degree of tolerance for Hamas that
the Arafat regime will permit. During the active first years of the peace process,
the risk of radicalism from Hamas may have made Israel more willing to nego-
tiate with the Arafat regime. Thus, before the second intifada, the regime was
prepared to co-operate with Israeli authorities to thwart Hamas terrorist attacks
in Israel.21 However, with the degeneration of the peace process, Hamas, as well
as Islamic Jihad, have been freer to engage in suicide bombings and other ter-
rorist attacks within Israel. These attacks have stimulated Israeli retaliation that
has sought to assassinate the most militant leadership of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad. As much as the Arafat regime might benefit from Israel’s elimination of
the more militant elements of the Islamic opposition, there is still the risk that
suicide bombers and their assassinated leaders would become religious martyrs
and their invocation of violent means to liberate Palestinians from Israeli occu-
pation would generate greater popularity for Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the
Palestinian political community. The call by a leading Fatah official for inclusion
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in a unity government lends some support for the
reality of this risk.22
israel
Although there are social tensions between Sephardic Jews of primarily North
African and Middle Eastern heritage and Ashkenazi Jews of primarily European
heritage, as well as between secular Jews and the Orthodox and Ultra Orthodox,
none of them has erupted into riots and terrorist activities of a kind that might
irreparably rend the social fabric of the Israeli political community. Nonethe-
less, there is potential social rupture from the political controversy over ‘who 
is a Jew’? This has adverse social consequences for ‘non-Jews’, such as non-
recognition of marriages. The more the regime favours the Orthodox Jewish 
precepts (which limit the definition to those born of a Jewish mother), the 
more it will alienate sectors of society, including large numbers of Russian
immigrants (Lustick, 1999: 417–33).23
On the other hand, Israel does face ethnic and religious dissension from 
the over one million or so Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. They may have
political rights within Israel, but they also suffer from the indignities of official
discrimination in the provision of social services, the promotion of economic
development, and from other laws that favour the Jews in the officially Jewish
State (Rouhana, 1998: 277–96). During the active years of the peace process,
the Barak government had been willing to restore greater equality of rights for
the Palestinian population by returning some expropriated land, allowing legal
residency in East Jerusalem to be maintained by absentee Palestinians, propos-
ing to establish new Arab towns, and to fund improvements to the infrastructure
of Palestinian areas within Israel.24 However, with the degeneration of the peace
process, the tough response to Israeli Palestinians’ demonstration of support 
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for the second intifada, Israeli rage at terrorist bombings, the discrimination
experienced by Israeli Palestinians remains. Over the long term, the superior
Palestinian birth rate,25 and the growing political consciousness of the Palesti-
nian population harbingers the likelihood of increasing demands for social
equality, and a potential constitutional crisis for an Israeli society that struggles
to balance its egalitarian democratic principles with a predominantly Jewish
identity.
Economic capabilities
It is almost a truism that states need economic capabilities to preserve their 
societies and, by implication, their regimes, in addition to supporting a defence
budget to maintain military capabilities. Without the economic wherewithal 
to provide for the welfare of its society, the populace would deny its rulers 
their political legitimacy. As already noted, if the regime lags in providing 
social welfare benefits, it provides opportunities for potential dissidents to fill 
the vacuum and garner support. Little wonder, therefore, that in the Middle 
East states with weak and developing economies radical Islamic groups can
flourish.
a palestinian state
The Palestinian economy ranks among the poorer economies of the developing
world, being even below the average for the Middle East and North Africa (Roy,
2001: 15).26 The basic problem for the Palestinian state has been its dependence
on the Israeli economy – particularly for employment and the income that
employment in Israel generated, but also for trans-shipment of any exports.27
Because of Israeli security measures, Palestinian exports are more costly and 
so less competitive.28 The weak economy also makes the West Bank and Gaza
unattractive to foreign investment and highly dependent on foreign subsidies.
Domestic banks prefer to invest outside of the West Bank and Gaza; enterprises
within those areas are relatively small, and the labour force has not been trained
for an industrializing economy. Moreover, tax collection is low and birth rates
are high (Kershner, 1999: 28–9).29 As a result the PA has depended on customs
duties and sales taxes that the Israelis collect from goods passing through Israeli
ports and borders.30 The PA also depends heavily on subsidies from foreign
donors.31 Demand for welfare services increases with the population, and may
potentially increase further if large numbers of refugees return as a result of
final status agreements.
By all indications, the breakdown in the peace process and Israel’s harsh
economic responses to the second intifada, that included denying tax transfers
and shutting down the points of entry into Israel for Palestinian labour and
goods, have almost bankrupted the PA.32 As a result, the PA has become even
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more dependent on outside subsidies from the Arab world, particularly the Gulf
Co-operation Council states and the European Community.33
israel
The Israeli economy stands in contrast as one of the strongest in the region.34
During the peace process it benefited to some degree from Palestinian labour and
the small Palestinian market. With the breakdown of the peace process, Israel
has turned to other sources for manual and low-cost labour. The second intifada
severely affected the tourism sector of the Israeli economy.35 Generally, the
Israeli economy relies on trade and investment with and from – and because of
its special relationship to – the US and the EU.36 Although during the peace
process there were hopes that its successful conclusion would stimulate Israeli
trade relations with a number of Arab states, the crisis in the peace process 
ruptured these relations.37
Availability of essential natural resources
Critical to a state’s economic capabilities is the availability of essential natural
resources such as water and energy. Territorial conflicts sometimes erupt
because of a state’s felt need to secure its supply of one or more essential
resources. Dependence on foreign suppliers of these resources renders a state
vulnerable to threats of embargo or cut-off by the supplier or by third parties.
The Middle East generally has much oil and little water. But the distribution 
of these resources is uneven, heightening the security concerns of those 
states which lack them. This is certainly the case with respect to Israel and a
Palestinian state. Israel and the West Bank and Gaza share three natural sources
of water: the mountain aquifer; the coastal aquifer; and the Jordan Valley basin.
The mountain aquifer is recharged mainly by rainfall in the West Bank and flows
naturally into three basins. Two of the flows go west and north-east into Israel,
and the third goes east into the West Bank (Assaf, al Khatib, Kally and Shuval,
1993: 5). The Gaza aquifer is a continuation of Israel’s coastal aquifer.38 Because
of serious over-pumping in Gaza, the wells have become overly salinated. The
water from the Jordan River basin emanates from Lebanon and Syria and flows
into Jordan and Israel as well as into the Jordan Valley in the West Bank.
a palestinian state
By comparison with most Middle Eastern states, a Palestinian state is the least
endowed. It lacks most of its essential natural resources. Because Israel controls
two of the three sources of water for a Palestinian state and the flow of the third
(the Jordan River) until it reaches the West Bank, the Palestinians have charged
Israel with unfair consumption or diversion of this precious resource.39 For
example, the Israelis use a larger proportion of the available water from the
29
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mountain aquifer, including for Israeli settlements on the West Bank, than does
the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza (Isaac, 2000: 20; Shuval,
1999: 2B).40
From the Palestinian perspective, the rain water that falls on the mountain
aquifer in the West Bank is their water, is critical for basic human needs, and
should be under their control. The Israelis point out that much of this water
from the mountain aquifer flows naturally into Israel and is tapped from the 300
or so wells west of the Green Line (demarcating the 1967 boundaries of Israel)
which date back in many instances some eighty years. Yet, after 1967, Israel
dug new wells for its settler population on the West Bank, while restricting 
the amount of water that the Palestinian population could pump (Shuval, 2000:
34 and 39). These claims echo the international legal disputes between up-
stream and downstream riparians over ‘historic rights’ and ‘prevention of sig-
nificant damage’ – the position taken by the Israelis – and claims of ‘appreciable
damage’ from disproportionate use by the other side – the position taken by the
Palestinians.41
The Oslo II Accord established a joint commission to determine a more equi-
table allocation of the shared water, but the commission still has much work to
do to alleviate water shortages in the West Bank and Gaza (Rouyer, 1999).42
Part of the problem for the Palestinians remains their inefficient and localized
system for accessing and delivery of water, particularly for irrigation uses
(Trottier, 1999: 99–134). Severe droughts and the second intifada have exacer-
bated water shortages, due to closures that interfere with the transport of water
by trucks, and also as a result of the uncontrolled drilling of private wells and
theft of water from major pipelines.43 Generally, for a Palestinian state to solve
the problem of its dependence on Israeli controlled water, it needs to negotiate
sharing arrangements for the West Bank and to build desalination plants for
Gaza, a substantial investment and strain on its economy. Furthermore, the
quality of much of the water for a Palestinian state has been compromised
through salination and pollution by chemical fertilizers, the treatment of which
needs to be negotiated with Israel (Isaac, 2000: 18 and 29–30).
With respect to energy resources, a Palestinian state may be only slightly
more fortunate, as there have been discoveries of natural gas off the Gaza
coast.44 On the other hand, Israeli control of coastal waters and the break-
down of the peace process have made it impossible for the PA to exploit these
discoveries.
israel
Approximately 25 per cent of Israel’s water comes from the mountain aquifer;
33 per cent comes from the Jordan River basin; and 37 per cent from the coastal
aquifer (Shuval, 1999: 3B). During the peace process, Jordan River water
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became part of the complex negotiations with Syria (Omstead, Makovsky and
Stroumsa, 2000: 32; Sher, 2000: 34). To conserve agricultural water, Israeli
authorities have been encouraging investment in recirculation plants, and some
advocate continued reduction of Israeli agriculture as well as its water sub-
sidies.45 Israel’s economy can also provide the investment in desalination plants
required for its population and for industrial growth.46 Israel has also been 
negotiating with Turkey for the purchase of water from the Manavgat, which
may be realized if the importation of water proves cheaper than the costs of
desalination.47
With respect to its energy resources, Israel depends generally on imported
gas and oil from global sources. One of these is Egypt, with which Israel con-
cluded a ten-year $3 billion natural gas deal early in 2001.48 As noted above
with respect to a Palestinian state, there have been discoveries of natural gas 
off the Gaza coast. Israel could proceed to develop them in the absence of peace
with a Palestinian state. During the first years of the peace process, there was
speculation that, if it succeeded, Israel may be able to import energy from Middle
East suppliers; however, the crisis in the peace process and the second intifada
have dashed such hopes.
Military capabilities
A state’s military capabilities provide a direct measure of its ability to withstand
and deter military threats from its external enemies as well as threats from
groups within the state seeking a violent overthrow of its government, regime
and/or social elites (as in a revolution). There are also indirect measures of a
state’s military capabilities. These include the somewhat intangible deter-
mination of its society to withstand violent threats. Another measure is the 
capability of a state to form alliances and the willingness of its allies to provide
deterrence or come to its defence. Ideological conflict, for example, restricts
potential alliance partnerships. Finally, there may be a willingness of a state to
limit its own tangible military capabilities, or to restrain an arms race, by engag-
ing in arms control regimes.
a palestinian state
During the peace process many assumed that a Palestinian state would have 
no armed forces and only a limited internal security force. Indeed the only
serious military threat facing a Palestinian state would be from re-occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. Even if there were remote threats from 
surrounding Arab states, Israel has a shared interest in deterring them. Not-
withstanding limitations on an internal security force, there are reports that the
General Security Service (GSS) has exceeded these limitations, and most of its
31
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components do not engage in straight police work. These various components
act against opponents to the regime, and oversee border security, as well as 
providing personal protection to Yasir Arafat.49 During the second intifada, they
also engaged in armed clashes with Israeli forces. Before the breakdown of the
peace process in 2000–1 there was much speculation concerning widespread
importation of mainly small arms weaponry into the West Bank and Gaza, and
these suspicions increased with the outbreak of the second intifada.50 It is also
possible that the Palestinian activists of the second intifada will gain some tan-
gible support from other militant opponents of Israel, such as Hezbollah.51
israel
Israel maintains, on multiple fronts, a multi-purpose military force to deter and
defend against military threats from both conventional weapons and weapons
of mass destruction. Israel depends upon its alliance with the US for defence
budget assistance as well as strategic support in meeting these deterrence 
and defence goals. In the 1990s Israel has entered into military co-operation
agreements with Turkey to enhance its strategic capabilities in the Middle 
East.
One of Israel’s key strategic resources is its well-provisioned army of con-
scripts that will stave off a conventional attack long enough to allow the mobi-
lization of reserves to counter the enemy force. To what extent do even lightly
armed forces of a Palestinian state have the capability to interfere with that
mobilization and undermine that strategy? Part of the reluctance of the Israelis
to concede full sovereignty over all of the West Bank and Gaza has turned on a
hard-line concern that this could prove to be a problem. Hence the hard-liners
assert the need to maintain certain strategically located Israeli settlements on
the West Bank that would function as guardians of mobilization routes.
Another, longer-term, possibility that would affect Israeli military capabi-
lities would be reduction of the risks of regional conflict by tacit arms control
regimes or explicit agreements on the limitation of weapons, particularly wea-
pons of mass destruction. On the other hand, there are difficult questions that
need to be addressed before such a possibility would become evident (Evron,
1999).52 These include the role of weapons of mass destruction in limiting war
or increasing the dangers of war, and how verification of reductions in such
weapons would be conducted (e.g. international or mutual verification).
Integration of the national security variables
The ways in which the five variables in the national security paradigm inte-
grate may be illustrated by assessing the extent of the national security of a
Palestinian state and of Israel, and considering the policy implications that arise
from their security relations.
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Assessing the security of a Palestinian state and Israel
a palestinian state
How much national security would a Palestinian state have and how will this
affect its relations with Israel? On all dimensions of the national security para-
digm, a Palestinian state would appear to be tremendously insecure. There are
multiple challenges to the political legitimacy of the autocratic regime of Yasir
Arafat. These range from general claims of ineptitude and corruption to specific
challenges from rejectionists of the Oslo Accords within Fatah and the PLO, as
well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad who reject peace with Israel and decry the 
secularism of the regime. Challenges also arise from ‘insider’ resentment of PLO
favouritism for the Tunis ‘outsiders’ and from democratic elite opposition to the
authoritarianism of the regime. The more that the Islamist groups gain in pop-
ularity, particularly by supplying social welfare and educational programmes
which the regime is incapable of providing, the greater will be the challenge to
the society’s tolerance for religion, in the sense of respect for flexible interpreta-
tion of Islamic doctrine, respect for secularism, and nondiscrimination against
non-Moslems. Palestinian economic capabilities are feeble, which would leave 
the state dependent on foreign support and on Israeli economic co-operation
that can be handicapped by Israel’s security measures. This economic insecu-
rity contributes to the inefficiency and corruption of the regime, giving all 
its opponents further opportunities to undermine its political legitimacy, and
extending its Islamic opponents’ opportunities to gain public support for a more
religious polity. Furthermore, the lack of water and, to a lesser extent, of energy
resources, both essential natural resources, would increase the economic burdens
of a Palestinian state. In particular, a Palestinian state would be highly depen-
dent on Israel’s willingness to share control over water sources. And the 
feeble economic capacity of a Palestinian state would render solutions to its
water dependence, such as desalination plants, unaffordable. The inadequacy of
Palestinian water supplies will also inhibit development of its economic capac-
ity through agricultural and industrial growth and will make the regime even
more vulnerable to challenges to its political legitimacy as demands for water
increase with population growth. A Palestinian state would have very limited
military capabilities. Its feeble economy and its security relations with Israel
hamper its ability to improve these capabilities or even to impede the distribu-
tion of arms to potential opponents of the regime.
In sum, a Palestinian state will be highly vulnerable to security breakdowns
that involve civil strife. These would include violent succession struggles as
opponents to the regime take advantage of its lack of political legitimacy to
promote competing principles of legitimation in their struggle for power. Civil
strife might also erupt as the regime seeks to repress challenges from more
popular Islamic militants or through civil disobedience arising from economic
33
DEF2  7/31/02  10:32 PM  Page 33
Lenore G. Martin
34
deprivations, including lack of water. The military capabilities of such a weak
Palestinian state may be inadequate to effect the quick restoration of civil 
order.
israel
Even though Israel enjoys a far higher degree of national security than would
a Palestinian state, in this Israeli–Palestinian context it also experiences an
interactive set of security concerns that arise from the large group of Palestinian
citizens within Israel and a Palestinian state across most of its borders. If dis-
crimination against Palestinian-Israelis continues, this lack of ethnic tolerance
will increase their dissatisfaction and encourage more extreme responses, in-
cluding challenges to the political legitimacy of the regime as the proponent of
the Jewish State. In its most extreme form, such dissension would also create a
potential diversion of Israeli military capabilities. This potential diversion would
become even more serious for Israeli security if it occurs at the same time as 
military conflict in the wider Middle East. Sharing its scant water supplies, an
essential natural resource, with a Palestinian state increases the cost of alterna-
tive water sources, such as desalination or imports from Turkey, and will have
an impact upon Israel’s economic capabilities.
In reality, Israel possesses a substantial extent of national security, at least
when considered in terms of its relations with a Palestinian state that Israel will
clearly dominate by demanding the latter’s demilitarization, controlling much
of its water supplies and being able to impact upon its economy.
Policy implications
Generally, the policy implications of the integrated national security paradigm
for any state require decision makers to integrate their domestic and foreign 
policies, as well as their defence policies. Devising national security policy that
concentrates on military defence does not necessarily optimize the national
security of a state (Martin, 2000). What, then, are the policy implications for
the regime of a very weak Palestinian state that is vulnerable to social and politi-
cal breakdowns, and for the regime of a dominant Israel in relation to such a
weak state?
A Palestinian state
Even after the establishment of a Palestinian state, as posited in this paper, 
its regime is likely to face challenges from political segments that adamantly
reject the peace and propose more militant relations with Israel. The regime 
will therefore need to shore up its political legitimacy, at least among the 
non-rejectionist segments of Palestinian society. To do so, it would need to
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operate in less authoritarian ways, constrain corruption and increase regime
effectiveness. By gaining more popular support, the regime could bid for better
relations with its dominant neighbour without becoming vulnerable to chal-
lenges to its political legitimacy from rejectionist opponents. Improved relations
would increase the state’s economic capabilities and essential natural resources,
particularly water, hence reinforcing the effectiveness of the regime and feeding
back to bolster its political legitimacy. If the regime is incapable of ruling hon-
estly and effectively, the state will be destined to suffer civil strife and potential
collapse.
Israel
The prospect of civil strife and the collapse of a Palestinian state might, of
course, be appealing to Israeli hard-line rejectionists of peace. On the other
hand, that would be a highly shortsighted policy position, at least from the 
perspective of integrated national security for Israel. In its security relations
with a Palestinian state, Israel will hardly benefit from handicapping the
Palestinian economy, restricting its water supplies, or generally undermining
the legitimacy of its regime. The consequences of the collapse of a Palestinian
state include vulnerability to direct or indirect intervention by other Arab states,
including those hostile to Israel, and the risk of a rejectionist regime being
installed in the Palestinian state, be it a coalition of rejectionists or one domi-
nated by Islamic militants. A rejectionist Palestinian regime might trigger
renewed demands in Israel, particularly by its own hard-liners, for re-occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza, or stimulate anti-Israeli disaffection among
Israel’s Palestinian population. In either situation, the diversion of military
capabilities and the social disruption within Israel would undermine Israel’s
own national security.
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1 The contributions in Martin, 1999 (New Frontiers in Middle East Security) of many noted
Middle East scholars illustrate the utility of each of the five variables used in the paradigm.
More rigorous testing remains to be done.
2 This is the elaboration of an analysis presented by Martin as ‘A Preliminary Approach to
a Framework for Security for Israel and a Palestinian State’ (unpublished paper), 15 April
2000, Harvard University Middle East Seminar. The paradigm has also been applied in
an analysis of Turkish national security in the context of the Middle East. See Martin,
2000, and also Martin, (forthcoming).
3 For the most prominent advocates of the realist/neorealist and the liberal/neoliberal
approaches, see Kegley, 1995.
4 Walt, 1998: 38, 40–1 discusses a third approach called ‘constructivist’ that analyzes 
the environment of international politics in which cultures and identity shape the 
development of national interests and international relationships. A limitation of the 
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constructivist approach is that, by focusing on ideas, it is unable to predict future ideas
that may develop and shape policies and relationships.
5 In a later formulation, Buzan et al., 1998 call the fifth sector ‘environmental’.
6 There are international actors other than states, the most well-recognized of which 
are ‘transnational actors’ such as multinational corporations, non-governmental orga-
nizations, multilateral institutions, and organized crime. However, it is still the state that
is represented in international institutions and remains the predominant actor in the
international arena.
7 This definition follows the international relations tradition, as opposed to the sociologi-
cal tradition that refers to the ‘state’ as the governing institution in society.
8 Uncertainty arises because the juridical legitimacy of the PA under the Oslo Accords 
was scheduled to expire in May 1999. If the authority of the PA were challenged inter-
nationally as a result of the collapse of the peace process, the Palestinians would most
likely activate the self-declaration of statehood made by the Palestinian National Council
in 1988. See Legrain, 1999: 6.
9 For the breakdown of peace negotiations by 2001 see Sontag, 2001; Malley and Agha,
2001.
10 See Legrain, 1999: 9–15; also Robinson, 2000: 77–90; Martin, 2002: 1–13.
11 A Palestinian state would also have an impact upon other states in the region, but this
inquiry has been limited to the Palestinian–Israeli relationship.
12 For a Middle Eastern example of political myth making, in the form of a rewriting of
history, see Al-Rasheed, 1999: 25–46.
13 One publicly highlighted articulation of such criticism appeared in the manifesto in
November 1999 complaining of systematic corruption in the PA by twenty politicians
and academics and stimulating an abusive reaction from the regime’s security forces. 
See the Mideast Mirror, 29 November and 2 December 1999; The Jerusalem Report, 31
January 2000.
14 See also the letter of 13 January 2001 to Arafat from the National and Islamic 
Forces leading the second intifada, available online: http://www.jmcc.org/new/01/
factionlet.htm
15 See Robinson, 2000: 79, referring to Qaddumi and other Fatah rejectionists; New York
Times (hereafter NYT) 7 July 2001, A4, referring to armed groups of Fatah members,
such as the Popular Resistance Committees; Financial Times (hereafter FT), 8 February
2001, describing the local anarchy and referring to Martyrs of al-Aqsa targeting PA 
officials suspected of corruption; and Roy, 2001: 17 referring to other Fatah militias,
sometimes acting through the National and Islamic Forces that spearhead the second
intifada.
16 See the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18 August 1988; Mishal and Sela,
2000.
17 Brown describes the frustrated efforts of this elite to write democratic principles into the
new constitution for the PA.
18 Precise demographic statistics are difficult to obtain. Most observers consider the Israeli
Arab population to be at least 1 million. See NYT, 26 January 2001, 1, referring to Israeli
Arabs as 18 per cent of a population of 6 million; Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics
projects an increase in the Arab population from 1 million (in 2000) to 1.4 million 
in 2005 out of a total Israeli population that may be 6.8–7 million, i.e. 20–20.6 per 
cent. Available online: http://www.cbs.gov.il/mifkad/popul00_051_e.htm (accessed 19
August 2001).
19 Six Arab Israelis were killed on Land Day in 1976 (Rouhana 1997: 100); and thirteen
were killed in the October 2000 incident (NYT, 26 January 2001, 1).
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20 See Internet version at http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/index.html
21 NYT, 27 September 2000, 10.
22 FT, 7 August 2001, 3; NYT, 12 August 2001, 8.
23 The criteria for immigration from the former Soviet Union into Israel under the Law of
Return have enabled a large number of traditionally non-Jewish immigrants to settle in
Israel, which, to some, has diluted the concept of the Jewish State.
24 FT, 11 April 2000, 8; NYT, 7 April 2000, 1. The Israeli High Court has delegitimized the
exclusion of Arab residents from Jewish communities built on state land (FT, 7 November
2000, 9).
25 Estimates of comparative birth rates in 1998 were: Palestinians, 4.76 per cent; Jews, 2.98
per cent. Central Bureau of Statistic, Israel in Figures 1999, 8.
26 In 1999, the figures for annual per capita GNP were $1,600 for the West Bank and Gaza,
$2,000 for Middle East and North Africa (West Bank and Gaza at a Glance, 22 September
1999). One estimate for the spring of 2001 (during the second intifada) put Palestinian
per capita income as $1,060. A report of the United Nations special co-ordinator in the
occupied territories for the end of 2000 described over one-third of Palestinians as living
below the poverty line and claimed unemployment to be at 28 per cent (FT, 17 August
2001, 3).
27 Before the second intifada some 110,000 Palestinians worked in Israel, 60,000 of whom
were legally registered, constituting 25 per cent of the Palestinian workforce (Israel Line,
23 December 1999). Because of the security measures by Israel, and from fear of being
labelled as an Israeli collaborator, very few permits were given out or accepted after the
second intifada (FT, 17 August 2001, 3).
28 In the first half of 2001, principally because of the second intifada, exports from the West
Bank and Gaza shrank from over $500 million in 2000 to practically none (FT, 22 June
2001, 7).
29 The population growth has been estimated as increasing from 3 million to 7.5 million in
25 years.
30 An estimated 60 per cent of the PA budget for 2000 ($600 million) derived from taxes
and duties collected by Israel (NYT, 6 December 2000).
31 Some $4.1 billion of foreign donor support was pledged up to 1999, $2.5 billion of which
had been spent by the end of 1998; and another $3.3 billion was pledged for the period
1999–2004 (Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, ‘Strengthening Palestinian
Public Institutions’ 1999). The European Union provided more than $1.5 billion to the
PA from 1994 to 2000; the US (indirectly to Palestinian social programmes and not
directly to the PA) approximately $750 million; others, approximately $750 million
(NYT, 20 March 2001, A8). In addition, pledges were made in November 2000 by Saudi
Arabia ($250 million), Kuwait ($150 million), the United Arab Emirates ($150 million)
and other members of the Arab League (collectively, approximately $150 million) (NYT,
6 December 2000, A10).
32 Wall Street Journal, 20 February 2001, A15; NYT, 17 February 2001, A3.
33 The PA received promises in March 2001, from the Arab League, the Islamic
Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, plus transfers from Persian
Gulf and other Arab states, of an aid package that would assist it to maintain its 
operations for six months (NYT, 20 March 2001, A8).
34 Israel’s per capita GDP in 2000 was $17,500 (Israeli Ministry of Finance, available
online: http://www.mof.gov.il/beinle/ie/israe_1.htm).
35 FT, 16 March 2001, 5. Other factors impacting the Israeli economy included slowdown
of the US economy and a slump in Israel’s technology sector.
36 Israeli trade with the EU and the US represented 32 per cent and 30 per cent respectively
37
DEF2  7/31/02  10:32 PM  Page 37
Lenore G. Martin
38
of its 2000 exports, and 22 per cent and 41 per cent respectively of its imports (FT, 16
March 2001, 5).
37 Oman, Tunisia, Morocco and Qatar all severed relations with Israel within two months
of the start of the second intifada (FT, 10 November 2000, 8).
38 Assaf, al Khatib, Kally and Shuval (eds), 1993, 10.
39 Ibid., 5–11. For the Israeli responses, see Shuval, 2000: 40–3.
40 Average Israeli consumption of water in 1999 was allegedly four times that of the
Palestinians, and settlers in the Gaza Strip consumed seven times as much daily as did
Palestinians there (FT, 17 July 2000, 3).
41 Shuval, 2000: 44–5.
42 See also Elmusa, 1994 for a discussion of applying international law to the negotiation
of equitable sharing of water.
43 Ha’aretz, 23 May 2001.
44 NYT, 28 September 2000, A6.
45 Ha’aretz, 18 October 2000; ibid., 20 March 2001.
46 Israel has approved the construction of two new desalination plants (Ha’aretz, 14
February 2001), and has contemplated investing in new reverse osmosis desalination
facilities, which, although cheaper for processing water, costs three times more than
natural water (Ha’aretz, 18 October 2000, 6).
47 FT, 7 November 2000, 4.
48 NYT, 1 February 2001, A3. Israel also has a $300 million contract for importing
Egyptian oil (ibid.). However, due to the second intifada these projects have been 
suspended.
49 Luft, 1999, 5–6.
50 Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 December 2000.
51 NYT, 15 October 2000, 11; FT, 13 August 2001, 2.
52 Evron (1999) discusses confidence and security-building measures that might be 
adopted to create a common security regime in the region, such as limitations on mili-
tary deployments, restructuring military forces, improved communications, learning
and socialization. He proposes the creation of a Centre for Conflict Management to 
aid this process. One of the preconditions for achieving an arms’ control regime is 
implementation of the Israel–Arab peace process, a shared precondition for the creation
of a Palestinian state.
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This  chapter examines the concept of security through discursivecontestation at the leadership level in a critical Middle Eastern case – thatof Israel. The approach adopted here can be called historical constructivism
in that it traces the fractured construction of security as a phenomenon that
changes dramatically, and with significant political implications, over time. This
historical constructivist approach is predicated on two fundamental claims. 
The first is that concepts such as ‘state’, ‘security’ and ‘nation’ are socially con-
structed and thus will hold different meanings in different spatial and temporal
contexts. The second is that the meaning of any socially constructed phenom-
enon is perpetually contested. That is, one cannot allude to a single ‘objective’
understanding of security at any point in time.
From these basic assumptions the chapter argues that it is both possible and
necessary to distinguish between security – a state of protected existence – and
the referent object of security – that which is to be protected.1 Related to this
point is the contemporary Israeli notion of national or strategic security versus
individual or ‘current’ security.2 All states and peoples want to be secure. In the
case of Israel, however, the lines between these various and otherwise distinct
concepts – security v. referent object; and state v. individual as referent object –
have been constructed in an increasingly blurred fashion over time so as to
advance the political agendas of specific political groups. In order to explain how
and why this is the case, the chapter examines the specific discourses of secu-
rity employed by opposing political groups during key periods in the history of
the Arab–Israeli conflict.
Turning to the Israeli case, it is striking how little the State of Israel in 2001
resembles the nascent state declared during May of 1948. Most of the goals of
the first generation of state-builders – territorial consolidation, demographic
stability, international recognition, economic prosperity – have been attained,
in many instances beyond the wildest imagination of the leaders of the pre-state
Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine). In the light of these transformed
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realities and of contemporary Israel’s preponderance of power, the question of
why there is still not a fully stable and institutionalized Palestinian–Israeli peace
is all the more intriguing. There are a number of possible approaches one could
take to explain the puzzle of the missing Palestinian–Israeli peace. A traditional
or systemic international relations approach would examine the effects of the
anarchic self-help context of the Middle East and assess the distribution of power
capabilities among various regional actors in order to see how and why peace,
or a lack thereof, is attained.
This chapter takes a different approach. It suggests that neither the Arab–
Israeli conflict generally nor contemporary Palestinian–Israeli relations specifi-
cally are well explained by a systemic IR approach. Instead, it argues that the
basis of the contemporary conflict rests on a historically significant divergence
among the worldviews of Israeli elites regarding the interrelated matters of state
development and security. On the one hand, a predominant hard-line doctrine,
or what some have termed Israeli ‘militarism’, has espoused the notion that the
Arab–Israeli conflict can be resolved solely through the ‘language of force’.3
Elites who support this position have, over time, effectively institutionalized 
a doctrine of militarism within the Israeli State and society. On the other hand,
minority Israeli moderates have long advocated diplomacy and internationalism
as vital not only toward resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict but as means towards
establishing a prosperous and just state and society.
The following pages argue that failure to resolve the fundamental dispute
among Palestinians and Israelis stems directly from the victory during the
1950s of the more hard-line militaristic Israeli approach towards state security
and development. In order to demonstrate the cogency of this argument, the
first section begins by discussing in more detail the shortcomings of a systemic
or structural realist approach to the question of the Palestinian–Israeli peace.
The second section of the chapter establishes a historical basis for the dispute
between Israeli militarism and moderation with a focus on the critical period of
the early to mid-1950s. It is argued that the victory during that period of
the Ben-Gurion over the Sharett ‘lines’ led in the short term to the 1956 Sinai
campaign and ultimately to the institutionalization of the use of force as the
preferred means of dealing with the Arab–Israeli conflict for many decades
thereafter. Section three jumps ahead to assess the contemporary implications
of the doctrines of militarism and moderation with regard to the Palestinian–
Israeli conflict during the 1990s. It is argued that the divergent approaches to
security and the Palestinians of Benyamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres during
this time represent contemporary instantiations of the ongoing traditions of
Israeli militarism and Israeli moderation, respectively. Finally, the conclusion
asserts that the lingering dominance of the militaristic approach helps to
explain why a fully consolidated and formalized Palestinian–Israeli peace is yet
to be.
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Why the balance of power does not matter
For better or for worse, the academic international relations literature of the
past several decades has been dominated by the influence of structural realism
and its variants, all of which emphasize the power of anarchy to influence 
state behaviour with regard to matters of conflict and peace in world politics.
Since the anarchic structure of the international system is constant, the most
important variable for understanding international relations is the relative dis-
tribution of state power, typically defined in terms of military capabilities.4 Given
these propositions, the persistence of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict during the
1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century presents a quandary for
structural realism. As tables 3.1 and 3.2 below clearly illustrate, contemporary
Israel enjoys a preponderance of power relative to its Arab neighbours in 
just about every possible way that power can be measured. If distributions of
military capabilities and regional position under anarchy were determinative of
outcomes, Israel should have been capable of effecting a peace settlement on
terms favourable to itself some time ago.
From a strategic perspective, three additional factors further bolster the case
for Israeli power. First, Israel has enjoyed several decades of stable and consis-
tent peace with its most serious adversary, Egypt. Second, Israel’s – poorly kept
secret – nuclear deterrent puts it in a league of its own in the Middle East. Third,
the fall of the Soviet Union has effectively arrested much of the ability of Arab
armies to equip, train and finance fighting forces that could pose a legitimate
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Table 3.1 Relative indicators of state military power
Total military Combat
expenditures Total military aircraft
($US, 1998, est.) personnel (1997) (1997) Tanks (1997)
Egypt 3.28 billiona 665,000 510 2,550
Israel 8.7 billionb 631,000 780 3,900
Jordan 608.9 million 154,200 91 1,226
Lebanon 500 million 51,400 16 350
Syria 0.8–1 billionc 512,500 520 4,800
Notes:
a 1995–96 fiscal year;
b 1999 fiscal year;
c 1997 fiscal year based on official budget data that understate actual spending.
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency 2000; Heller and Shapir 1997.
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threat to Israel, much less any one else. In light of these realities, Israel is a
‘superpower’ in terms relative to the power of its Arab neighbours, not only 
militarily, but economically and developmentally. With such a preponderance 
of power and so little opposition to balance against it, it is surprising, at least
from the structural realist perspective, both that Israel has been unable to 
impose its will with regard to peace and that the various Arab parties have 
not yet utterly capitulated to Israeli power. It is precisely for these reasons that 
an alternative approach to explain the course of the Arab–Israeli conflict is 
necessary.
The consolidation of Israeli militarism: 
David Ben-Gurion v. Moshe Sharett
The Ben-Gurion v. the Sharett ‘lines’
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a group of ‘new historians’ achieved 
a good deal of success, as well as infamy, for producing a significant corpus of
literature critically reinterpreting the origins of the Israeli State and the Arab–
Israeli conflict.5 More recently, a second wave of ‘new’ historiography in Israel
studies has begun to recast common understandings of Israeli politics during
the 1950s. In particular, new emphasis is being placed on the significance of
the bitter political clash between two opposing camps within the ruling Mapai
Party during the period.6 In that struggle, one wing of the party centred on
Table 3.2 Relative indicators of state developmental power
GDP per capita Infant mortality Literacy
(purchasing rate (deaths per Life (% of total
power parity, 1,000 births, expectancy population)
$US 1999, est.) 2000, est.) (2000, est.) (1997)
Egypt 3,000 63.33 63.33 51.4a
Israel 18,300 7.9 78.57 95b
Jordan 3,500 21.11 77.36 86.6a
Lebanon 4,500 29.3 71.25 86.5




Source: Central Intelligence Agency 2000.
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Israel’s first and third prime minister (1948–54 and 1955–63) and leader of
the Mapai David Ben-Gurion, while the other supported the second prime mini-
ster (1954–55), Moshe Sharett. Crucial to this emergent theme is the view that
the struggle was not merely one between individual adversaries but was rather
a broader existential/ideational conflict between opposing perspectives on Israeli
grand strategy and security and the political–cultural future of the Israeli polity.
Sharett’s biographer Gabriel Sheffer asserts:
In more than one sense the story [of Moshe Sharett’s struggles with David 
Ben-Gurion] is also a history of the moderate camp in the Yishuv and Israel Labour
movement, of the compromise reached between the moderates and the activist
hard-liners, and of their respective contributions to the establishment and well-
being of the Jewish state. (Sheffer, 1996: 2)
On the one hand, Ben-Gurion and his followers, most notably Pinhas Lavon,
defence minister (1954–55), Moshe Dayan, Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) chief of
staff (1953–58) and Shimon Peres, director general of the Defence Ministry,
advocated a more militant and aggressive orientation, not only for Israel’s
foreign and military policies but for the structuring of Israeli society in general.
This included a hard-line and escalatory approach towards retaliation against
Arab incursions, violent or otherwise, into Israeli territory. As Dayan asserted
in 1955, the IDF ‘had the power to set a [high] price on our blood, [a price] that
no Arab village, army, or government would feel was worth paying’ (cited in
Morris, 1993: 176).
According to the Ben-Gurion line, then, international legitimacy and law
were at best merely epiphenomena and at worst serious impediments to 
the ability of Israel to secure its existence territorially and economically. Foreign
relations with the Arab world were most effectively communicated through 
the ‘language of force’, whereas diplomacy, it was felt, was perceived by the
Arabs to be indicative of Israeli weakness. As the British minister in Amman, 
A. S. Kirkbride, observed in a communication of June 1950: ‘The Jewish 
authorities . . . always preached the doctrine that the only way to control 
Arabs was by the utterly ruthless exercise of force’ (cited in Morris, 1993: 
175, n. 6).
On the other hand, Moshe Sharett and his supporters, including Abba Eban,
ambassador to the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN), and, at times,
Levi Eshkol, prime minister (1963–69), advocated an aversion to military con-
flict with the Arab states and the Palestinians and a commitment to diplomacy
and negotiation as the means by which to address Israel’s foreign and military
problems. According to the Sharett line, international legitimacy and diplomatic
prestige were long-term means toward the end-point of a secure existence and
a just society. The Arabs, in Sharett’s view, could understand diplomacy as well
as force as a means of resolving fundamental conflicts of interest. Thus, Sharett,
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‘profoundly appalled by Ben-Gurion’s strategic conclusions and recommenda-
tions’, searched for
political solutions to the Arab–Israeli conflict that would avert the possibility of
another war. He felt an overriding need to consider dealing with this danger [of a
new war] through non-military means, such as implementing solutions to the
refugee problem – a courageous concrete proposal to pay compensation, mending
fences with the powers, and continuing efforts to reach an agreement with Egypt.
In a nutshell this was the outline of the alternative political orientation that he
would try to develop further and implement after his appointment as Israel’s second
prime minister. (Sheffer, 1996: 690)
Sharett defined the two lines, his own and Ben-Gurion’s, and the sharp dis-
tinctions between them in similar terms: ‘The activists believe that the Arabs
understand only the language of force’, asserted Sharett in a November 1957
speech. He continued:
The State of Israel must, from time to time, prove clearly that it is strong, and able
and willing to use force, in a devastating and highly effective way. If it does not prove
this, it will be swallowed up, and perhaps wiped off the face of the earth. As to peace
– this approach states – it is in any case doubtful; in any case, very remote . . .
If [retaliatory] operations . . . rekindle the fires of hatred, that is no cause for fear
for the fires will be fuelled in any event.
But, according to Sharett, the activist approach was not the only alternative.
Thus, a more moderate line called for the pursuit of peace under all circum-
stances. ‘This is not only a political calculation in the long run, this is a decisive
security consideration . . . We must restrain our responses [to Arab attacks].
And there is always the question: is it really proven that retaliatory actions solve
the security problem’? (Quoted in Morris, 1999: 280)
Thus at this early phase of the Arab–Israeli conflict, we find alternative and
conflicting notions of how Israel could attain a secure state of existence during
the long term. Whereas Ben-Gurion’s activist line called for the use of force in
order to push through the incontrovertible reality of Israel’s permanence and
strength, Sharett believed that political accommodation would best preserve the
stability of Israeli existence in the long term.
Ben-Gurion v. Sharett, rounds 1–2, and the debate over reprisal policy
The fundamental divide between the two lines in Israeli politics manifested itself
across the entire range of policy issues in Israel during the 1950s: the problems
of Israeli Palestinians, Palestinian refugees, water concerns, international diplo-
macy and military spending. But in no sector was the clash between Sharett and
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Ben-Gurion more prominent than in the Israeli hard-line reprisal campaign
against both violent and non-violent Arab incursions into Israeli territory.
Sharett ‘had never been enthusiastic about retaliation, doubting its political and
military efficacy either as a punishment or deterrence’ (Sheffer, 1996: 684).
This is evidenced clearly in numerous diary entries in which he sharply criti-
cized a growing Israeli lust for revenge under the guise of security-based
reprisal. In response to calls for retaliation against an Arab raid during January
1955, Sharett writes: ‘The [Israeli public’s and army’s] rage must be defused.
That alone is the logic, none other [in launching retaliatory strikes]. I do not
believe that the reprisal will help in any way in terms of [improving] security.
On the contrary . . .’. Two months later, following a major raid into Gaza (later
known as ‘the Gaza raid’), Sharett laments:
We have taken off the psychological and ethical brakes on this [revenge] instinct
[yetzer], which is embedded, for ill, in human nature, and have thus permitted 
and enabled the Paratroop Battalion to turn the matter of revenge into a moral 
principle . . . [The principle of revenge] has been sanctified in this battalion, which
has become the State’s collective tool of revenge. (Morris, 1993: 173–4)
Sharett’s views were thwarted by an entrenched interest in militarism and the
use of force on the part of the Israeli military; an interest that was strongly rein-
forced by Ben-Gurion’s long-standing dual capacity as defence minister in addi-
tion to prime minister. Israeli militarism, despite the efforts of Sharett during his
stint as prime minister to effect change, had profound policy outcomes, the most
notable of which were large-scale reprisal raids against Arab targets, many of
which resulted in substantial loss of life. As the frequency and scale of the raids
increased, so too did the divide between the two Israeli political camps. The
dispute over the logic and propriety of reprisal raids reached a peak with the
Qibya operation in October 1953, which resulted in the death of more than
seventy Palestinians, including women and children. ‘There is no doubt that the
Qibya affair profoundly exacerbated relations between Sharett and Ben-Gurion.
In turn, these recurrent clashes influenced Ben-Gurion’s attitude towards the
succession question: these tensions pushed him to an even more determined
support of Eshkol’ over Sharett to succeed him as prime minister (Sheffer, 1996:
690).
Sharett won out in this first round of political competition, gaining the
crucial support within Mapai’s inner circle to be appointed prime minister in
1954. No sooner had Sharett assumed office, however, than Ben-Gurion,
through his proxies in the government, began to criticize and undermine the
prime minister’s authority. Sharett fought back, proposing cuts in military
spending to the 1954–55 budget, immediately incurring the wrath of Dayan
and Lavon (Sheffer, 1996: 714). By 1955, relations between Sharett and 
47
DEF3  7/31/02  10:33 PM  Page 47
Jonathan B. Isacoff
48
Ben-Gurion further deteriorated and it soon became clear that the Sharett line
in Israeli politics was gradually losing support among both the elites and the
public. Cognisant of the realities surrounding him, Sharett wrote in his diary in
April 1955:
Ben-Gurion was heading towards war and any barrier that would be erected on his
way should be removed . . . his belief in reprisals remained strong as ever, and he
justified it by saying that the masses of citizens in this country as well as military
leaders, like Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, would not tolerate murderous actions
without punishment . . . a strange justification for the doctrine of revenge. (Quoted
in Sheffer, 1996: 798)
Ben-Gurion’s response was straightforward: ‘Contrary to Moshe [Sharett]’s
opinion . . . reprisals are imperative. There is no relying for our security on UN
observers and foreign states. If we do not put an end to these murders now –
the situation will get worse’ (quoted in Morris, 1999: 280). Upon his return to
the Defence Ministry in February 1955, Ben-Gurion tellingly remarked to an
aide that Sharett ‘is raising a generation of cowards. Infiltrators are coming in
and we are hiding behind fences again. I will not let him. This will be a fighting
generation’ (quoted in Tal, 1996: 67). By November 1955, the Ben-Gurion line
finally won out over Sharett’s more moderate worldview, and Ben-Gurion
himself replaced Sharett as prime minister.
The foundation and implications of the Ben-Gurion line
That Ben-Gurion ultimately won out in his personal competition with Moshe
Sharett is clear, regardless of the historiographical position, new, old, or other-
wise, one adopts. What are less clear but perhaps more interesting are some 
of the broader underlying reasons for and the implications of the victory of the
Ben-Gurion line. Uri Ben-Eliezer argues in a recent study that the course of
the Arab–Israeli conflict can be understood in large measure as an outcome of
entrenched and institutionalized militarism within Israeli society and culture.
‘During the two decades beginning in 1936’, Ben-Eliezer asserts, ‘the idea of a
military solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict was gradually legitimated first
within the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, then within the new state
and crystallized into a value, a formula, and a doctrine’ (Ben-Eliezer, 1998: x).
Israeli militarism is most vividly seen in the growth and prominence of the 
Ben-Gurion line during the 1950s. Accordingly, an
institutional trade-off was undertaken between central forces in society, by which
the inculcation of the idea that it is possible and desirable to solve ‘the Arab problem’
by military means was counterbalanced by the clarification and concomitant order
of relations of authority . . . the military solution was universally accepted as the
legitimate and desirable way to end the Israeli-Arab conflict. It became part of the
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natural order and was preferred over possible political solutions involving diplomacy and
compromise. (Ben-Eliezer, 1998: 13–14; emphasis added)
According to this interpretation, then, Israeli security policy decisions, such 
as large-scale reprisal raids and the Sinai campaign itself, are better viewed as
choices that were to an extent pre-determined by cultural and institutional
norms and ideologies than as strategic calculations based on rational assess-
ments of systemic variables. This perspective is supported by the findings of Yagil
Levy, who recently has suggested that Israeli militarism can be explained by 
the relationship between super-ordinate and subordinate groups within Israeli
society. To elaborate: the selection of military solutions to the Arab–Israeli 
conflict over available alternatives, coupled with the promotion of military
prominence within Israeli society, served the ability of the Ashkenazi elite to
solidify and enhance their dominant role within society.7 Thus, the Arab–Israeli
conflict provided a basis for the Ashkenazim to attain a ‘legitimation of inequa-
lity owing to the war-driven internal empowerment of the state’ (Levy, 1997:
23). Increased militarization and bellicosity were important in asserting
Ashkenazi dominance over other ethnic groups and, in particular, over the
Sephardim, from Arab and North African countries, in the hierarchy of the mili-
tary. The more daring the operations, the more admiration and prestige were
given the military by the Ashkenazi political leadership, especially Dayan and
Ben-Gurion. The more admiration and prestige were given from the top down,
the more the elite units of the military responsible for implementing the most
bellicose operations became magnets for Ashkenazi youth. Thus, ‘the military
had taken part in aggravating the external threat and concomitantly acquired
prestige by repulsing this very threat. Self-creation of symbolic resource was at
work’ (Levy, 1997: 85–6).
Satisfied with the newly created war-based reality, social groups’ openness to receiv-
ing force-oriented signals transmitted by the military command was greater 
than their openness to hearing moderate calls voiced even half-heartedly in Arab
countries . . . Satisfaction, by nature, dictates low demand for information. A public
discourse that allowed for two or more alternative avenues to deal with the regional
threat . . . was averted. Nor was the Ben-Gurion–Sharett debate voiced publicly.
(Levy, 1997: 91)
Key to the logic of this argument is that strategic decisions were not taken
in response to systemic stimuli per se. On the contrary,
agents did not rationally calculate several alternatives in terms of losses and gains;
at least in the long term they possibly could have partly satisfied their interests 
even had the state selected a more pacifist policy. Rather, agents reconciled their
interests to the newly created reality that satisfied them relative to a past reality, not
necessarily to a tentative one. (Levy, 1997: 92)
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In other words, militarism empowered already dominant groups in society,
inspiring them to press for further militarism regardless of future losses in 
terms of war with the Arabs. ‘The immediate results were pronounced in the
Sinai Campaign. It was managed as an “elite war”. Conceived and planned 
in complete secrecy by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and a few advisors, it was 
not brought to the cabinet for approval until almost the eleventh hour’ (Levy,
1997: 93).
These interpretations are not unsupported by the ‘empirical data’ on the
events leading up to the 1956 War. As early as October–November 1953,
toward the end of his first stint as prime minister, Ben-Gurion revealed plans for
reorganizing the IDF
based on the assumption that the ‘second round’ would occur in 1956 when,
according to his evaluation, the Arab armies would be ready to launch a new war
against Israel. This assessment dictated Ben-Gurion’s future political and military
actions and moves and would contribute to the decision to launch a ‘war of Choice’
in 1956. (Sheffer, 1996: 690)
Similarly, Motti Golani, who has been the first to review the most recently
released archival material in London and Israel on the Sinai campaign, argues:
‘my research led me to conclude that Israel had been ‘in search of a war’ before
the onset of the Suez Crisis and without any connection to it’ (Golani, 1998:
viii). Thus, during 1954–55, Israel’s retaliation policies underwent a subtle 
but crucial shift away from punishment and deterrence towards provocation
and escalation in the effort to explore the possibility of a ‘war of choice’. Despite
being justified for their deterrent value, ‘[p]aradoxically, during the years
1955–56 (and perhaps as early as 1954), retaliatory strikes were also launched
by the IDF in order to draw the Arab states into a premature war’ (Morris, 1999:
276). ‘Dayan wanted war, and, periodically, he hoped that a given retaliatory
strike would embarrass or provoke the Arab state attacked into itself retaliating,
giving Israel cause to escalate the shooting until war resulted’ (Morris, 1993:
178–179).
A turning point in the tenor of the Israeli retaliation policy was clearly sym-
bolized by the massive Gaza raid of 28 February–1 March 1955, codenamed
‘Operation Black Arrow’, which caused the death of thirty-eight Egyptians and
Palestinians and brought injury to several dozen more.
Far from curbing infiltrator attacks, the Gaza Raid proved a great catalyst of Israeli–
Egyptian violence. Before February 28, 1955, attacks across the Gaza frontier into
Israel had been local and sporadic, not state policy; thereafter, they were promoted
and directed by Cairo . . . The Gaza Raid proved to be a turning point in Israeli–
Egyptian relations and in the history of the Middle East . . . Gaza had not only led
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to Egyptian counter-raiding. It had also set in motion a massive arms race, bound
to end in war. (Morris, 1993: 334)
Not surprisingly, then, both ‘Sharett and Dayan showed far greater concern over
possible escalation due to border incidents, the former viewing it as a danger,
the latter as a prospect’ (Golani, 1998: 8). Even one Israeli historian who 
disagrees with the overall revisionist interpretation of 1956 acknowledges: ‘It
was Israeli reaction that overlaid the infiltrations with a political dimension, as
Israel did not treat them for what they were but linked them to the broad
Arab–Israeli context and to the country’s political and security problems’ (Tal,
1996: 61).
It is important to point out that the preceding view of Israel’s reprisal policy
as other than a purely strategic effort to attain deterrence is not merely an inter-
pretive move on the part of modern scholars. At a meeting of Israeli intelligence
executives during February 1953, Yair Elgom, head of the Jordan desk in the
Foreign Ministry asserted that ‘most of Jordan’s violations [of the armistice
agreement] . . . were a reaction to our own violations. Jordan’s secondary viola-
tions do not justify our sharp reprisals . . . justice . . . was not on our side. This
in itself may not be important, but it is so obvious that it will be difficult to hide
it for long from the West . . . It is time that we reviewed our actions’ (quoted in
Morris, 1993: 216–17). Similarly, the IDF Intelligence Department in early
1953 reported: ‘During the past few months all our reprisal raids have ended in
failure, lowering Israel’s prestige in Arab eyes and causing other damage . . . The
existing retaliatory strikes against border villages must cease, as it does more
harm than good’ (quoted in Morris, 1993: 217).
There are two conclusions to be drawn from the preceding discussion. 
The first is that by the time of the 1956 Sinai campaign, the hard-line Israeli
approach toward the Arab–Israeli conflict, instantiated in the Ben-Gurion line,
had ultimately won out in the competition with Israeli moderates. That victory,
in turn, represented a crucial consolidation of power for the Ashkenazi elite, who
benefited tremendously from the political rewards gained by successfully
implementing aggressive military policies vis-à-vis the Arabs. Second, and more
important, the events of the 1950s, culminating in the 1956 War, were a victory
as much for the Ben-Gurion line as they were on the battlefield. As a result of
these twin victories, one military and the other political, a doctrine of militarism
was institutionalized within the Israeli State and society with profound impli-
cations for the future trajectory of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The victories en-
sured that security would be to the fore in all future debates regarding Israel’s
relations with the Arabs, whether in the context of war or peace. Additionally,
the ‘language of force’ would henceforth be the preferred option in resolving the
conflict over other available alternatives.
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From militarism to territorial security
The Netanyahu v. the Peres line
Israel’s strategic situation has changed somewhat dramatically since the 1950s.
No longer does Israel face an imminent threat from its most deadly Arab 
adversary; nor must Israeli military planners be concerned with the prospect of
facing first-rank Soviet-trained and supplied Arab fighting forces. Perhaps of
greatest consequence, especially at the perceptual level, is the attainment of a
nuclear deterrent unmatched by the Arab states. It is interesting, then, that the
‘language of force’ remains prevalent in the thinking and discourse of Israeli
political and military leaders, even through the present juncture. In acknow-
ledgement of the changed realities of Israel’s strategic position, the ‘language of
force’ is no longer so much a matter of the ‘next round’ in terms of conventional
inter-state warfare, although even that discourse persists in some quarters of
the Israeli polity.8
For the most part, however, contemporary Israeli militarism is manifest in
the doctrine of territorial security espoused by the Likud Party and a number of
right-wing parties and organizations allied with it.9 The doctrine of territorial
security, much like the Ben-Gurion line of the 1950s, holds that the most effec-
tive means by which to deal with the Palestinians are through the language, if
not the outright use, of force. Accordingly, Israel treats the Palestinians as 
a security threat rather than as political partners, and all issues pertaining to
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict – especially territorial issues – are addressed
through the discourse of security rather than in terms of political partnership
and diplomacy. Instead of acknowledging the preponderance of Israeli power as 
a basic starting-point from which to approach the Palestinians, the Likud 
and its allies have retained the discourse and strategy of militarism toward the
Palestinian ‘problem’. In the process, security and strategy replace politics as the
dominant issues within the thought and language of Likud politicians and their
supporters. By linking the issue of land with that of security, the Israeli right
wing has essentially prolonged the Palestinian–Israeli conflict beyond what
would have otherwise been its ‘natural’ life.
In contrast to the doctrine of territorial security espoused by the Likud, 
the left wing of the Labour Party and its allies inherited the legacy of Israeli
moderation originally and most eloquently espoused by Moshe Sharett.10 Thus,
the leading proponents of the doctrine of moderation discuss the importance of
diplomacy, negotiation and, most centrally, partnership.11 The moderate line
thus argues that security is better attained by creating new political realities
than by identifying and responding to perceived threats. In accordance with
these views, the Palestinian problem is seen as one of politics and not of secu-
rity, per se. At the core of this doctrine is the notion of ‘land for peace’, whereby
long-term security is linked not to control of land but rather to the exchange of
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land for a stable and institutionalized peace. The following subsections discuss
the most important proponents of the two opposing doctrines during the 1990s,
namely, Benyamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres.
Benyamin Netanyahu and territorial security
The most eloquent and influential proponent of territorial security during the
1990s was Benyamin Netanyahu, who served as prime minister from 1996 to
1999. During the years both prior to as well as following his electoral victory in
May 1996, Netanyahu carefully and cogently constructed and advocated the
militaristic doctrine of territorial security, which emphasizes several key themes.
The most important is the underlying assumption that the Palestinian question
and, indeed, the Palestinians themselves are a security problem, or threat, rather
than political partners. Accordingly, matters of Palestinian–Israeli relations are
addressed as responses to threats rather than as political negotiations to be
resolved through co-operation and partnership. The foremost instantiation of
this approach is in an effort to inextricably link territorial control with the
concept of security. That this view may to lead to confrontation as opposed to
reconciliation Netanyahu readily admits: ‘continuing struggle does not neces-
sarily mean perpetual war, but it does mean an ongoing national exertion and
the possibility of periodic bouts of international confrontation’ (Netanyahu,
2000: 372).
Netanyahu worked assiduously to construct a discursive field whereby land
is equated with security, so that, by definition, to give up one entails a dimi-
nishment of the other. According to this logic, diplomacy is ‘idealism’ and true
security can be attained only through territorial control. ‘Most of the wars’,
writes Netanyahu,
including the wars between Kuwait and Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait, were based on
conditions of peace. There were peace treaties galore, all over the place. Most wars
in the world start from a state of peace treaties and normalisation. Now, I think that
ultimately guarantees are important, but they cannot substitute for actual security.
I, for one, would like to see American guarantees . . . But one thing I do not want: I
don’t want American boys coming in to defend Israel. And that’s what you’ll end
up doing if Israel is denuded, if Israel strips away these buffer strips, the wall of the
Golan Heights, the wall of the West Bank that protects Israel.12
For Netanyahu, ‘land-for-peace’ is a strategic rather than a political problem.
‘Given the specifics of the West Bank’, Netanyahu contends, ‘the slogan ‘land
for peace’ is singularly inappropriate: To achieve a sustainable peace, Israel must
maintain a credible deterrent long enough to effect a lasting change in Arab 
attitudes. It is precisely Israel’s control of this strategic territory that has
deterred all-out war and has made eventual peace more likely’ (Netanyahu,
2000: 319). The doctrine of territorial security thus views Israeli power as 
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providing a pretext for continued territorial control rather than as facilitat-
ing a process of compromise from the standpoint of strength. Accordingly,
Netanyahu contends, ‘a territorial peace is hampered by the continuing concern
that once territories are handed over to the Arab side, they will be used for future
assaults to destroy the Jewish state . . . Ironically, the ceding of strategic terri-
tory to the Arabs might trigger this destructive process by convincing the Arab
world that Israel has become vulnerable enough to attack’ (Netanyahu, 2000:
322). Thus, Netanyahu suggests that accumulation and consolidation of land
are in point of fact necessary requirements of security, generally speaking. 
That said, Netanyahu somewhat ironically claims that ‘Israel does not ask for
additional territory, only that the present strategic depth (and strategic height)
of the West Bank be left intact’ (Netanyahu, 2000: 303–4).
In all public forums where the issue of land is raised, Netanyahu invariably
draws upon the linkage between territorial control and Israeli security. Guiding
a plane tour of Israeli politicians and members of the media during 1994, he
pointed out: ‘The last house in [the Israeli settlement] Kfar Sava is just 200
meters from [the Palestinian town of] Qalqiliya. The government of Yitzhak
Rabin is going to establish a Palestinian state there. They don’t admit it in public,
but MKs are talking about it in the corridors.’ This, according to Netanyahu,
would pose a grave danger to Israel, prompting him to lament about ‘what this
would mean for [Israeli] security’.13 In response to the Hebron massacre of
twenty-nine Palestinians by the settler Baruch Goldstein that same year,
Netanyahu remarked that ‘Jews are slain on the roads every day and none of
these cases was ever inquired into. We need an inquiry into the overall deterio-
ration of security in this country since the government made its deal with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It would be wrong to isolate a single
atypical event like an artificial island in time and space.’14 Following a shooting
of IDF soldiers by Palestinian policemen at the Erez checkpoint in Gaza, also
during 1994, Netanyahu asserted that ‘the important lesson to learn from the
PLO’s failure in keeping the agreement and the security in Gaza is that Israel
must keep exclusive responsibility for security and order in Judea and Samaria
in the hands of the IDF’.15 Both of these statements reflect a consistent 
militaristic worldview according to which two assumptions follow: (1) the
Palestinians represent a fundamental threat; (2) accordingly, control of
Palestinian land is essential toward maintaining Israeli security.
Following his election victory in 1996, Netanyahu institutionalized the 
doctrine of territorial security in the guidelines for the governing coalition
between the Likud and its allies.16 The guidelines’ text states: ‘Settlement in all
parts of the Land of Israel is an expression of our right to the land and it rep-
resents an inseparable part of our national security. The government will ensure
the continued existence and development of new settlements and will allot the
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required funds for that purpose.’17 In less than a year, however, Netanyahu came
under increasing pressure from both the United States and within Israel to 
tone down these positions, especially following a deadly confrontation between
Palestinian police and the IDF following the opening of an archeological tunnel
in the Old City in September 1996. Netanyahu, however, persisted in steadfastly
resisting such pressure. As peace talks with the Palestinians repeatedly stalled,
it became clear that Netanyahu’s basic approach toward the peace process, as
called for by the doctrine of territorial security, was one of confrontation and
threat rather than one based on political partnership and compromise. After
rejecting an American-sponsored peace proposal in March 1998, Netanyahu
declared on national television: ‘Understand that Israel is a tiny country, and
every piece of territory here is tied to security, every piece. Every per cent is 
the size of Tel Aviv. And this territory that abuts our major cities determines
whether we can effectively guarantee that additional territory is not turned into
a Hamas base, a terrorist base.’18 ‘You can very quickly reach a situation in
which you endanger the security of the state, and I will not (do it).’19 By the 
end of 1998, Netanyahu’s failure to produce any results on the peace front,
coupled with a series of domestic political scandals, grated on the Israeli public
and in May 1999 he was defeated in national elections by the Labour Party
leader Ehud Barak.
Shimon Peres and the politics of partnership
From within the older generation of Israeli leaders who can be described as
‘moderate’, few make a less likely candidate than Shimon Peres. Having been a
‘Ben-Gurionist’ for most of his career, Peres’s transformation from a hard-liner
to an internationalist caught many Israelis, even some close to Peres, by sur-
prise. ‘Many of my friends’, Peres himself admits,
and even more of my opponents, have asked me how my concern for the armed
defense of Israel . . . has been supplanted by fervent dedication to the peace process
. . . As far as I can tell, it was not I who shifted course from the traditional concept
of national defense, which depends mainly on military and weapons systems, to the
modern concept, which is of necessity based on political accords, and embraces
international security and economic considerations. Rather, the world has changed.
And the process of change compels us to replace our outdated concepts with an
approach tailored to the new reality. (Peres, 1993: 33–4)
Whereas Netanyahu, as discussed above, views the Palestinian question as a
matter of security and threat, Peres emphasizes the political nature of the
Palestinian–Israeli relationship and the importance of partnership and co-
operation to that relationship. ‘There are two ways in which to end the conflict
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with the PLO’, Peres remarked during a meeting with US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher: ‘With the power of power or with the power of wisdom.
Wisdom is better than power. If we all act wisely, the PLO will become a partner
in peace instead of an obstacle to it’ (Peres, 1993: 29–30). Elaborating on the
theme of the Palestinians as partners, Peres notes that he and former Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin ‘tried to look upon Arafat as a partner. Netanyahu looks
upon him as an agent. Arafat cannot exist as an agent. You cannot give him
orders . . . We can meet as partners for peace, but we cannot make out of him
an instrument to realize our policies’ (Peres and Littell, 1998: 95–6). ‘In order
to make peace’, Peres writes,
you must have a partner more than a plan. If you have a plan and you don’t have
a partner, you have a piece of paper that’s of no value. Only when you have a partner
can you try and find the proper plan . . . Now enemies are the raw material of part-
ners. Dangers are the raw material of hope. How to overcome them? How to take
an enemy and make a friend of him? How to take a danger and turn it into an oppor-
tunity? . . . when you finally meet the other person, you are surprised to learn that
he is a human being like yourself. (Peres and Littell, 1998: 74)
On the sharp contrast between his worldview and that of Netanyahu, Peres
makes a number of important points. First, whereas Peres campaigned in 1996
on the platform of ‘land for peace’, the Likud claimed ‘that you can have peace
for nothing. Which is nonsense. Saying that you can have security before peace.
Which again is nonsense’ (Peres and Littell, 1998: 89). ‘Mr. Netanyahu made a
terrible mistake when he said he would provide security before peace. For peace
you need a majority. For terrorism a tiny group of people can do whatever they
want . . . when you say, I will not make peace unless all the bombs disappear,
you encourage the terrorists to continue’ (Peres and Littell, 1998: 96–7).
Second, Netanyahu, according to Peres, is incapable of properly comprehend-
ing the Palestinian perspective on the Arab–Israeli conflict, which is, in turn,
essential towards resolving it. Netanyahu ‘sees himself as a great authority on
terrorism. On many occasions he looks at the Arab side through the eyes of an
expert on terrorism. His book is devoted to the issue of terrorism. I am not sure
that he understands [the Arab side]’ (Peres and Littell, 1998: 22). Accordingly,
whereas Netanyahu believes Israeli power is a means toward the end of dictat-
ing the resolution of security problems, Peres adopts almost precisely the oppo-
site view: ‘To achieve peace, the basic problems of the Middle East need to be
approached realistically. First and foremost, we must all acknowledge the futil-
ity of war: the Arabs cannot defeat Israel on the battlefield; Israel cannot dictate
the conditions of peace to the Arabs’ (Peres, 1993: 49). Peace, then, can be
brought about only by political rather than military means.
Peres’s vision of the Middle East, much like that of Moshe Sharett during
the 1950s, is formed of a cosmopolitan outlook according to which security
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issues are a function of diplomacy and co-operation rather than problems that
are best resolved through the ‘language of force’. Accordingly, Peres argues that
the Palestinian question is really a subset – albeit a crucial one – of the broader
matter of overall Middle East peace. To attain peace on a regional level requires
bilateral and multilateral pacts, extending beyond the borders of the countries
involved and covering whole regions . . . the key to maintaining an equable and safe
regional system is in politics and economics . . . True power – even military power
– is no longer anchored in the boot camp, but on the university campuses. Politics
should pave the way from pure military strategy to an enriched political and eco-
nomic repertoire. (Peres, 1993: 34–35)
Thus, Peres adopts a moderate and cosmopolitan, rather than a hard-line mili-
taristic, worldview with regard to the international relations of the Middle East
generally, and the Palestinian–Israeli peace process specifically.
Israeli politics during the 1990s reveal a very clear picture of the contrast
between the militaristic and moderate worldviews with regard to resolving the
Palestinian question. For the latter part of 1993, while Netanyahu established
himself as leader of the Likud, Peres oversaw and later participated in the 
secret Oslo negotiations, which culminated in the now-famous Oslo Accords,
signed at the White House on 13 September 1993.20 Peres attained his greatest
success in promoting and implementing his moderate doctrine while serving as
foreign minister under Yitzhak Rabin from 1992 to 1995, during which time 
he successfully shepherded the Oslo negotiations to fruition and convinced
Rabin of the need to agree to them. Following Rabin’s tragic assassination in
1995, Peres assumed the prime ministers’ office and was soon plagued with
political difficulties, the most damaging of which was a series of deadly suicide
bombings by the Hamas group. In the wake of the bombings, Peres was defeated
at the ballot box by Netanyahu in 1996 and was subsequently replaced as
Labour Party leader by Ehud Barak.
Conclusion
Theirs ‘was a struggle between hard-liners and soft-liners, security-centredness
and diplomacy, intractability and conciliation, and the certainty of war and a
chance for peace’ (Morris, 1993: 227). While this statement by the founding
new historian Benny Morris alludes to the historical competition between David
Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett discussed earlier, it is remarkable how aptly 
the words also apply to the divergent doctrines of Shimon Peres and Benyamin
Netanyahu during the 1990s. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate,
the ongoing insolubility of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is not well explained
by systemic international relations theory for the simple reason that the balance
of power in the Middle East has changed dramatically, while the dispute between
Palestinians and Israelis and among Israelis themselves is in large measure
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unchanged. The preceding sections have therefore traced two competing strands
of thought regarding state development and strategy in Israel: a dominant line
of militarism and security, and a minority line of moderation and diplomacy.
While the militaristic doctrine has been in the ascendant since the victory of the
Ben-Gurion over the Sharett lines during the 1950s, the competition between
the two perspectives is still very much apparent today. This raises two very 
interesting and significant issues worthy of discussion. The first pertains to the
matter of security as a concept. The second regards the present and the future
of the Palestinian–Israeli peace process.
The preceding historiographical accounts of the Arab–Israeli conflict reveal
the important conclusion that security is in practice a constructed phenomenon
in so far as it carries different meanings in different historical and cultural con-
texts. This has at least three important implications. First, it is both possible and
necessary to distinguish between security – a state of protected existence – and
the referent object of security – that which is to be protected (see Campbell,
1998: 2–3; and Buzan, 1990: 22–8). All states and people want to be secure.
However, as Ben-Gurion and his followers recognized, there is an innate distinc-
tion between national or strategic security v. personal or ‘current’ security’ (see
Alpher, 1995, Academic Index Internet version). Whereas the Ben-Gurionists
were concerned with both forms of security, their primary consideration was
national/strategic, not personal/current.
For the present, Benyamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon and the Likud have
maintained the prominence of security as a fundamental national issue, but 
the referent object of security has changed quite profoundly as the nature of the
threats to Israel and Israelis have been transformed. At the start of the twenty-
first century, Israelis have much more to fear from individual suicide bombers
than from airborne jet bombers. Second, and relatedly, Netanyahu and Sharon
and their allies, most notably the National Religious Party and the Gush Emunim,
have intentionally blurred this important distinction between national and
current security in order to play on the fears of the Israeli public and further
their goal of maintaining territorial control over Palestinian lands. Thus, the
doctrine of territorial security is in an important sense a façade employed to
justify the irredentist claims of the settlers rather than a genuine effort to further
the requirements of security in either of its forms. Third, and most importantly,
by promoting the doctrine of territorial security, the Likud and the settlers 
have antagonized the Palestinians by continuing to approach them as security
problems rather than as legitimate, if flawed, negotiating partners. In doing so,
the Likud has essentially undermined the entire basis for a stable and institu-
tionalized settlement. In short, territorial security and ‘land for peace’ are 
fundamentally incompatible.
Turning to the present and the future of the Palestinian–Israeli peace
process, it is not insignificant that Israel has seen two new prime ministers since
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the departure of Netanyahu in May 1999.21 One might ask, why focus on
Netanyahu and Peres at all in light of the waning of their respective careers?
The response is simple: while neither Netanyahu nor Peres is currently in power,
their articulations of the doctrines of militarism and moderation, respectively,
remain as robust as ever. It is also far from clear that moderation has replaced
militarism as the dominant doctrine in Israeli politics, especially with the pre-
viously unthinkable election of the quintessential hawk Ariel Sharon to the
office of prime minister. Indeed, it seems that the notion of territorial security
and the fear of the Palestinian ‘threat’ are still quite prominent among many, if
not most, Israelis (see Benvenisti, 2000: A31; Livnat, 2000: A21; Sharansky,
2000: A25). As Netanyahu himself most recently and clearly put it, ‘the vast
majority of Israelis have once again realized that our enduring conflict with 
the Palestinians is rooted in a dispute not over the borders of the Jewish state
but over its very existence’ (Netanyahu, 2001: A19). Furthermore, the Gush
Emunim has not disappeared, thus guaranteeing that the linkage between 
territorial control and security will not diminish appreciably any time soon.
While many point to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in the fall of 2000 as
a major impediment to peace, this chapter would caution against thinking with
too short a time horizon and thus conflating precipitating with underlying
factors pertaining to the peace process. Rather, the analysis here suggests that
a formal and institutionalized peace will remain elusive until the majority of
Israelis come to support moderation over militarism in their basic perception of
the politics of Israel–Palestine.
notes
1 For discussion of referent objects of security, see Buzan, 1990: 22–8, especially. For a
related discussion of risk and referents marked as dangers, see Campbell, 1998: 2–3.
2 Yossi Alpher (1995, Academic Index internet version) discusses these two conceptions
as they relate to the peace process.
3 The term ‘doctrine’ is employed in a very traditional sense. For the present purposes, a
doctrine is defined as a set of principles that is taught and learned by a group or groups
that claim, explicitly or implicitly, to adhere to that doctrine. On Israeli militarism, see
Ben-Eliezer, 1998.
4 All of the core propositions of structural realism are laid out most elegantly by Waltz 
in his classic Theory of International Politics (1979). For examples of structural realist
approaches to modern Middle East politics, see Telhami, 1990; Walt, 1987.
5 For overviews of the ‘new historiography’ in Israeli Studies, see Lustick, 1997b: 157–62.
See also Levy, 1999; Slater, 1994; Heydemann, 1991; and contributions to the special
issue History and Memory (1995). The first and most well known texts on the new histo-
riography are Morris, 1987 and Shlaim, 1988.
6 The Mapai is the precursor party to the modern Labour and contemporary One-Israel
Parties.
7 The founding Ashkenazim, or Jews of European ancestry, historically have dominated
Israeli society and politics. Sephardim, or Jews of Arab and North African origin, have
traditionally been members of the lower classes, both socially and politically speaking.
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8 One settler leader in Gaza recently put the matter of the ‘next round’ as follows: ‘Egypt
still considers a war option viable and that it can dispatch its army across Sinai in a single
day while Israel scrambles to summon its reserves. The only guarantee that the Israeli
army will remain at strategic points in Gaza . . . is on the pretext of guarding settlements.
The army isn’t protecting us, say settlers, as much as we’re ensuring its presence in Gaza’
(Jerusalem Report, 26 October 1998, 15).
9 The Likud is the second-largest and most important right-wing party in Israel. While it
is traditionally allied with the settler movement, the latter maintains its own grassroots
organization and party, the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and the National Religious
Party (NRP), respectively.
10 The left wing of the Labour Party refers to the faction led by Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin
and Haim Ramon. The Labour left wing’s principal ally is the leftist Meretz Party.
11 For further discussion of the conception of partnership in the Palestinian–Israeli peace
process, see Lustick, 1997a: 741–57.
12 Larry King Live, 7 December 1992, Transcript no. 713.
13 ‘Likud Fights PLO Pact with Scattershot’, Los Angeles Times, 14 January 1994, A4, col.
1; brackets added.
14 Jerusalem Post 1994a, 2.
15 Jerusalem Post 1994b, 2. Judea and Samaria are the names employed by Israeli settlers
and many right-wing Israelis to refer to the West Bank. The names are derived from the
Old Testament.
16 See note 9, above.
17 Mideast Mirror 1997. The Mirror gives the statement from the newspaper Maariv.
18 International Herald Tribune, 1998, 2.
19 Associated Press 1998.
20 For a chronological account of the Oslo negotiations, see New York Times (1993: section
I, 1); Savir, 1998; and Elon, 1993.
21 They are, respectively, Ehud Barak and, as of the time of this writing, Ariel Sharon.
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In the context of broadening the scope of international relations (IR) andof the related field of security studies in light of the changed internationalsystem after the end of the Cold War, Islam and Islamic movements have
moved to the fore of this discipline. At the surface it looks as if the study of the
‘geopolitics of Islam and the West’ has taken the place of the earlier Soviet
studies (Fuller and Lesser, 1995). Students of IR concerned with the study 
of the Middle East and those who have turned to focus on Islamic civilization
are caught, however, between a tremendously increasing Islamophobia in the
West and the need to inquire into the threats to security by what is termed
‘Islamism’. Those who study Islamism while dealing with security are thus often
challenged by the question: ‘Why then are you involving Islam in security
studies? Isn’t this a part of Western Islamophobia?’ This chapter does not escape
this challenge which has increased since September 11.
The chapter begins by arguing that there are many different ways of
responding to this question. Some scholars specializing in Islamic studies rightly
question those efforts in the West that view Islam as a ‘threat’, a view which
they qualify as perpetuating a myth (Esposito, 1992). They also deal with the
question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and give a positive
answer. In light of these answers we may doubt any inclusion of Islam in a study
concerned with redefining security in the Middle East. But then we are intrigued
by the rise of fundamentalist and rejectionist movements most hostile to the
West and the Arab–Israeli peace process.
It is true that when existing threats, violence and instability are related to
Islamic movements there is a need for security studies to inquire into this issue.
In redefining security in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War while also
focusing on the peace process, we cannot escape looking at the events in which
political Islam has become the ideology underpinning the rejection of peace and
the promotion of anti-Western ideologies. This study, in doing so, takes as its
point of departure the distinction between the religion of Islam and Islamism.
4
Between Islam and Islamism: a dialogue with
Islam as a pattern of conflict resolution and 
a security approach vis-à-vis Islamism
Bassam Tibi
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The focus is those groups, in the main non-state actors, which represent Islam
in a politicized pattern. The term ‘Islamism’ refers to political Islam – particu-
larly in the Arab world. In this chapter Islamism is viewed as a variety of reli-
gious fundamentalism. In the effort to redefine security the challenge of
religions fundamentalism, not of Islam itself (Tibi, 1998a), is of concern. The
groups representing political Islam1 do in fact pose a threat to security at domes-
tic, regional and international levels. It follows that the inquiry needs to focus
on the politicization of religion, because that process elevates religion to an issue
of security, and that compels us to put it on our agenda in the study of IR.2
Despite September 11 the main security threat of the Islamists is related to
domestic order. This explains why Arab governments themselves feel threatened
by Islamism and why, therefore, Islamists encounter hostility in their own coun-
tries and therefore seek political asylum in Europe.
Political Islam and post-bipolar security in the Middle East
As a recent development, the politicization of religion is not restricted to Islam,
insofar as it can be observed in other religions as well, be it Hinduism or Judaism
– among others.3 When it comes to Islam one cannot escape witnessing the 
Bin Laden and, earlier, the Iran connection of terrorism.4 In Algeria the Front
Islamique du Salut (FIS) and the Groupes Islamiques Armées (GIA) envisage the top-
pling of the existing state order5 to replace it by a divine one they call Hakimiyyat
Allah.6 Similarly, we see in Egypt Jihad and other groups, which legitimize them-
selves by references to ‘true Islam’, attempts to destabilize the state, which they
identify as a deviant secular order. On a regional level, militant groups like the
Kashmiri (but based in Pakistan) United Jihad Commando, the Hezbollah in
Lebanon (Jaber, 1997) or Hamas and Jihad Islami in Palestine (see Milton-
Edwards, 1999) ignite great tensions and contribute to what one may conceptu-
alize as an Islamization of regional conflicts. Our focus on the peace process in
the Middle East, while studying security in post-bipolar politics, compels us to pay
specific attention to this anti-peace-oriented Islamization of conflict. The study
of regional conflict in light of political religion and ethnicity therefore becomes
a major concern in the study of IR. If we are committed to inter-faith dialogue as
an instrument and a framework for preventing what is called a ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ (Herzog, 1999; Tibi, 1999a: 107–26), we must expose ourselves to the
serious challenge posed by this question: ‘Given the existence of Islamophobia in
the West, how can you combine your commitment to dialogue with your inclu-
sion of Islam in the study of redefining security in the Middle East?’ This question
needs to be taken most seriously, and only a security analysis on sound founda-
tions can provide the proper answer to it. This is not to ignore the assumption
lying behind it, namely that Islam replaces communism as the ‘enemy’ of the
West. But this assumption needs to be treated with great caution.
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At issue here is a fact-based distinction between the religion of Islam and
the political ideology of Islamism (Tibi, 1998a). That ideology refers selectively
to the religion of Islam and then engages itself in politicizing it in an arbitrary
manner so as to legitimize political action. In our case, this action is directed
against the Arab–Israeli peace.
In response to the question of whether Islam poses a threat, Esposito argues
that the question itself is misplaced because there is no monolith that we may
call ‘Islam’. The religion of Islam must be differentiated from the many varieties
of Islamism as political ideology. The religion of Islam is not a threat. However,
as a political ideology Islam clearly is, insofar as it poses a threat to the existing
order. Esposito fails to see this and explores the relationship between Islam and
democracy. Understanding this relationship is crucial to redefining security for
two reasons: First, religious fundamentalism and ethnicity are among the major
challenges to security in the post-Cold War era. Jean-François Revel suggests we
view the tolerance practiced vis-à-vis political–religious and ethnic groups, par-
ticularly those related to Islam, according to the formula ‘Democracy against
itself ’ (Revel, 1993: chapter 12). By this Revel means that democratic systems
allow non-democratic groups to operate. Supporters of political Islam acting in
the West have no problem making use of democracy in pursuit of their ends
while they simultaneously antagonize democracy in their actions and look down
at it as an indication of the decline of the West. One of the spiritual fathers of
political Islam, Mawdudi, for instance argues:
I tell you in all clarity, my brethren in Islam, secular democracy stands in all aspects
in contrast to your religion and beliefs . . . Islam being your belief, and that is why
you call yourself Muslims, is different from this ugly democracy . . . and therefore
there can be no concurrence between Islam and democracy . . . There where democ-
racy rules Islam cannot prevail and when Islam dominates there is no place for
democracy. (Quoted in Dharif, 1992: 98)
With regard to this fundamentalist attitude, Islam is only compatible with
democracy if it is interpreted in a liberal Islamic manner. In contrast, Islamism
clearly rejects democracy. Second, in this security-related study, reference is
made to democracy because of the idea of a democratic peace (Russet, 1993).7
It is for that reason that democracy is placed on this agenda while dealing with
security. Liberal Islam approves of democracy, while Islamism does not. Without
outlining the distinction between Islam and Islamism, one can not formulate a
new approach necessary to redefining security in the Middle East.
Based on the above distinctions, the hypotheses underlying this chapter are:
1 Political religion is becoming a major issue in the study of conflict in the
Middle East. Conflicts addressed in religious terms cannot be resolved
because the belief in the absolute is the substance of every religion. This
leaves no place for negotiating peace.
DEF4  7/31/02  10:34 PM  Page 64
Between Islam and Islamism
2 With the exception of Iran, groups and parties committed to Islamism – the
expression of politicized religion – are not in power and therefore these 
challengers are basically non-statal actors. Currently they are not able to
seize power, but they can destabilize and create more tensions and disorder.
This observation creates a challenge to traditional state-centred security
studies.
3 In acknowledging the relevance of the idea of democratic peace for the post-
Cold War era, the assumption to be dealt with is that undemocratic, and to
an even greater extent totalitarian, ideologies and the groups representing
them are a threat to peace and thus to security.
These three hypotheses must include the differentiation pertinent to all of
them. Those who politicize the Islamic faith to make out of it an ideology claim-
ing an Islamic order, both for the state and the world, by and large can be iden-
tified as Islamists. To employ a broader concept (see related contributions in
Marty and Appleby, 1991) we may address them as religious fundamentalists.
Yet there is still a need for further distinction between religious fundamenta-
lism and terrorism. Every supporter of the idea of an ‘Islamic state’ or an
‘Islamic world order’ is clearly a religious fundamentalist. Therefore, and in a
broader sense, all political groups related to these ideologies are a threat to the
stability of the existing orders.
At the same time, not every fundamentalist is a committed terrorist. There
are plenty of fundamentalist individuals and groups who do not subscribe to
‘terror in the mind of God’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000) or the related use of force.
This commitment to violence and force is the dividing line between funda-
mentalist terrorism (e.g. those engaging in Jihad) and non-terrorist fundamen-
talism (e.g. the Muslim Brethren in Egypt). However, both share the intention to
topple the existing order; but their means of reaching their goal are different.
In short, the study of security in the Middle East is related to the important
task of redefining security in the international system. Post-Cold War develop-
ments require a new approach to security that goes beyond preoccupation with
the state (see Tibi, 1998c). To do so, one must embrace non-statal actors in the
analysis, and put them at the top of the agenda. In this case, groups and parties
of political Islam in the Middle East are at issue. The next step is to explain how
religion comes to the fore in security studies, i.e. when it undergoes a process of
politicization.8
The politicization of religion, destabilization and irregular war: redefining
post-bipolar security
The analysis begins with the study of the circumstances and conditions that 
led to the politicization of religion in the international arena. Even during the
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Cold War, political religion as a source of potential conflict was on the scene.
However, bipolarity was a veil to hide religion, ethnicity, culture and other
factors by subsuming these divisions beneath the East–West rivalry. Since the
disappearance of bipolarity and the bisected world of the Cold War, new con-
flicts and new forces related to politicized religion have been on the rise. In fact,
emerging religious fundamentalism and ethnicity do indicate these phenomena.
These changes necessitate a new concept of security in world politics. There are
some, however, who claim that fundamentalism is a passing phenomenon tied
merely to current events, and others go even further and maintain it has already
ended (Kepel, 2000). Events even prior to September 11 clearly show how mis-
taken these analysts are because all current international conflicts are related
either to fundamentalism or to ethnicity. In some cases, like in the Balkans,
Chechnia and Kashmir, we even find a mixture of the two, merging them to a
kind of ethno-fundamentalism. The established thought-patterns of the study
of security as well as of related policies cannot provide adequate answers to
these new challenges. Hence the need of a new approach.
In view of the developments in the post-bipolar Middle East, there is a clear
connection between fundamentalism and security. It must be emphasized here
that it is not the religion of Islam as such that is at issue. Clearly, there can be 
a dialogue with Islam as a religion in pursuit of peace; it is Islamic fundamen-
talism – not Islam – that is a concern of security policy. While Islam is a world
religion whose followers number one-fifth of the world population (1.4–1.5
billion people), Islamic fundamentalism represents a new pattern of political
mobilization carried out by a great variety of groups. They instrumentalize 
and misuse religion for non-religious ends. These groups are a minority in the
world of Islam, but they are well organized and equipped and cannot, therefore,
be ignored. The numbers matter little, though, for these groups are very capable
of destabilizing activities and creating disorder.
In short, the new approach for redefining security that takes account of
the politicization of religion is one based on a differentiation between Islam 
and ‘Islamism’, with the latter defined as religious fundamentalism. In deal-
ing with this security concern, the present chapter pursues several lines of
reasoning to reach some conclusions about the topic under issue. These are
referred to as ‘issue areas’, and they are discussed in this section in the follow-
ing manner:
First, Islam is a religion and framework for a civilization,9 but it is – as
argued earlier – not the proper object of the needed security approach, as
Huntington suggests. Islam is a monotheistic religion based on divine revela-
tion. As a world religion and civilization, it manifests great religious diversity,
between Sunnite and Shi’ite, and between different religious denominations 
and numerous sects. Islam is further characterized by great cultural diversity.
For example, African Islam is entirely different from the Islam of Southeast 
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Asia, that of the Indian subcontinent, or even its original Arab form. The
addressed religious and cultural diversity10 are also reflected in Islamic funda-
mentalism throughout the world of Islam. There is thus a weakness in those
security studies – e.g. Huntington’s 1996 Clash of Civilizations – which claim the 
existence of a monolith called ‘Islam’. In highlighting the issue in terms of secu-
rity policy, there are multiple political Islamist movements that seek to legiti-
mize themselves through religion. They proclaim one Islam but are themselves
as diverse as Islam itself. Above all, these groups adhere to similar concepts of
political order based on religion and divine law.
When security experts posit the questionable idea that Islam is a threat to
the West because of the alleged unity of action claimed by the Islamists, it
becomes necessary to clear up this misinterpretation through more precise
analyses. In order to do so, two schools of thought must be rejected: first, those
who refuse to include Islamism in security studies; and, second, those who
confuse Islam and Islamism.
Samuel Huntington, for example, correctly recognizes what is termed the
‘cultural turn’ in seeing how cultures and civilizations play an increasingly
important role in international politics. The major problem with his approach
is that he believes civilizations can engage in world political conflicts.
Huntington attempts to evade the implicit impasse by introducing the concept
of ‘core states’ (Huntington, 1996: chapter 7), each of which is supposed to lead
a civilization in international politics. In the case of Islam, this construct is not
promising for the simple reason that none of the existing fifty-five Islamic states
is in a position to lead the entire Islamic civilization. The major argument of the
present study is that security questions are related neither to Islamic states nor
directly to the civilization to which they belong. Some expert may contradict this
by pointing at the ‘security threat’ posed by Saddam Hussein of Iraq (Cockburn
and Cockburn, 1999). However the exceptional character of this case must be
considered despite all the false connections of Iraq and al-Qaida.
In contrast to Huntington, the argument presented here is that civilizations
cannot themselves engage in international conflict, but there is a sense in which
they do matter. The study of IR in the post-Cold War era needs to acknowledge
that worldviews of civilizations play a more important role in world politics
today than they did previously. In considering this fact and in continuing this
line of reasoning, war is not understood here as a military conflict between
states. The War of Civilizations (Tibi, 1995), suggests that we consider the con-
flict of different worldviews and of particular norms and values in the analysis 
of security because this conflict affects the issue of order. This conflict revolves










The outcomes differ and therefore conflicting concepts of world order emerge.11
Conflicts of values have nothing to do with armies, but they do contribute to 
the emergence of real conflicts. The ‘war of civilizations’ is therefore a war of
values and worldviews that directly affects conflict on all three levels: domestic,
regional and international.
In our time we need to include cultural dialogue as a peace strategy for the
twenty-first century in the study of security and the related conflict studies as
an alternative to the clash of civilizations (see Herzog, 1999; Tibi, 1999a).
Dialogue is a means of conflict resolution. Fundamentalists, by contrast, politi-
cize differences of worldviews between civilizations and thus fan the flames of
conflict and create an area of security concern. In this light it must be recog-
nized that security policy has two levels: first, conflicts of values, which have
political effects but cannot be settled by military means; and, second, the vio-
lence of the fundamentalists believed to be in the ‘mind of God’. It is extremely
important to distinguish between these two levels at this stage of the analysis in
shedding light on the politicization of religion, while being wary of any involve-
ment in Islamophobia.
Second, having clarified the area of concern on the grounds of the distinc-
tions made, the discussion can now move to the area of fundamentalism as a
political ideology resulting from the politicization of religion. As argued earlier,
this is not an exclusively Islamic issue since the phenomenon is cross-cultural
and global, i.e. covers all religions.12 In analysing fundamentalism in terms of
security, two distinctions must be made. One is the fact that it is common to all
varieties of fundamentalism to politicize religion in order to arrive at concepts
of political order which challenge existing secular orders. The second is that fun-
damentalism does not confine itself to a confrontation of worldviews; the resort
to violence as part of irregular military actions (i.e. the resort to terrorism) is
an actualization of the conflict related to worldviews (both aspects are analysed
in Tibi, 1998a).
The major target of the political and military activities pursued by the fun-
damentalists is the secular state. This applies to fundamentalists in all religions.
It is, however, unique to Islamic fundamentalists to go beyond the state in
embracing the universalism of Islam in order to contend that Islam provides a
concept of world order. This belief leads to a contestation of concepts about
world order. In addressing this conflict between two concepts of world order, the
prevailing Western one and the Islamic one envisaged for the future, the scholar
of Islam John Kelsay states: ‘in encounters between the West and Islam, the
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struggle is over who will provide the primary definition to the world order’. Then,
on the same page, he asks, who will lead the world in the future?
Will it be the West, with its notions of territorial boundaries, market economies,
private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights? Or will it be Islam, with its
emphasis on the universal mission of a transtribal community called to build a social
order founded on pure monotheism natural to humanity? (1993: 117)
Islamic fundamentalists answer this question by referring to the spiritual father
of their ideology, Sayyid Qutb, who in his Road Signs (1989: 6–7) states that
Islam will lead the world. It is clear that these questions and the answers given
indicate a competition between Western and Islamic concepts of world order
that cover different understandings of the notions of war and peace, as well as
of law and justice (Juergensmeyer, 2000). This is the content of ‘war of civi-
lizations’. It follows that we are confronted not only with a new era for the study
of security but with new substance.
Mark Juergensmeyer does not deal explicitly with world order, but with the
secular nation state as challenged by fundamentalism. In his study he predicts
a confrontation that leads to an emerging ‘New Cold War’ (1993). When fun-
damentalists escalate this conflict of worldviews to one related to irregular war
as neo-jihad, the politicization of religion becomes a real security problem. Some
of the cases in point are Kosovo, Macedonia, Chechnia and Kashmir. In the
Middle East it is most unfortunate to see the al-Aqsa intifada shifting the conflict
over occupation to one of order related to religion and civilizational worldviews
in viewing the uprising as an islamic jihad.
At this point, Westerners need to be cautious and to refrain from immedi-
ately thinking of Islam when they hear the word ‘fundamentalism’, since
Western media focus almost exclusively on terrorist acts committed by Islamic
fundamentalists. Without addressing the substance of conflict and without
referring to related cases, for example, the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque
in India by Hindu fundamentalists or similar terrorist acts by fundamentalists
of other religions, such as the Hebron massacre by Jewish settlers in the occu-
pied territories of Palestine, have been downplayed in the media. In stating this
concern about the potential for Islamophobia in the West, the objective is not to
belittle the threats of Islamic fundamentalism to security. The following three,
interconnected, points are essential for an understanding of how fundament-
alism can become a security threat.
1 A new security agenda must include the threat of fundamentalism. Because
fundamentalism has a dual nature, i.e. religious and political ( Jansen,
1997), it can draw on the former in pursuit of the latter – thus, it politicizes
religion. By drawing on religious symbols and grounding their message in
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religion, fundamentalists are very appealing. This makes them able to ‘fight’
without conventional military means. In order to effectively combat such a
security threat, a new kind of security approach is thus required (Buzan,
1991), one that is no longer fixated on the state and on the predominance
of military mobilization by organized armies.
2 In all religions, fundamentalist ideology is based on the belief in a divine
order. Most fundamentalists fight for this goal with political means; only 
a minority among them employs violence and acts of terror to enforce 
their concept of order. Thus, it is simply empirically false to equate funda-
mentalism with terrorism. It follows that ‘terror in the mind of God’
(Juergensmeyer, 2000) is only one aspect of fundamentalism; much more
important are its worldviews about order and its politicization of a conflict
of values. Nevertheless, terrorism13 has to be covered by the new approach,
given the resort of some fundamentalists to this means.
3 When referring to the politicization of Islam, certain well-intended
Europeans prefer to use the term ‘Islamism’ as an alternative to the term
‘Islamic fundamentalism’. In this chapter, the terms ‘political Islam’,
Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism are used interchangeably. However,
if the intent is to use the term ‘fundamentalism’ as a means of spreading
prejudice, then the effect is utterly misleading. Although the term ‘funda-
mentalism’ has been hardened into a cliché, it is a scholarly and analyti-
cal concept for studying the politicization of religion. By using the term
‘Islamism’ as an alternative way of referring to the global phenomenon of
fundamentalism as such, these scholars unwittingly contribute to the
stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting the politicization of religion
to Islam. By electing to call this fundamentalist phenomenon exclusively
‘Islamist’, they limit the phenomenon of politicized religion to Islam only,
thus denying its global character.
The third issue area refers to the field of security studies itself, and the need
to look at fundamentalism as the subject of a new approach within security
studies to what has been addressed as ‘new frontiers of security’.14 The new
approach demands an advance on the traditional concept of security dominated
by military thinking, with a broadening of scope and a deepening of insight.
Since the end of the East–West confrontation15 (see Hogan, 1992) conventional
Clausewitzian wars between states and their organized, institutionalized armies
have almost disappeared – and it is most unlikely that they will recur in the fore-
seeable future. Therefore, most of the issues must be thought through anew.
Security experts have long been arguing that this change has to be taken into
consideration, and have underscored the need for a new security approach.
Barry Buzan (1991), and later Martin van Creveld and Kalevi Holsti (see Holsti,
1996: chapter 7), have been pioneers in announcing the end of Clausewitz’s
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thesis of classical war as a confrontation between institutionalized armies. 
Non-military aspects are emphasized more and more strongly, and are quickly
becoming central subjects of security policy. In that sense, and that sense only,
it is argued that religious fundamentalism should become one of the major sub-
jects of study in the new security approach.
Organized armies are helpless against the terrorist acts of fundamentalists
or ethnic nationalists, as the examples of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Afghanistan and,
more recently, Kosovo and Macedonia, clearly demonstrate. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces could overpower the Serbian army with its
arsenal of weapons in 1999, but in 2000 and 2001 they were unable to contain
the religious–ethnic UÇK irregulars’ acts of revenge against the Christian Serbs
and Macedonians. In the traditional historical (not the theological) Islamic
understanding, jihad is a war of irregulars against the infidels. This under-
standing is currently gaining topicality for determining ‘Islam’ and ‘war’ (see
Tibi, 1996; Kelsay, 1993: chapter 5).
Any security concept for combating fundamentalism should guard against
equating the political activists of these new tendencies with Islam itself. It
cannot be reiterated enough how important it is to make clear the distinction
between the religion of Islam and its fundamentalist abuse. This – missing – dis-
tinction also reinforces the claim of the Islamists to be the ‘true voice of Islam’
as such, and allows them to demonize their critics as the ‘voice of Islamophobia’.
The logistics of Islamic fundamentalism in the West have become an important
component of this movement. Therefore, the study of security must inquire into
the networking between the region of conflict itself, in this case the Middle East,
and what is termed the ‘gated Diaspora’. Categorizing the values-based conflict
between political Islam and the West as Islamophobia obscures complex cat-
egories and is misleading.16
The Middle East and the quest for democratic peace: 
the place of Islamism
The final part of this chapter proceeds to focus exclusively on the attitudes 
of Islamic fundamentalists vis-à-vis the Arab–Israeli peace process. It might
confuse some readers to see these attitudes illustrated with respect to neither
Hamas nor Jihad Islami, but rather with reference to the case of Islamic funda-
mentalism in the Maghreb. There are two reasons. First, the scope of the study
is broadened in the Middle East by extending the concept of peace from an
Arab–Israeli one to a Mediterranean peace. In this understanding of Euro-
Mediterranean peace17 fundamentalism is viewed as a threat to political stabil-
ity in the Mediterranean (Tibi, 2000c). Second, the direct security threat posed
by Hamas or Jihad Islami is pertinent, but it is for a scholarly analysis more 
illuminating to showcase the issue on other Islamist movements.
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At the outset some remarks on the differences between the first intifada
(1987–93) (Hunter, 1993) and the recent one (beginning at the end of
September 2000) are necessary and most pertinent to understanding the
Islamization of the conflict. The first intifada was a national one led by the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It is wrong to blame the PLO for initiat-
ing the uprising, for early on it did not control it for some time. Clearly, the
Islamists led the second intifada, referred to as the al-Aqsa intifada. In what way
does this difference matter to peace and security? In the preceding sections, it
was argued that political Islam is not in favour of the peace process as based on
mutual acceptance in terms of each ‘acknowledging the other’s nationhood’, as
Herbert Kelman of Harvard, a mediator in the peace process, has put it (1992:
18–38). In this regard we need to ask whether, and in a commitment to peace,
the Islamists acknowledge the place of Israel in the Middle East18 and the right
of the Jewish people to sovereignty over the grounds of mutuality regarding the
rights of the Palestinian people to establish their own state and determine their
own destiny (Farsoun, 1997: 311ff.). Clearly, the answers are negative. From
this vantage-point, Islamism is seen as an impediment to the peace process. In
the dominant stream of security studies, we see a continuing focus on the state,
and thus the aforementioned issues are ignored insofar as the so-called ‘deadly
struggle for peace’19 is viewed as a struggle between the states of the Middle East.
In a redefined concept of security Islam does have a place in Middle Eastern
peace. With reference to the concept of democratic peace pertinent to post-Cold
War security studies, there is a compatibility of Islam, understood as morality,
with modern democracy. In contrast, Islamism is not a religion-based morality,
but rather a concept of political order. To be sure, it is not democratic order (Tibi,
1998a: chapters 7 and 8). The assumption is that a democratic peace is a 
guarantee of non-belligerent conflict resolution in that democracies negotiate,
but do not wage wars against each other (see Russet, 1993). In this regard, the
question is whether divine orders, based on the Sharia (Islamic law) or, alter-
natively, on the Halakha (Jewish law) could commit themselves to peace. The
hypothesis is that states based on divine law can not do so, that only secular
orders are able to commit themselves to democratic peace. This is not to ignore
the place of religion. However, it is necessary to establish harmony between 
‘religious commitment and secular reason’ (Audi, 2000) while searching for
peaceful conflict resolution through dialogue.
For the final part of this study, the working hypothesis is that an Islamic
state as envisaged by the Islamists is not designed to accept Israel as an equal
partner for Arab Muslims. The Maghribi Islamists are a case in point. In con-
trast, the traditional Islam-based monarchy in Morocco20 has proved to be most
supportive of the idea of peace with Israel. The late King Hassan II left consider-
able records as a positive legacy in this regard. In commenting on the death 
of the Moroccan king in July 1999, Shimon Peres acknowledged in a BBC 
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TV-interview that Hassan II was a friend of the Jewish people and a supporter
of an Islamic peace with their State. The published records by Abu Mazen, 
alias the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, support this statement (Abbas,
1995: 186).
Before moving to examine the impact of the working hypothesis on the neg-
ative connection between peace and Islamism in the case of the Maghreb, it is
pertinent to explore the notion of ‘peace’ used here. Prior to the age of nation-
alism and the formation of the State of Israel, Muslims and Jews lived in peace
with one another to the extent of having a Jewish–Islamic symbiosis21 – to use
the term of the most distinguished Jewish historian Bernard Lewis (1984). In
arguing on secular grounds for a lasting peace, Jews and Muslims can learn
from European history that only after the peace of Westphalia, i.e. after estab-
lishing the mutually accepted secular sovereignty of all states, religion-based
wars in Europe disappeared.
One must further determine the scope of the envisaged democratic peace 
in broadening it from an Arab–Israeli and a Jewish–Muslim peace to a Euro-
Mediterranean partnership (see Khader, 1997; see also Tibi, 2000c). Domestic
and regional stability in the southern Mediterranean is needed, and the
Islamization of politics is viewed as a security threat to peace in this region.
In applying the findings of the earlier, more general, deliberations in the 
preceding parts of this study to the case of Maghribi Islamists, the following 
two hypotheses are formulated:
1 Islamism, viewed as the Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism, is 
in this concrete case primarily a concept of political order for the Arabo-
Islamic Maghreb. Religious fanaticism, extremism or even terrorism are 
in fact only side-effects of this phenomenon: they do not pertain to its 
substance as a worldview underpinning a concept of nizam siyasi (political
order), labelled by the Islamists themselves as Hakimiyyat Allah (God’s rule)
(see Marty and Appleby, 1991). It follows that the pending challenge in the
Maghreb is not merely a religious one, but rather one related to a new
Islamic order aspired to and as such a security issue. Thus, Islamism matters
in the first place as an alternative political order envisioned by the Islamists
as counter-elites opposed to the ruling elites. To be sure, in considering the
professed commitment to democracy, this is not to suggest that the ruling
elites in the Maghreb, or in any other part of the world of Islam, are more
democratic than the challenging Islamist counter-elites.
2 Religious fundamentalism as political Islam, or Islamism, has been intro-
duced to the Maghreb from outside of this sub-region of the Arab world
with the implication that it can only work if successfully indigenized, i.e.
Maghrebized in being adjusted to local conditions. The external sources of
religious fundamentalism in one of the three Maghreb states (Algeria)
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referred to in this section are to be located in their respective domains. In
the main, the introduction of Islamism to the Maghreb from outside can be
located at three points of impact:
• Ideologically, the major impact comes from the Arab east (the Mashrek).
In terms of countries, Egypt and Syria are to be mentioned, and in terms
of organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood (see Mitchell, 1969) ranks at
the top. The writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and his followers are
most pivotal in this regard.
• Politically, the Iranian Revolution (Arjomand, 1988) generated great
impact on the Maghreb: it ‘breathed life into Islamist movements every-
where’ (Burgat and Dowal, 1993: 185). Though the Iranian Revolution
has been based on Shii Islam, which is clearly alien to Sunni Maghribi
Muslims, it has been able to exert great ripple-effects on the unfolding
of political Islam in North Africa. It is true that the envisaged export of
the revolution failed,22 but the addressed ripple-effects should not be
underestimated. In addition, there exists clear evidence of an ‘Iranian
Connection’ (O’Balance, 1997) that also applies to the Maghreb. There
is evidence that many Maghribi Islamists went to Iran and that several
of their movements received funds from Teheran. Both the Egyptian
and Iranian connections determine a fundamentalist Maghribi rejec-
tion of the Oslo peace.
• Militarily, the war in Afghanistan had considerable effects on the trans-
fer of political Islam into military action throughout the world of Islam,
and in particular the Arab world. Again, the Maghreb has been no
exception. Algeria is to be mentioned in the first place. The Islamists
returning from Afghanistan are the foremost exponents of radical
Islam (Draz, 1993). There were numerous Algerians among them 
who now also act in Western Europe, as well as in North America.
Among the Mujahidin combating the ‘infidel’ communist Soviets in
Afghanistan, after their invasion of December 1979, about 20,000
Arabs participated in the war of resistance. A leading figure among
them was Usamah Bin Laden, who has recently made international
headlines and received global media coverage.23 The origin of the
phenomenon that has been named ‘the Arab Afghans’ in the Western–
Islamist co-operative element in the Afghanistan war is well known to
experts, but not yet acknowledged by the politicians involved. Among
these warriors of political Islam there were 2,000 Algerians and a
great, but not exactly known, number of Tunisians and Moroccans. In
short, there existed a considerable Maghribi contingent in Afghanistan.
After the end of the war these militarily trained Islamists returned to
the Middle East and North Africa. They were diffused throughout the
DEF4  7/31/02  10:34 PM  Page 74
Between Islam and Islamism
region while engaging themselves in politically destabilizing irregular
military actions addressed as terrorism. Students of war like Kalevi
Holsti (1996: chapter 7) view this military action as ‘war of a third
kind’. Irregulars constitute a new type of soldier, which compels 
revision of earlier concepts of security in favour of envisaging ‘new
security’ (Tibi, 1998c: see chapter 12 in particular). September 11 has
been the most prominent case of irregular war.
In addressing this ‘new security’, it must be reiterated that Islam, as a world reli-
gion and a belief system, is by no means a ‘whatever threat’. Islamism is a threat,
not to NATO, but rather to regional stability in North Africa and other parts 
of the world of Islam, and also to Arab–Israeli peace. From that point of
view the spread of political Islam in North Africa is a tough challenge to 
the existing political order and thus a distinctly geopolitical issue that matters
to stability. A Maghribi Islamist supports the reference to political Islam as a
concept of political order with regard to the advocated education in political
Islam in this manner: ‘These were no longer lessons on how to wash one’s
hands, or to pray or fast. They had become lessons on how it might become 
possible to live in an Islamic State’ (quoted in Burgat and Dowal, 1993: 258).
To be sure, this envisaged ‘Islamic State’ has roots neither in the Quran nor in
the hadith,24 but is basically a political belief of the Islamists.
The call for an Islamic state unfolded in the Maghreb at three levels and
according to three different steps, particularly in Algeria where Islamists resorted
to the use of force (Ayashi, 1992). At the outset it was the mosque, which has
‘constituted the first framework for a gestation of the Islamist discourse’, as
François Burgat tells us; the Islamist movement then ‘left the obscurity of the
mosque . . . and began via the university to come into public view’ (Burgat and
Dowal, 1993: 86f.). Thus, the mosque,25 the academic campus, and then the
urban street as well as the sub-proletarian suburb were the major spaces in which
this process unfolded. The outcome has been a new movement, which has
become, as argued earlier, a security challenge to the nation state,26 both to its
legitimacy as well as that of the ruling political elites themselves.
Another important issue is the contest for power among those who rule 
and those who want to replace them in office by shattering the system itself.27
The Hakimiyyat Allah concept, representing the Islamists’ alternative order, is
supposed to supersede the existing nominally secular nation state (Tibi, 1990b:
127–52).28 The Islamists target the weak Arab states. The weakness of their
statehood affects their ability to make peace. The issue under question clearly
pertains to political and regional stability – a top security issue. In response to
this challenge the religious establishment backing the existing order made an
effort to curb the politicization of the mosque. The Algerian Islamist Abbasi
Madani challenged this effort in pointing to the fact that ‘the mission of the
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mosque is not the same as that of a church . . . The mosque is a place . . . in
which all the affairs of the umma are treated . . . It is from there that the armies
left to confront the enemy (quoted by Burgat and Dowall, 1993: 90).
In historical terms Abbasi Madani is right, but this is not the religion of
Islam as revealed ethics; rather it is Islamic history. The historian of early Islamic
jihad in the sense of conquest Khalid Yahya Blankinship (1994: 15f.) informs us
that the mosque indeed served as part of the logistics of the Islamic wars of
futuhat, which stand in the historical context of jihad and crusades, i.e. of enmity
(Tibi, 1999b). In our age, Mediterranean peace and intercultural bridging are
necessary in order to avoid revising that tradition, and instead to engage in the
politics of preventing the clash of civilizations. This requires an effort on both
sides. Islamism in all three Maghreb states is clearly opposed to peace with Israel,
as are other varieties of this movement throughout the world of Islam.
Conclusions: how can we cope with fundamentalism?
In considering the fact that Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa is not only
a threat to the security of the states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, but an
obstacle to Arab–Israeli reconciliation and to peace in the Mediterranean, one
can conclude that Islamism is an issue area in the study of security. In this
understanding, the present case exceeds the domestic level as a threat to
regional security. This is a serious challenge to stability with which we need to
cope. Given the great sectarianism of groups and subgroups among the
Islamists and the related splits in their movements, their capability to seize power
is clearly limited. Islamists will probably fail to establish the divine–political
order they envisage, but nevertheless are continuing and will continue to be in
a position to destabilize and create disorder (see Tibi, 1998a). The result would
be regional instability and turmoil.
The redefinition of security studies is a challenge to design policies capable
of dealing with changed situations. We need to put on our agenda the study of
the political strength of the Islamist movements and of their ability to mobilize
and thus create a real threat to stability. In policy terms Islamism is to be viewed
as the major force of opposition in the world of Islam. It follows the need for a
policy that helps to determine the ways in which we deal with this political
movement.
In moving from the case of Islamism in the Maghreb to the entire Middle
Eastern regional state subsystem, which represents the arena of the Arab–
Israeli conflict,29 the search is for peaceful conflict resolution, which goes beyond
the states. At issue is the rise of Islamism as a new political opposition. The 
foremost goal of Islamism is to establish a new political order described as an
Islamic state. Despite the inclusivist inclination of this study, i.e. the plea not to
‘other’ the Islamists, but rather to integrate them with the political system, the
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present analysis views a lasting peace in terms of democratic peace. This posi-
tion leads to major reservations vis-à-vis the Islamists because they would never
accept a peace with Israel based on mutual acceptance of sovereignty.30 A tac-
tical peace is not a lasting peace. In addition, an Islamist state based on the
Sharia is not a democratic state based on democratic pluralism and secular civil
society and therefore it could not be part of a democratic peace, either in the
region of the Middle East or worldwide. Nevertheless, a temporary peace is better
than war, regardless of whether it is waged between states or as an irregular
war. Two ideas will conclude the thoughts developed in this study.
First, Islamism is diverse, but it can be viewed in a general manner as a
threat to domestic, regional and international security. Most Western experts on
Islam, who are trained as philologians not social scientists, correctly point out
the cultural diversity of Islam. Unfortunately, from this fact they then go on to
draw the false conclusion that any generalized judgement is inadmissible.
Rejecting generalization deviates from this traditional wisdom peculiar to the
general logic of philology, but not from the study of politics and society. In 
particular, in security studies it is patently false to argue this way. On the basis
of research and expert knowledge, generalization is possible and often even 
necessary if only up to a certain point. Otherwise, one runs the risk of failing 
to perceive the true problem. The world of Islam is diverse, but this diversity is
part of a general spectrum which could be called Islamic civilization. Similarly,
Islamism is characterized both by diversity and unity. Furthermore, as the
approach which dominates Islamic studies, philology is unable to recognize
either the phenomenon of fundamentalism or the security dimension related 
to it. Therein lies the limitation of Western Islamic studies and its practical 
relevance for our inquiry. Its anti-social-science attitude hinders a scholarly 
dialogue toward a better understanding of the problems at issue.
Second, fundamentalism results from both a crisis of meaning and a struc-
tural crisis that derives in part from the poverty of populations in many parts of
the world. In this environment, fundamentalism functions as an ideology of
salvation, which promises a better life by making glorious promises. Terrorists
are a minority among fundamentalists; they are in large part youths without
any prospects in life who get sucked into the bog of underground terrorism and
firmly believe they are acting in the name and interests of Islam. As laymen who
are not very familiar with Islamic teaching, they do not realize that their actions
violate all basic Islamic norms and values. To be sure, the Islamic doctrine of
jihad allows violence, but has clear rules that unequivocally prohibit terrorism.
For instance, the rules of jihad prescribe an early warning of violence and direct
confrontation in contrast to terrorist acts based on surprise and the use of
ambush tactics (see Tibi, 1996).
In the Middle East itself every politics of confrontation contributes to a dilut-
ing of the lines between liberal and militant Muslims. Thus it is a security
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concern in the post-Cold War sense of averting all kinds of confrontational 
politics. The peace movement in Israel contributes more effectively to the 
security of the country than do current Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and his
supporters. The only alternative for a promising future is to return to the spirit
of mutual acceptance and respect. This spirit was the ground for establish-
ing mutual confidence. Under the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu all confidence measures were shaken (Lockery, 1999),31 and under
Sharon they were ultimately bulldozed.32 It is time to teach politicians that post-
bipolar security is based on a search for peace, not on jihad nor on the military
and its capabilities for retaliation.
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It  is  widely assumed that war is a man’s world. Male soldiers fight enemysoldiers on the battlefield to protect their homelands and their families fromexistential threat. The woman’s role during war, on the other hand, is to
remain steadfast on the home front, support her man, keep the home fires
burning, and wait anxiously for his safe return. On the basis of this scenario,
the motivation for the ‘citizen warrior’ to take up arms is ultimately to shield the
honour and integrity of his ‘beautiful soul’ against the perils of a dangerous 
and anarchic world (Elshtain, 1987). Whether or not this account of warfare 
is accurate, it is the quintessence of the conventional rendition of national 
security, namely, protection of the boundaries of a nation state (homeland) from
external military threat. The accompanying script of home front (safety) versus
battlefield (warfare) as respectively feminized and masculinized is a powerful
interface of discourses and practices that designate particular roles to men and
women in conflict zones.1
However, upon consideration of gender as a major analytical category, the
real landscape of war and national security is often revealed as less exclusively
male (Enloe, 1989), as women participate beyond the home front, and practices
of warfare are not necessarily confined to the battlefield as typically defined.
Women occupy many diverse positions in relation to international conflict, not
only as supporters of men, but also as combatants, guerrilla warriors, terrorists,
and so on. As well, divisions between home front and battlefield are not neces-
sarily exclusive when the social context of warfare is considered. In short, a 
consideration of gender renders ambiguous many of the common assumptions
held about male–female domains in war, as well as the nature and effectiveness
of protection systems (i.e. security). This has significant implications for redefin-
ing security from the perspective of feminist debates and concepts.
The Middle East is a valuable laboratory for investigation of the dynamic
between gender and security. Because of the protracted conditions of warfare in
many Middle Eastern states, gender roles are structured to a great extent by the
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exigencies of the national security agenda throughout that region, and hence
the predominance there of the military in political decision making. States in
the Middle East are characterized by unsettled boundaries, civil/ethnic disputes,
guerrilla warfare, proliferation of weapons, militarism and a general context of
insecurity. These political circumstances spill over into the private sphere in the
form of militarized social relations and gendered insecurity. The vulnerability 
of women often results from the dependence of regime self-preservation on a
centralized form of patriarchal authority, a disproportionate military defence
budget and uniformed male decision making in times of crisis.2 For the general
population, this situation of chronic emergency can be experienced as a mecha-
nism for order and social control. The militarized and masculinized form of
leadership in the Middle East tends to impinge upon the rights of minorities and
other collectives, the identities of which are based on class, ethnicity, religion
and gender, groups whose main interests may not coincide, and may even con-
flict, with those of the state. Women tend to be positioned in such sub-state
groups and, as such, comprise a major category from which to understand the
exclusive nature of security in the Middle East.
In this chapter, Israel is the immediate context for exploring gender roles
ascribed by national security, and the cleavages that result from a society in 
constant state of war. Israel is the epitome of a war society in which all aspects
of life are conditioned, to some extent, by the security policy predicament. The
predominance of warfare in Israel developed in tandem with the process of state
building. Israel’s origins as a pioneering community led to the dual objectives of
assimilating a diverse immigrant population and of transforming the Jewish
national character from a persecuted minority in the diaspora into a sovereign
and independent majority in Palestine. The army was given a special role in the
transformation of both the Israeli citizen and Israeli society (Almog, 1993), and
the process of state development. Over the years, the protracted Arab–Israeli
conflict has effectively positioned the state and its security apparatus as the over-
arching power structure that impinges upon all other aspects of life in Israel,
whether in the political, economic, cultural or social spheres.
Until recently, the primary role of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was not
subject to public scrutiny or criticism. However, changes to the strategic envi-
ronment in the 1980s and 1990s opened space for civil society and dissenting
groups to question their roles in national security and to promote new under-
standings of the relationship between national and personal security in Israel.
This process of reflection on the military in Israeli society has developed further
in the context of the Middle East peace process (MEPP). Peace negotiations have
altered the context in which the theory and practice of security in the region
are understood. Although internal conflict is raging in the Israeli–Palestinian
context, inter-state war in the Middle East is no longer regarded as a legiti-
mate political mechanism, and this has resulted in new constraints on and
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opportunities for social groups struggling for change, whether through violent
or non-violent means. Women have played a significant part in ongoing politi-
cal transformations. Women have occupied a large role in protest movements,
and they have also contributed significantly to ongoing discussions about
national security, which hold crucial implications for conflict zones in the 
post-Cold War era.
This chapter has two main lines of inquiry. First, it seeks to explore the gen-
dered aspects of national security in Israel and to consider the ways in which
women are domesticated within their protection systems. This line of inquiry
considers how current gender boundaries have developed historically and in
relation to the political process in Israel. Second, within the context of these
gender boundaries and symbols, the chapter turns to the politics of women’s
resistance in order to explore women’s alternative understandings of security.
Israeli women have organized around two main responses to the gendered struc-
tures of war, responses that correspond to the mainstreaming versus indepen-
dence debate in feminist theory (Jacoby, 2000).
On the one hand, Israeli women have waged an arduous struggle for equal
access to the ‘right to fight’. In Israel, women undergo compulsory conscription
but have not, until recently, entered the last bastion of male exclusivity in the
state – combat. A consequence of the predominance of the military in Israeli
society is that, women’s right to fight is equivalent to women’s equal access to
all the leading structures of authority in Israel. Since the 1973 War and the
quandaries that resulted from the lack of womanpower on the home front, 
the goal of women’s career advancement in the military, and later women in
combat, became an issue on the political agenda. The struggle for women’s right
to fight involves working towards equality within existing structures and rules,
and participating in the mainstream political process alongside men.
On the other hand, women have articulated a feminist agenda within the
context of the women’s peace movement in Israel. Women’s peace activism 
represents an oppositional constituency with roots dating back, in large part, to
the 1982 Lebanon War and the 1987 Palestinian uprising against the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.3 Although not a pacifist move-
ment, women in the peace camp have expressed critical and dissenting views
vis-à-vis the State and its military policy. In its actions and ideologies, the 
Israeli women’s peace movement has articulated understandings of security
that, in relation to feminist identity and social justice, lie outside the mainstream
agenda, and an affinity with their Palestinian women counterparts. This strat-
egy combines a campaign against war with a struggle for women’s equality.
Significantly, women’s peace activism in Israel has taken place largely outside
the predominant structures of the Israeli political system.
While both strategies – mainstreaming and independence – promote
women’s voices in the national security agenda, they hold different implications
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for female liberation in Israel – broadly defined – as well as for the nature of
a negotiated settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The main question is the
extent to which either strategy for women’s activism helps or hinders a redefini-
tion of security in support of the dual goals of gender equality and peace in
Israel.
Finally, the chapter considers the significance to gender relations in Israel
of the changes currently taking place in the military–industrial complex as a
result of the evolution of the strategic environment and the new circumstances
set in motion by the Middle East peace process. In the contemporary Middle East,
a complex of relations, both formal and informal, has been forged to support
normalization and peaceful coexistence. While not always successful in political
terms,4 these relations influence the opportunities and constraints for women’s
struggles and the perception of women’s roles in society.
Israeli women and national security
For the purposes of this discussion, and notwithstanding the wealth of debates
within feminism,5 the definition of gender used here is that of a ‘constitutive
element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes’
(Scott, 1988: 42), and as a primary way of signifying relationships of power.
Gender is understood, therefore, as a social rather than a biological category
underpinning the male–female distinction as well as the separation of male 
and female bodies in all the major structures of society. In this sense, gender is
both a discourse and a practice. As a discourse, gender produces and reproduces
what Cynthia Enloe (1989) refers to as a ‘bundle of expectations’ about socially
valuable and culturally acceptable norms related to ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminin-
ity’. As a practice, gender is a concrete representation of the power dynamics
between actual men and women in terms of their access to economic, political
and military authority.
A growing body of seminal works has begun the process of critical reflec-
tion on the relationship between gender and national security in Israel (Emmett,
1996; Kandiyoti, 1996; Palestine–Israel Journal, 1995; Sharoni, 1995; Mayer,
1994; Azmon and Izraeli, 1993; Bernstein, 1992; Swirsky and Safir, 1991). A
major theme of this literature is the fundamental contradiction in Israeli society
between the myth of gender equality and the reality of women’s marginaliza-
tion. The gender equality myth in Israel draws from such significant cultural 
signifiers as women’s compulsory conscription, Golda Meir (the first and 
only woman prime minister of Israel), communal childcare in the kibbutz 
(co-operative settlement), images of the pre-state pioneering women and of
women’s fighting roles between 1947 and 1949. A result of these indicators 
of gender equality in the historical development of Israeli society is the 
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often-encountered assumption that the problem of feminism in Israel either has
never existed or has already been resolved.
By way of contrast, Israeli feminist scholarship has begun to challenge 
the gender equality myth through revisionist history and gender analysis by
exploring ways in which the Israeli political system has simultaneously mobi-
lized and marginalized women. This ‘mobilization–marginalization’ pheno-
menon in Israel has been linked to the primary role of the military in Israeli
society and the underlying prioritization of military over civilian interests. The
predominance of the Israeli military is upheld by the widespread belief that, as
a result of the protracted conflict, the existence of the State of Israel has yet to
be guaranteed. This notion of an ‘existential threat’ has given elite military men,
including those in the upper echelons of the military hierarchy and those 
generals who have made the horizontal move into politics, the responsibility for
making key decisions for the State on such crucial matters as war and national
security. As part of this perspective on national security, Israel has invested a
disproportionate amount of spending in the military sector,6 thus creating a
large military–industrial complex at the expense of other areas such as health,
education and social services. The predominance of military–industrial over
civilian interests has developed simultaneously in Israel, therefore, with the 
predominance of men over women, who occupy a secondary role in military
affairs and a disproportionately large role in the private sphere.
Israeli women have always had a difficult relationship with the Israeli 
military–industrial complex. Historical accounts relate that the early Jewish
immigrants to Palestine from Eastern Europe and Russia in the early 1900s were
motivated by the common goal of building a new egalitarian society that would
be collectively organized and committed to social transformation. However, the
early egalitarian objective of the Jewish community in Palestine did not extend
to equality between men and women. The harsh physical conditions and secu-
rity issues led to social norms being eventually surpassed by the glorification 
of physical labour, militarism and masculinized traits. Productivity targets 
and the prioritizing of physical labour intensified the segregation of men and
women. Women’s work became associated with a lack of productivity and
power and was thus rendered less valuable than men’s work, in particular the
physically demanding tasks associated with agricultural labour (Bernstein,
1992). Although women did work alongside men in the fields, their inclusion
in the nation eventually became synonymous with motherhood and child-
bearing, and other traditional feminine functions such as childrearing and
various unremunerated social services.
A similar gendered dynamic of inclusion and exclusion took place in the
pre-state military sphere. During the initial stages of warfare, women struggled
to be equally included in military operations. However, the issue of gender
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equality was continually sidelined as tensions escalated between Jews and the
local Arab population opposed to the Zionist settlement project. Women were
excluded from the first Jewish pre-state defence organization, Hashomer, an
authoritarian para-military group that espoused power and male superiority
(Rein, 1980: 35). However, as a result of the deterioration of security in the early
1920s Hashomer was replaced by a new and secret defence organization,
Haganah (literally defence), that recruited all able-bodied men and women to
struggle against the Arab population as well as against British restrictions on
Jewish immigration. Nevertheless, although Haganah women were trained with
men in techniques of discipline and weaponry, women’s service was segregated
into such feminized areas as communications, first aid and medical assistance
(Bloom, 1991: 129). The early articulation of gender relations in Israel was
characterized, therefore, by the domestication of women within the key struc-
tures of Israeli society, despite the ideology of equal inclusion in labour and
defence that underpinned the pre-state period.
Following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the persistent
security situation continued to impinge upon gender relations. However, the
period of statehood established an additional factor in the social construction of
biological difference between the sexes in Israel. The lack of separation between
religion and statehood in the State of Israel further complicated the role of
women in the national security agenda. Israel was initially established as a 
political solution to the persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe. Although a 
large portion of Israeli citizens currently identifies itself as secular, Israel has
remained a Jewish state with laws that favour Jewish over non-Jewish citizens.7
An unwritten accommodation between religion and statehood known as the
‘status quo’ gave the Orthodox rabbinical authority a monopoly over personal
status law.8 The disproportionate political power of the Orthodox as opposed to
other streams of Judaism, such as Conservative, Reform or Reconstructionist,
pertains to a broad range of areas, such as marriage and divorce, child custody,
inheritance and burial. This reliance on Orthodox Judaism for monitoring 
the contours of the Jewish nation has problematized women’s struggles for
equality since, according to Orthodox interpretations of scripture and custom,
women occupy traditional roles as mothers and bearers of children. In fact,
according to Orthodox interpretations, a Jew is defined as having been born 
to a Jewish mother, thus establishing a maternal lineage for reproduction of
the Jewish nation. However, Orthodox women do not play an important part 
in public prayer and political life, the key staples of authority in religious 
communities.
In a zone of conflict such as Israel, religion serves two major purposes. On
the one hand, religion is a source of solace and community in times of crisis.
On the other hand, religion can be manipulated as an ideological tool to 
serve political ends. Since the 1967 War9 and the acquisition by Israel of key
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holy sites in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, policy debate about national
security has become integrated with fundamental belief systems. Since 1967,
both the Labour and Likud Governments have sought to populate the occupied
and/or annexed land. Since 1967, strategic reasons for control over disputed
territory have increasingly mixed with religious and messianic arguments in
support of the biblical Land of Israel (Sprinzak, 1991; Lustick, 1988).
This increasingly politicized role of religion in Israeli politics has served to
radicalize political platforms, and has allowed the Jewish settlement imperative
to impinge upon the most intimate relations in Israeli society – those of the
family. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has seen the family become a primary
tool in the demographic struggle between Jews and Palestinians in disputed ter-
ritory. At its core, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is fought over the settlement of
territory and the designation of borders. Families are needed to populate con-
quered territory. As a result, strategic arguments have permeated the personal
arena of sexuality, fertility and reproduction. The notion of strategic superior-
ity maintains that soldiers must defend borders, while the Bible gives the cardi-
nal commandment ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ (Genesis 1:28). The synthesis of
religious and strategic arguments over land renders national security synony-
mous with the need to reproduce, settle and populate territory, and this has had
a direct impact on women’s reproductive freedom in Israel in both Orthodox and
non-Orthodox circles.
In both instances, the idea of the ‘nationalist family’ is a normative struc-
ture that embodies strategic value. The gendered significance of this politicized
understanding of the family lies in its impingement upon women’s obligation 
to the nation. The nationalist family perpetuates domesticated notions of
women’s role as reproducers of culture and social continuity, and members 
of the national collectivity (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989). This female 
image has had very concrete effects on women’s struggles for indepen-
dence in Israel. For example, controversy over population control in the 1970s
became connected with the campaign to legalize abortion in Israel. The State’s 
pronatalist policy rendered any form of decreased fertility (such as abortion) 
as inimical to the political exigency of Jewish reproduction in Israel. In other
words, abortion was regarded as a threat to Israeli national security. The 
State clashed on numerous occasions with the women’s movement over a
woman’s right to decide about her own reproduction. The coincidence of
women with national reproduction is reinforced in Israel by the association of
womanhood with territorial integrity and notions of the Jewish nation as a
‘family writ large’ (Katz, 1996). The male domination of military and labour
relations, the patriarchal religious establishment and the patriarchal family, 
all represent key gender structures in Israel that combine to define a prob-
lematic relationship between women and national security in Israel (Jacoby,
1999).
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The politics of women’s resistance in Israel – peace or 
the right to fight?
In response to these gender boundaries in Israel, the politics of women’s resis-
tance has taken two major forms. The first is defined by the struggle for the right
to fight, while the Israeli women’s peace movement represents the second. This
section explores these strategies for women’s resistance in terms of their con-
tribution to women’s liberation – broadly defined – and their association with
security and a peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
Israeli women and the right to fight
Israeli Jewish women10 have undergone compulsory conscription into the IDF
since the establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, followed by the
passing of the Defence Service Law on 8 September 1949. The compulsory 
military service of women, during times of peace and war, is a distinguishing
feature of the Israeli context in so far as that most other instances of interna-
tional conflict do not involve women serving as soldiers. This participation of
women in the national security agenda creates an array of challenges and
opportunities that are unique to feminist struggles in Israel.
Women’s right to fight is a complex dimension of international feminist
theory. Female soldiering contradicts the two major assumptions of conven-
tional feminist scholarship on gender roles in war. On the one hand, conven-
tional feminism posits a coincidence between women and pacifism (Ruddick,
1989; Gilligan, 1982). This female pacifist role is, in many respects, diametri-
cally opposed to men’s supposed predisposition to aggression. The literature on
women and war assumes that women’s aversion to violence derives from the
feminine qualities of motherhood, care giving, morality, emotion, connection,
holism, and value for the sanctity of all life (Reardon, 1993). It is assumed that
these qualities are universal and exhibited by all women, in all places and at all
times. However, the Israeli context renders problematic these basic categories of
feminist theory.
In Israel, women’s organizations, such as the Israeli Women’s Network
(IWN) and the Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women, have con-
tradicted the assumptions of Western feminists by waging a strong battle for
women’s right to fight. Although women have always served in the IDF, con-
troversy has lingered over women’s entry into combat positions. Arguments in
favour of women in combat imply that women’s liberation and their attainment
of full civic rights depend on equal representation with men in all domains and
leadership positions where policy is made.
However, women’s marginalization in the Israeli military and obstacles to
their career advancement have been a serious concern for the Israeli feminist
movement. Galia Golan, a veteran Israeli feminist, academic and peace activist,
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has argued that ‘the military stands as the quintessence of a patriarchal insti-
tution reinforcing the stereotypical role of woman as subordinate, subservient
and superfluous’ (1997: 115). One of the major issues in women’s service
derives from job segregation. Statistics show that the majority of women con-
scripts serve in clerical and service positions under the authority of a male of
higher rank. In 1994, the largest category of women in the IDF was clerical,
representing 33 per cent.11
The most significant factor in women’s marginal role in the military 
has been their exclusion from combat.12 In Israel, combat duty is considered 
the most prestigious area of military service on account of the national secu-
rity situation. Elite combat units such as Sayeret Golani (footsoldiers), Sayeret
Tsanchanim (paratroopers), and Sayeret Matkal (special forces) are seen as pro-
tecting the State from existential threat. For that reason, these units are recog-
nized as the most honourable soldiers, since they risk their lives for the good 
of the State. Soldiers who remain on the home front are derogatorily referred to
as jobnikim, soldiers who preserve a low rank and entertain no risk. Combat 
is not only considered a prestigious arena within the military: it serves as an 
all-encompassing rite of passage into other areas of Israeli society. For example,
many high-ranking soldiers translate their decorated military careers into 
material and political benefits in the governmental, commercial and industrial
sectors upon retirement to civilian life. Women’s lack of combat experience has
effectively denied them such benefits and opportunities.
The campaign for women’s career advancement in the military in Israel
began in the aftermath of the 1973 War. During the war, while the male-
dominated labour force was resituated at the front lines, problems resulted 
from women’s lack of training in areas of manufacturing, agriculture and
public transit. After 1973, the armed forces were restructured in a way that
broadened the number of professions open to women. For example, in 1978
women became eligible to instruct on combat courses such as tank and artillery.
In the 1990s, major gains were achieved by women struggling for the right to
fight. In 1995, a women whose objective was to become a military pilot peti-
tioned the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice which forced the Air Force to create
accommodations for women in pilot training courses. In fact, in 1999 the first
woman completed the Israel Air Force’s pilot’s course and was assigned to an F-
16 squadron, while other women have since entered basic flight training.
Women were recruited to border-guard units in 1996, and since 1998 women
have been integrated into anti-aircraft defence units, which train personnel in
the operation of Hawk and Patriot missiles, and Ramit radar systems.13 Women
have also served as flight navigators, as spotters on the northern border, and
have trained in the navy’s ship commander’s course.14 The gradual opening of
all positions in the military to women has dismantled one of the last bastions of
male privilege in the national security agenda – at least formally.
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However, issues for Israeli women in combat continue to arise. First, formal
rights to career advancement in the military do not necessarily translate into
concrete gains. A serious complicating factor is that women in the military
structure continue to face informal barriers to advancement. First, women’s
right to fight in war does not account for some of the most pervasive forms of
structural and direct physical violence in society by men against women, i.e.,
domestic violence and sexual assault/rape. Indeed, the military is not exempt
from this type of gendered violence, and some would argue that militarized 
masculinity in the IDF contributes to an environment in which violence against
women is tacitly condoned. For example, a serious concern for female soldiers
has been sexual harassment. In mixed-gender units, a substantial number of
court cases have involved women charging senior officers with rape and/or
sexual misconduct.15
One strategy for responding to male–female tensions in the military has
been to train women separately from men. This strategy has been undertaken
in the Israeli military with underlying gendered connotations. Israeli female sol-
diers belong to the Women’s Corps, or Chen, which refers literally to charm and
grace. Simona Sharoni has pointed out that this is not a ‘linguistic coincidence’,
but rather reflects the fact that women in the Israeli military are encouraged 
to emphasize their femininity and neat appearance, and are actually provided
cosmetic guidance as part of their basic training (1995: 46). While the separa-
tion of men and women in the military may avert problems of inappropriate
physical contact, it inadvertently replicates traditional female roles as women
are segregated into such traditional fields as caring for male soldiers and pro-
viding ‘moral support’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 101). As a whole, the Women’s
Corps in the Israeli military is seen as secondary to the more serious business 
of the male combat soldiers. While many women have moved over into elite 
and mixed-gender units, it is clear that women’s individual career advancement
does not necessarily eradicate the formal and informal gendered structures that
characterize the construction of sexual difference in the Israeli military and 
in society at large. In this sense, the experience of women in combat offers
limited insight towards a feminist transformative agenda, not to mention the
negative implications for the Middle East peace process of increased numbers 
of women willing to go to war.
A major difficulty is that women’s entrance into male-dominated domains,
such as military combat, reproduces the standard for citizenship in Israel that
relies on the male citizen warrior as a role model. Feminist critics argue that this
standard is inappropriate, and even unattainable, for a functioning society 
that would ideally value the reproduction and moral education of children, the
harmonious functioning of families, and the growth of society. Rebecca Grant
has suggested that ‘bellicose women’ are an ‘ambiguous model for reform’
(1992: 93) because women soldiers are trained to reproduce the masculine
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norms and modes of behaviour of militaristic systems that restrict and repress
many other women, and also women’s traditional domains. Women’s assump-
tion of the masculine role does not, in itself, challenge patriarchal norms.
Indeed, women in combat do not necessarily promote men’s increased role in
reproduction and care giving. In fact, critics suggest that the advancement of
so-called ‘token women’ may even undermine a transformative agenda for the
vast majority of women who are marginalized within the war system and its
underlying norms of militarism and violence. In short, critics of the right to fight
point out that women in combat reproduce the association of citizenship with
the bearing of arms and thus do not contribute to the transformation of society
in a way that values women, reproduction and peace.
One of the main conclusions to be drawn from the campaign for women’s
right to fight in Israel is that while it may be a positive step for the advance-
ment of individual women or groups of women, it does not address the overall
gendered aspects of a society at war in terms of the association of security with
certain norms and modes of behaviour associated with ‘masculinity’ and the
devaluation of ‘femininity’. Although women in combat are notable for their
struggle for gender equality, they may do so at the expense of replicating the
dominant renditions of national security established by men and the state
system. For that reason, the contribution of women in combat to a redefini-
tion of security is rather limited in terms of taking into consideration women’s
traditional roles and interests, and attempting to transform the war system 
into a more peaceful society. This limitation may be partially attributable to the
constraints on women working for change within the system. The next section
explores women’s struggles for peace outside of the formal political process and
determines their contribution to redefining security.
The Israeli women’s peace movement
A second major political strategy pursued by women in Israel has taken the form
of the Israeli women’s peace movement. Since the late 1980s, Israeli women
have articulated an agenda for liberation that coincides with a distinctly femi-
nist anti-war sentiment. The Israeli women’s peace movement has not been
identified as ‘pacifist’ along the lines of women’s movements in the West. The
message of female peace activists has been clearly defined as opposition to 
violence with support for the right to defence – when necessary. Indeed, many
female peace activists were conscripted and have male family members who
serve either in the army or do reserve duty. This close connection between
women peace activists and the military is a key distinguishing feature of the
Israeli context that blurs the lines between peace activism and the right to fight.
There exists a considerable overlap between those individual women involved in
the IWN and the Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women (the right
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to fight) and women involved in the peace movement. However, there is also a
key ideological difference between the two strategies insofar as the former con-
dones women’s participation in war, while the latter supports a peaceful rather
than a military settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Many Israeli women
struggle simultaneously on both fronts.
The Israeli women’s peace movement is comprised of a number of organi-
zations, whose roots can be traced back to women’s opposition to the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.16 The Lebanon War and the aftermath of protest
was the first time Israeli women occupied a dissenting role in the national secu-
rity debate and made public statements against Israeli foreign policy. Massive
anti-war demonstrations took place throughout the country, as both men and
women vehemently protested Israel’s tacit involvement in the massacres by
Christian militia in the Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
Women came to form the majority of the rank and file of one of the most visible
mixed-gender protest movements, Peace Now. However, women were under-
represented in Peace Now’s positions of authority and did not represent the
movement publicly.17 This underrepresentation of women in the Israeli peace
movement was mirrored a decade later when women had to struggle for repre-
sentation in the official peace process that started at the international confer-
ence in Madrid in 1991. Women were most active at the grassroots level, in
neighbourhood committees, public demonstrations, and mass movements,
admonishing both Israeli and Palestinian leaders to make progress on the peace
issue. However, from 1991 onwards, the diplomatic level appropriated the
momentum established by popular struggle where the initiatives for peace 
originated, and women disappeared from public view.
Because of their marginalization in both the mainstream peace movement
and the official peace process, women formed their own separate organiza-
tions and the Israeli women’s peace movement was born. One of the initial
women’s peace organizations was Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon
(renamed Women Against the Occupation, Shani, in January 1988), a markedly
feminist anti-war group established to protest the Lebanon War. Women 
against the Invasion of Lebanon was represented negatively in the Israeli media
because of their combination of feminism with support for Palestinian women’s
struggles. For both Israeli and Palestinian women, however, their affiliation was
a celebration of sisterhood beyond the national divide. The Israeli public
nonetheless perceived it as a serious act of disloyalty, particularly during times
of crisis.18
After the Lebanon War, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation,
intifada, in 1987 was the second major catalyst for the organization of feminist
peace activities. Israeli women were particularly moved by the nature of the
intifada itself. The uprising was not a typical war, but rather a popular insurrec-
tion comprising Palestinian men, women and children. Scenes of Israeli soldiers
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beating women and children were televised worldwide, bringing stark images 
of the violence, brutality and oppression created by the State of Israel into 
the homes of Israeli families. The media, along with condemnation expressed 
by the international community, had enormous influence over many Israeli 
feminists, whose personal struggles against gender oppression in Israeli society
were rekindled by the intifada. For example, many of the women who orga-
nized politically during the intifada had worked in rape crisis centres and 
shelters for battered women, and had participated in struggles for the right 
to abortion in Israel in the 1970s (Rein, 1980). Their experience of struggle
against patriarchy informed their struggles against Israeli political oppression of
the Palestinians. This combination of feminism with support for Palestinian
national self-determination was expressed pervasively through the political 
ideologies and activism of the Israeli women’s peace movement.
Along with over 180 Israeli and Israeli–Palestinian mixed and women-only
peace organizations19 Shani organized against Israeli military policy during 
the intifada. However, its unique approach was to establish Israeli–Palestinian
dialogue and co-operative activities in support of peace at the social, political
and personal levels. While organizations such as Peace Now made public 
pronouncements against the intifada, Shani embarked on solidarity visits to 
hospitals, nursery schools and individual homes in the occupied territories, 
and staged protest demonstrations for the release of Palestinian political pri-
soners or against school closures in the West Bank (‘Women and Peace’ a 1989 
pamphlet).
The emphasis of women’s peace activities on the social dimension of war
contrasts with the State’s diplomatic focus. During the intifada, Palestinian
women were invited to parlour meetings in the homes of Israeli women to
discuss their experiences and try to dismantle long-standing psychological 
barriers created by military occupation and war.20 Israeli women travelled to 
the Israeli occupied territories to visit Palestinian women’s committees and pro-
duction co-operatives. Through these personal contacts, strong friendships were
formed. This combination of the personal and the political is a long-standing
objective of women’s movements around the world. The extra cross-cultural
dimension of these organizational activities in the Israeli–Palestinian context
helped to create dialogue at the social level and meaningful exchange about 
the perspectives on peace and security of the different women involved in the
conflict.
The most significant contributions of the Israeli women’s peace movement
have been in the independent organizational structure for women’s cross-
cultural activism, and in the articulation of an alternative perspective on peace
and security. Since the intifada, Israeli women peace activists have emphasized
the need to establish security based not primarily on military power and 
statehood, but on justice, reconciliation and coexistence between Israeli and
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Palestinian people. All members of mixed-gender peace groups campaigned for
an end to the violence, but Israeli women peace activists linked this claim pri-
marily to their support for the cause of Palestinian national self-determination.
This focus on the rights of the other destabilized the affinity between security
and the State of Israel, and established a point of solidarity between women
whose primary focus of identification was not the nation state. The Israeli
women’s peace movement has always suggested that peace does not result from
agreements between leaders, but from establishing good relations between
people and providing the fruits of peace that render those agreements solid and
long-lasting to begin with. According to this new definition, security is detached
from the state and positioned in relation to the protection of individuals and
their communities. In other words, the term security is rendered meaningful in
relation to the needs and interests of people, rather than the protection of
national boundaries.
To further the human element of security, the Israeli women’s peace move-
ment has employed the symbol of motherhood. In such conservative societies
as Israel, and even more so in the Palestinian areas, motherhood has offered
women a legitimate platform from which to protest in the public arena. It has
also provided a common foundation to bolster the partnership and the shared
experience of Israeli and Palestinian women. In a zone of conflict, mother-
hood is often politicized as a symbol of bereavement. When grieving for child-
ren takes the form of opposition to a state’s authority to declare war, the public
generally embraces the mothers. Opposition to war expressed by feminists, on
the other hand, has elicited more highly controversial and negative connota-
tions. During war, the struggle for equality between men and women is 
perceived as divisive to society, particularly when that struggle is made in con-
junction with ‘enemy women’, so to speak. This was apparent in the negative
responses to such groups as Women in Black.21 For example, while perceived as
making overtures to the ‘enemy’ because of their partnerships with Palestinian
women, the Israeli Women in Black met with a harsh and often extreme public
reaction. During silent vigils, male bystanders called the women ‘whores of
Arafat’ and ‘traitors’, and shouted for them to ‘go home and clean the house’.
Others threatened, spat, and assaulted the women physically. This deeply 
gendered response to Women in Black vigils represents a deep-seated hostility
in Israel toward a feminist anti-war sentiment. This was not the typical reaction
to mothering groups22 whose cause was perceived as beneficial to the Israeli
family. Women in Black and other feminist components of the Israeli women’s
peace movement have generally been chastised for collaborating with groups
and individuals perceived by Israeli society as ‘the enemy’. This type of cross-
cultural activism is rejected, particularly during times of crisis when many
Israelis feel the need to ‘close ranks’ and prioritize internal unity over relations
outside the nation.
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Nevertheless, the politicization of motherhood in Israel has served as an
important means by which to blur the lines between nation and enemy. Feminist
anti-war activists worked to replace a parochial or nationalist motherhood 
discourse with a universalist discourse of motherhood emphasizing commo-
nality between Jewish and Arab people. Their symbol of universal motherhood
involved a transition from caring for their own children to caring for the 
children of others or even all children, for that matter (Orleck, 1997). Feminist
organizations have, often reluctantly, employed the symbol of motherhood 
for campaigning purposes. The Jerusalem Link, an organization of Israeli and
Palestinian women,23 expressed one of the most notable examples of this type
of platform in an advertisement entitled ‘Every Person Has a Mother’ published
in October–November, 1996. The ad featured a common list of Jews and Arabs
murdered during the conflict, followed by the statement ‘We don’t want to see
our sons, our spouses, or our brothers – IDF soldiers – fighting in a useless war
in the territories.’ The point of unity resulting from Jewish and Arab casualties
was the tragedy of bereavement experienced among mothers (and fathers) in
both communities and their joint renunciation of war as a political tool.
On the basis of the use of such concepts as universalism, bereavement,
motherhood and justice, the Israeli women’s peace movement has established
an alternative discourse on the meaning and nature of peace and security
among Israelis and Palestinians. Women’s articulation of peace entails the
building of a ‘new society’ from the ground up rather than from the top down.
This transformation of society would involve a transition from the militarist
culture that prioritizes security to a society that values education, social services
and civil society. For these women, the challenge of peaceful coexistence is 
both to overcome the deep psychological barriers resulting in stereotypes 
and prejudices between Israelis and Palestinians, and to eradicate the symbols
of violence that continue to be produced and reproduced in cultural forms such
as the media, arts, and education.
For the Israeli women’s peace movement, a broader definition of peace 
begs a reconsideration of the meaning of Israeli national security. The official
definition of Israeli security in foreign policy and popular discourses is terri-
torial and oriented toward military solutions. By way of contrast, Israeli and
Palestinian women have forged a different understanding of security that
emphasizes connection with and legitimization of ‘the other’ as a means to
acquire protection for the self. In this sense, protection derives neither from 
separation nor boundaries, but from connecting with and understanding 
the other’s motivation, and struggling for the rights of the other. A member of
the Israeli women’s peace group Bat Shalom (the Israeli part of the Jerusalem
Link) describes this sentiment by suggesting that security is not a question of
keeping people out, but of bringing them in. ‘Security does not come from walls,
fences or guns, but from removing the initial desire to harm or climb that wall
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in the first place.’24 Her perspective on the security quandary in Israel crystal-
lizes the notion that power is a problem rather than a solution to the personal
insecurity Israelis experience. National security does not consider the reasons
why Palestinians protest, and even fuels Palestinian discontent, thus inten-
sifying the underlying motivations for Palestinian violence against Israelis in the
first place. This redefinition of security holds profound implications for resolv-
ing the Arab–Israeli conflict in ways that promote justice, coexistence and social
transformation.
This chapter has explored some of the alternative perspectives on security
articulated by women peace activists. It was suggested that, in Israel, a feminist
anti-war sentiment has greater implications for redefining security than a liberal
campaign for women’s right to fight. While women in combat may contribute
to the feminist goal of gender equity, feminism must be combined with peace in
order to promote a society in which women can be equal with men and also live
without the fear of violence. This means that gender equity cannot serve the
interests of women in isolation from a transformative agenda. Such an agenda
would link feminism with peace and a diplomatic, rather than military, solution
to the Arab–Israeli conflict, since the two are interconnected. In so doing, it
would seek to improve the overall context within which women struggle for their
rights and opportunities.
Post-peace process strategic environment
Since the 1990s, significant changes have taken place in the Middle East 
military–industrial arena because of the evolution of the strategic environment.
These changes have crucial implications for gender relations in Israel. New 
circumstances have been set in motion by the Middle East peace process and its
breakdown (primarily the second intifada since September 2000). The most
important social consequence of the negotiating process was that it fostered
higher expectations in Israel that violence would disappear and security 
would prevail. However, Mark Heller (2000) claims the opposite. Although the
possibility of inter-state war remains greatly reduced in the peace process era,
counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla warfare has risen as a top security
concern in Israel. These violent measures are not contained within the battle-
field as traditionally defined, and threaten civilian targets, including women and
children, in all areas of Israel, both public and private. As a result of the impasse
in Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations, along with the election of right-wing
governments in Israel in 1996 and 2001 and the apparent delegitimization of
the Palestinian Authority, security has returned to the Israeli policy agenda as
a national priority. Civil society groups, including the Israeli women’s peace
movement, have yet again been sidelined as the State of Israel has come to rely
more heavily on military solutions to the conflict. This strategy has been witness
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to ongoing retaliatory attacks by F-16 fighter planes and helicopter gun-ships
against Palestinian targets in response to suicide bombers since the spring of
2001.
On the other hand, despite the escalation of violence, the Israeli military
has been influenced by changes in a society that expresses serious ‘war fatigue’
and strives to participate in the era of globalization. In the 1990s, the IDF 
has moved away from its traditional self-image as a ‘people’s army’ by adopting
the policy of selective service (Cohen, Eisenstadt and Bacevich, 1998: 57–58).
A more professional army would be characterized by greater technological capa-
bilities that could respond to the increased threat of ballistic missiles and the
proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction in the region. This change
in Israeli military policy has also resulted from a reduction both in popular
support for the high levels of defence spending in Israel and in the decreased
willingness of the average Israeli to serve and sacrifice his/her life so long as the
private sector and development in high technology offer greater opportunities
than the military for economic status and social mobility. These changes in 
societal outlook in Israel have accompanied a rise in standards of living, and in
individualistic and consumerist attitudes that conflict with both the essence 
and nature of military service.
These changes in Israeli society have greatly affected the contours of
women’s struggles in Israel. On one hand, the reorganization of the IDF towards
the image of a professional army has problematized women’s right to fight by
reducing the time of women’s service from twenty-four to twenty-one months,
thus further dissuading women from pursuing a military career. Furthermore,
the prospect of cutting expenditures has focused on those soldiers who are con-
sidered ‘expendable’, and women have become increasingly associated with this
category on account of their lack of high-level military training. The Israeli
Women’s Network has argued that the decreased service time for women is part
of a broader trend to ‘diminish the status of women in the IDF’ (Women in Israel,
1996: 77). This process is a grave concern for those women soldiers for whom
career advancement in the IDF depends on the opportunity to serve alongside
men on equal terms. On the other hand, women are entering combat positions
at the same time as the military is becoming a less important institution in Israeli
society as a whole. This begs the question: should women reorient their ener-
gies toward inclusion in areas that hold greater promise in the future such as
high technology and the private sector? Along with the growing trend toward
privatization in Israel, these professions have surpassed the military as lucrative
and growing sectors of the Israeli economy in which young students and urban
professionals seek employment. This economic trend couples with the growing
criticism of military policy and the state’s authority to declare war expressed by
protest movements and ordinary citizens since the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon. Despite the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement and despite
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increasing personal insecurity in Israel (because of terrorist attacks) decreased
respect for and investment in the military may characterize security policy in
the years to come. As a result, combat duty, for both women and men, may not
be the most conducive avenue for attaining social mobility in Israeli society. This
development stands in sharp contrast to the early years of state building and
inter-state war when the military stood as the ultimate institution in Israeli
society representing the sacrifice and fraternity that defined citizenship in the
State of Israel.
Concluding remarks
In a zone of conflict, involvement in society tends to be characterized by the
precedence of equality of duties over the equality of rights. The primary duty is
to bear part of the defence burdens of the community. In order to produce and
reproduce the national security agenda, societies in conflict make demands of
the citizen that otherwise peaceful societies would not. As the Israeli context
demonstrates, women have been particularly torn between their individual
rights and their collective duties. On the one hand, war has served as the cata-
lyst for the political mobilization of Israeli women as they have entered the polit-
ical sphere in order to struggle for equality of inclusion in the national security
agenda. This has involved an arduous campaign for women’s right to fight and
women’s entry into combat positions in the IDF. The result of these efforts has
been an increase in the number of women who strive to be equally responsible
for the security of the State of Israel. On the other hand, simultaneously with
women’s right to fight, there has developed a feminist peace sentiment in Israel
that eschews the militaristic undercurrents of Israeli society and seeks social
transformation on the basis of women’s support for peace and social justice. 
The feminist rejection of peace relates in an ambiguous way to the feminist
acceptance of women in combat. While both are definitions of ‘feminism’ in
Israel, their objectives can often contradict one another.
Therefore, war has mobilized women in the public sphere both ‘for’ and
‘against’ military combat. However, war also marginalizes women by trans-
ferring the burdens of conflict to the traditional family and by reinforcing the
domesticated roles of women as wives and mothers. In this sense, the equality
of duties has tended to constrain the opportunities available for women to par-
ticipate at all levels and in all sectors of Israeli society. As a result of the milita-
rized and masculinized characteristics of war, which have a tendency to spill
over into the private sphere, women have forged a connection in their political
activism between the dual goals of feminism and peace. The right to fight and
the right to peace are two distinctly separate objectives for Israeli women that
coexist uneasily in their political struggles. While the former does not help to
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redefine security, the latter is problematic at a time when peace negotiations are
at an impasse and Israeli society is struggling against serious security concerns.
The appropriate path for Israeli women’s struggles will remain ambiguous and
problematic for so long as the security situation persists and changes continue
to occur in Israeli society and its economy. However, it is clear that, with respect
to women in Israel, future peace negotiations must necessarily include gender
issues in order to fully address the rights, freedoms and securities of all members
of that society, both male and female. The relationship between gender and
security in Israel will depend to a large extent on the evolution of the strategic
environment and the capacity of feminist groups, regardless of their goals, to
fully participate in forging women’s roles in the theory and practice of Israeli
national security.
notes
1 For a more comprehensive discussion of ‘zones of conflict’ – or what they refer to as
‘zones of turmoil’ – see Singer and Wildavsky, 1993.
2 Not all leaders in the Middle East are in the military although many have a background
in the armed forces.
3 For more on the Israeli occupation and Palestinian intifada, see Lockman and Benin,
1989.
4 Indeed, at the time of writing, the second intifada, as it has come to be known, since
September 2000 has caused a breakdown in peace negotiations and an escalation of vio-
lence in the region.
5 For a comprehensive overview of different feminist perspectives see Tong, 1989.
6 Israel spends approximately US$8.7 billion on the military, 9.4 per cent of its GDP. For
more information see the CIA Factbook at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook
7 For example, the 1952 Law of Return provides that any Jew throughout the world can
emigrate to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship automatically.
8 The ‘status quo’ was established to placate the demands of the religious sector, and has
been kept indefinitely because of the disproportionate influence of religious political
parties in all subsequent coalition governments.
9 For more on the 1967 War, see Khouri, 1976; Smith, 1988; Parker, 1992.
10 Arab women citizens of Israel as well as Jewish women who are married, pregnant or
claim a religious way of life are exempt from military service.
11 According to the Israel Women’s Network, female soldiers in 1994 were categorized thus:
12.6 per cent were officers, 10 per cent worked in technical professions, 9 per cent in
instruction and training, 7 per cent in intelligence, 7 per cent in communications, and
1 per cent in the military police.
12 Until recently, women served only in combat support positions.
13 See Ha’aretz, Friday, 9 April 1999.
14 See The Jerusalem Post, Monday, 19 April 1999.
15 For example, the debate over the promotion of Brigadier General Nir Galili to major
general was taken to the Israeli High Court of Justice after he was accused of raping a
female soldier. See Ha’aretz, Friday, 26 March 1999. Other less publicized cases of rape
and sexual harassment in the military have raised serious questions about women’s 
position in the military.
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16 In response to the bombardment of Israeli cities in the north by Palestinian militants 
in southern Lebanon, the IDF staged a siege of west Beirut. This mission deviated from
the national consensus and the agreed-upon 40-kilometre security zone thus causing
outrage in the Israeli public directed against the government.
17 Chazan, quoted in ‘The Israeli Woman – Myth and Reality: An Interview with Naomi
Chazan’, New Outlook: Middle East Monthly, June–July 1989.
18 The Palestinian reaction to the Israeli–Palestinian women’s partnership was equally
hostile during times of crisis. In fact, the Islamic resistance movement threatened female
members of the Palestinian side of the Jerusalem Link and reinforced the negative atmos-
phere for joint work with Israelis.
19 Women’s peace groups in Israel included Women for Women Political Prisoners, The
Peace Quilt (an Israeli–Palestinian project exhibited at the Knesset on 5 June 1988),
Reshet (the Israel Women’s Peace Net), Women in Black, and the Jerusalem Link (an
umbrella organization for two Israeli women’s centres, an Israeli centre in west Jerusalem
and a Palestinian centre in east Jerusalem).
20 ‘Parlor Talks for Peace’, Jerusalem Post, March 1990.
21 Women in Black is a loose network of women dedicated to peace and social justice, 
and opposed to war and violence. The women-only silent and non-violent vigils were
established as a formula for action in Israel in 1988 with the objectives of protesting
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and promoting a peaceful settlement of the
conflict. See www.chorley2.demon.co.uk/wib.htm
22 For example, Parents Against Silence (dubbed Mothers Against Silence) during the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Parents Against Moral Erosion in response to the 1987
Palestinian uprising, and Four Mothers since 1997 for Israeli withdrawal from southern
Lebanon. These groups, of disproportionately female composition, express the feminine
rather than the feminist discourse for peace, emphasizing the private sphere and mothers’
concern for their children – in these cases, concern for sons serving in IDF combat units.
23 The Link is a co-ordinating body of two independent women’s centres, the Israeli Bat
Shalom (Daughters of Peace), in west Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Marcaz al-Quds la
lNissah (Jerusalem Centre for Women), in east Jerusalem.
24 Personal interview with Susan Techner, Jerusalem, 11 December 1997.
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Did  water scarcity precipitate the 1980s’ intifada – the violent con-flict between the Palestinians and the Israelis? This difficult question isthe type of issue with which environmental security researchers grapple.
Obviously, violent conflict results from multiple factors, such as ethnic tension,
failed deterrence, and misperception. The environmental security analyst must
untangle the sources of conflict to determine whether the violence would have
occurred had not environmental resource scarcity been a factor. In other words
was Israeli and Palestinian water scarcity the precipitating factor for the intifada?
Environmental security is an emerging and vigorously debated subfield of
security studies. Although Cold War issues have dominated the international
security research agenda for the past fifty years, a different set of global dangers
– earlier overshadowed by the East–West conflict – now receive more attention
(Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995). In the field of security studies, the focus has 
now changed, for example, from how to reduce the risk of nuclear war between
the superpowers to how to alleviate a broader range of potential global and
regional conflicts (Dabelko and Simmons, 1997; Matthew, 1995). The growing
attention given to renewable resource scarcity and to its negative impact on
human welfare is redefining security to encompass environmental issues
(Mathews, 1989; Ullman, 1983; Brown, 1977). In redefining security studies,
some analysts have challenged the status quo statist approach for examining
environmental scarcity (Myers, 1993; Gurr, 1985). In response, more tradi-
tional security scholars have argued that the definition of environmental secu-
rity dilutes the true meaning of security. Security ought to be left narrowly
focused on military threats, they argue, if it is to be a useful concept and effec-
tively operationalized. In particular, security studies’ scholars such as Stephen
Walt and Lawrence Freedman object to including the environment in the
research agenda. Freedman argues that ‘once anything that generates anxiety
or threatens the quality of life in some respects becomes labelled a “security
problem”, the field risks losing all focus’ (1998: 53; Walt, 1991).
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Indeed not all environmental problems are relevant to security studies. 
Most environmental issues have more to do with international co-operation,
economics and demography than with questions of force and conflict (Haas,
Keohane and Levy, 1993). Some environmental problems, though, in particu-
lar resource scarcity, can be a source of political tension and may contribute to
violence within and between states. The environmental security subfield has
dodged the tricky issue of defining security by initially focusing on instances
where environmental problems clearly lead to acute conflict, because, as Paul
Diehl and Nils Gleditsch point out, the ‘conceptual debates about whether to
include environmental security in the realm of traditional security studies are
moot if there are no empirical connections between the environment and
violent conflict’ (2001: 3). The focus, then, for many environmental security
scholars is not to debate the definition of security, but rather to examine the
linkage between resource scarcity and violent conflict and to understand the
relationship between the politics of scarcity and international relations (Homer-
Dixon, 1999; Homer-Dixon and Levy, 1996).
Water scarcity is a pivotal environmental security issue. Fresh, renewable
water is a precious resource today in much of South Asia, northern China, parts
of Africa and in the Middle East. These regions find it increasingly difficult 
to provide sufficient water for agriculture, industry and household needs. In
regions such as the Middle East that suffer from seasonal drought, if not from
continual water crises, perceived discrimination in the distribution of resources
is a highly sensitive question. Many affected riparians, as well as specific domes-
tic groups, view water scarcity as a threat to their existence, and so well worth
fighting for. Moreover, water scarcity issues inevitably become co-mingled with
other factors and so may play a significant role in heightening tensions among
feuding parties. Some of the most enduring conflicts in the international arena,
including the Arab–Israeli conflict, the India–Pakistan dispute and the
Syrian–Turkish conflict, to name only a few, have all involved serious disagree-
ments over sharing common water resources (Elhance, 1999). Additionally,
when riparians are engaged in an extended cold war, strained political and mil-
itary relations make co-operation more difficult and outright conflict more prob-
able. This is the case in the Middle East, the region most likely to experience
future conflict over water. By looking at this region, we are better able to under-
stand the issue of water scarcity and conflict, and to develop and test an
approach to analysing environmental security, in general. In this chapter, 
the term ‘environmental security’ is most appropriate when states or domestic
groups are experiencing intense renewable resource scarcity and where a 
lack of effective domestic or international institutions further aggravates the
problem.
This chapter first clarifies those concepts that have led to confusion in the
water scarcity and environmental security literature. The second section offers
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arguments why water scarcity rarely causes war, and then considers how
scarcity under certain circumstances can nevertheless lead to acute conflict.
Examined here is a ‘most likely’ case, which is intended to validate the environ-
mental security hypothesis that water scarcity under certain conditions can lead
to violent conflict. The focus here is on warlike acts in relation to water disputes
prior to the advent of the 1987 Palestinian uprising. Finally, the implications 
of water scarcity for the ongoing Middle East peace process are examined. In 
this case, water scarcity is perceived as an important factor prior to the onset 
of violence. There is an important relationship between water scarcity and 
violence, although other variables are also at work.
A better understanding of water and politics
For environmental security to be a productive subfield of security studies, 
it must have focus. Environmental security analysts cannot merely state 
that ‘water is a big issue!’ or claim that ‘there are serious risks of future “water
wars” ’ (Gannon, 2000: 6). Environmental security scholars must be precise
about what they are explaining, about causal relations, and in defining 
key concepts. This section differentiates between domestic and international
water conflicts, explains the causal relationship between water scarcity and con-
flict, and clearly defines the terms ‘violent water conflict’ and ‘environmental
scarcity’.
To better understand the connection between scarcity and conflict, it is
important to differentiate between water conflicts that are intra-national (for
example, the intifada) and those that are international in scope (for instance, the
1960s Jordan River clashes between Israel and Syria). Since the end of the
Second World War, most of the violent conflict around the globe has occurred
in or between developing countries. Slow development and modernization, weak
government and ethnic conflicts create instability within these states. Deep-
seated ethnic, political, economic and regional animosities can drive intra-
national conflicts. Furthermore, intra-state water conflict may result from
unequal social distribution of water, from relocation of large numbers of people
due to the construction of dams and other major water projects, and from weak
or failed states that are unable to provide a sufficient or expected quantity of
water for their citizens. These domestic problems, in turn, can put pressure on
governments to increase the water supply from international sources at the
expense of other states, so that ‘domestic’ problems are often inter-state prob-
lems in the making. In the past fifty years international water conflicts have
rarely occurred, and never between industrialized states. Such conflicts usually
involve developing states that share a common water source and rely heavily on
their agricultural sector. Often developing world riparians lack the political and
institutional expertise to resolve their scarcity dispute peacefully.
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While scholarly and popular discussions of the subject tend to muddle the
different levels of water conflict, this study differentiates between water wars,
water-related acute conflict, and tactical attacks on water facilities. Unlike the
other two categories of water conflict, tactical attacks on water facilities occur
during wars and are a result of military and not political objectives. For example,
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, both sides targeted dams, desalination plants
and water-conveyance systems because they had a tactical military value during
the war, not because the warring states had a water dispute. In a water war, by
contrast, mass organized violence is the method for resolving a water conflict
between states and it results, by definition, in over 1,000 civilian and com-
batant deaths (Singer, 1972). It is true, as geographer Aaron Wolf notes that 
in the last 4,000 years ‘there has never been a single war fought over water’
(1997: 8). However, water scarcity certainly has been one of many issues that
initiated violence, not as a precipitant, but as an intermediate or long-term
factor. An acute conflict, unlike war, has limited scope and size but still involves
violence,1 as was the case in the 1960s Israeli attacks on Syrian and Lebanese
Jordan River diversion projects. While water was a primary reason for the con-
flict, it was not the only cause of the fighting, and, unlike a war, the violence
was limited (Baechler, 1998: 8).2 These conflicts may be contributing factors to
a larger conflict, as illustrated by the events leading to the 1967 Arab–Israeli
War (Bickerton and Klausner, 1998). This chapter deals primarily with the 
political tension that conceivably leads to acute conflict. The challenge is to
understand how and why water scarcity leads to political tension and then how
those pressures result in acute conflict.
Since the function of water scarcity varies from case to case – ranging from
mere background noise to a direct trigger of violent conflict – it is important 
to clarify its role. A trigger is anything that serves as a stimulus and initiates 
a reaction. More specifically, a trigger can predispose an actor, who previously
preferred non-violence, to seek violent action. For example, the damming of a
river can result in acute water problems for lower riparians, and if this action 
is carried out to deny access to resources, the water issue is a trigger. In this 
case, the water issue becomes an exogenous or necessary factor for violent 
conflict – in other words, the conflict would not otherwise have occurred
without the water scarcity issue (Baechler, 1998: 35–8). On the other hand, 
the water issue can also provide a secondary reason for conflict. Unlike a 
trigger, a secondary reason is background noise that can vary in importance,
but is not an exogenous causal factor. This chapter’s focus is on interna-
tional and intra-national acute conflict over scant renewable water resources to
determine when water scarcity should be considered an exogenous causal
factor.
A distinction should be made, as well, between the two types of natural re-
source – those that are non-renewable, such as oil and gold, and those that are
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renewable, such as river water, most groundwater, and air. A non-renewable
resource, by definition, has a finite supply, while a renewable source receives
incremental additions over a period of time. A renewable that is not degraded
or depleted will continue to be available, although if it is over-exploited it can
become non-renewable. For the most part, non-renewables are not inter-
dependent and so are less difficult to study (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1999: 2).
For instance, depletion of oil does not affect a nearby supply of gold. However,
renewables such as water and air are usually part of an ecosystem and thus are
interdependent. Given this fact, renewable analysis should consider all relevant
environmental factors that affect the supply, such as pollution, global warming
and human population growth.
Isolating how individual factors affect renewable resources can prove dif-
ficult because of this interconnection. We can reduce water scarcity and environ-
mental scarcity in general to three types: increased demand (either because of
population growth or greater per capita consumption); decreased supply (due to
pollution); or unequal social distribution (as occurs when a government concen-
trates a limited supply in the hands of one part of the population while the rest
experiences shortages). These factors usually interact with one another, though,
and are pivotal in understanding the dynamics of scarcity (Homer-Dixon and
Blitt, 1999: 5–7). Given the fact that international conflict affects the status of
renewable resources so profoundly, the field of environ-mental security focuses
only on this class of resources.
The water non-conflict thesis
Although this chapter sees water scarcity as an important factor in some con-
flicts (and therefore as a legitimate subfield of security studies), it is important
to recognize that water scarcity rarely leads to violent conflict, and never pre-
cipitates war by itself. Proponents of the water non-conflict thesis primarily
argue that this is because states and domestic groups utilize human ingenuity
through market mechanisms to mitigate the negative impact of water scarcity.
This point of view sees international rules and laws as helping to decrease state
insecurities over water scarcity. Informal or formal international institutions or
regimes enact rules between states that prescribe roles, constrain activities and
shape expectations (Keohane, 1989: 383). They also provide critical informa-
tion, reduce transaction costs, establish focal points for co-ordination, and facili-
tate reciprocity (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42). This is critical for states that
seek to co-operate in an international environment but lack the means to
enforce agreements, since, according to the institutionalist literature, cheating
or non-compliance is the greatest obstacle to co-operation (Keohane, 1995;
Kratochwil, 1995). These obstacles to co-operation are of course, exacerbated
in a protracted conflict.
109
DEF6  7/31/02  10:36 PM  Page 109
Jeffrey Sosland
110
While general international water law has been ineffectual, bilateral and
multilateral treaties that address the issues of water allocation, pollution and
other aspects of joint management have been effective in reducing water related
conflicts. In fact, some 145 water-related treaties have been ratified in the past
100 years (Wolf, 1997: 10). Both the International Court of Justice and the
1997 Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses
encourage states to negotiate water disputes and to carry out joint-management
activities. State leaders have multiple interests: thirsty states might need water
but they also have other priorities, such as foreign aid and trade, which might
be negatively impacted by aggressive military action to capture water resources.
For instance, a powerful state not directly involved in the water dispute, such as
the United States (US), might use its influence to prevent a water dispute or a
violation of an agreement from degenerating into violent conflict by threaten-
ing economic sanctions against the aggressor. And, in general, governments 
are reluctant to use violence to realize their water-related interests. A strong
international norm exists, which member states codified in the United Nations
Charter, which obligates states to resolve all disputes peacefully. While wars do
occur, states are usually hesitant to challenge this principle of international law.
In addition, waging war is a complicated prospect. If an upstream state builds
a disputed dam, then a more powerful downstream state has a tactical target.
Capturing a source of water is difficult unless a state is willing to be an occupy-
ing force, which today has many political, military and economic drawbacks
(Orme, 1997–98: 143). Because inter-state war is not an attractive option,
states have often resolved their water disputes through means other than violent
conflict.
Proponents of the non-conflict thesis argue that when the larger political
environment improves, water politics also improve. In basins where analysts
predicted acute conflict, such as the Jordan and Ganges, conflicting riparians
have recently signed treaties (Wolf, 1997: 14–15; see also Postel, 1997).
Although the economic argument against a state fighting a water war is that
water is a cheap commodity compared to the costs of war, in these cases 
it was not economics or hydrology, but regional and international politics, that
mitigated the problem of scarcity and conflict. Water disputes and protracted
conflicts necessarily complicate each other. With the end to the protracted con-
flict or important changes in international relations that directly influence the
feuding riparians – the end of the Cold War, for example, or domestic political
changes such as new national leadership – the chances of international 
co-operation become more probable (Lowi, 1993).
Human ingenuity and the role of the market are especially important, in
the non-conflict thesis, for reducing the chances that scarcity will lead to violent
conflict. Political scientists Daniel Deudney and Ronnie Lipschutz maintain that
resource wars, in general, are unlikely for the foreseeable future because, as
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many economists argue, governments can often procure resources through
trade (‘virtual water’ or buying water intensive products, such as cotton and
oranges through international trade instead of producing it domestically).
Additionally, technology has made it possible to develop substitutes for many
materials (through desalinisation for fresh water), greater efficiency and con-
servation (Deudney, 1990: 470; Lipschutz, 1989). In fact, some economists
argue that scarcity is not a problem or a source of conflict, but a catalyst for
human ingenuity. According to this approach, scarcity pushes mankind to
search for a substitute, to conserve and recycle, so that in the end the service
provided by the original resource costs less. For example, the cost of copper and
oil over the last 100 years has declined because scarcity has promoted ingenu-
ity (Simon, 1981: 46).
Most dry countries have strengthened domestic water management
through policy changes, such as improved pricing, efficiency and conservation
initiatives that have successfully lessened the impact of resource scarcity. These
countries have avoided the need to develop new sources of water supply by 
carrying out intelligent water conservation and demand management 
programmes, for instance, installing efficient new equipment and applying
appropriate economic and institutional incentives to maximize efficiency. 
Such policies have successfully reduced water use through efficiency without
sacrificing economic productivity or personal welfare. In fact, a trend has 
been emerging since 1980 in which developed states, such as the US, have 
been steadily decreasing water use even though their population and economy
continue to grow. This trend runs counter to the conventional belief that water
use inevitably rises along with population and economic growth. It shows that
states do not necessarily need to find new sources to develop economically;
rather, they need a bureaucracy that can institute means for using the resource
more efficiently (Stevens, 1998).3
Proponents of the non-conflict thesis point out that technological advances
ease the pressure of water scarcity. When states make the largest water-using
sector – agriculture – more efficient, supplies are freed up for other sectors and
total demand is reduced. In fact, in most developing countries agricultural water
use is inefficient because old or poorly constructed pipes and aqueducts lose
water. Policy analyst Sandra Postel estimates that more than half of all water
diverted for agriculture never produces a crop, so advanced irrigation tech-
nologies would substantially decrease the quantity of water used and increase
crop yields. In fact, in certain countries, drip irrigation in combination with
other policies has produced dramatic increases in crop yields while cutting water
consumption by up to two-thirds (Postel, 1997: 103–7). Because drip irrigation
calls for planning and financial capital, albeit in the short run, it is easier and
cheaper to use flood irrigation, which is extremely wasteful, than to deliver water
through a network of small porous pipes that are installed on or below the soil
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surface. Such a system serves water directly to the crops’ roots, keeping down
evaporation and seepage losses and maintaining water efficiency at approxi-
mately 95 per cent. When farmers automate the system with computers and
monitors, they can sense the best time to distribute the water. Still, such a system
is expensive, requiring an initial outlay of $1,500–3,000 per hectare (Postel,
1997: 103–4). Moreover, the farmers need to be trained on how to use the
equipment.
Other technological advances, such as the use of alternative types of water,
have also increased the supply but they, too, require expertise and capital. Israel
has an extensive wastewater reclamation programme that treats and uses a
large percentage of waste water for the agriculture sector. Some Israeli analysts
speculate that within a couple of decades fresh water will go first to cities and
industries and the only reliable source for agriculture will come from the use of
treated waste water (Gleick, 1998: 28–9). Building waste-water treatment
plants and the piping system to distribute reclaimed water is a multi-million
dollar endeavour that calls for significant bureaucratic and technical planning,
as does another important technological advance – desalination. Although
there is a virtually endless supply of accessible seawater available to numerous
water-poor states, the resource is not economically feasible because desalina-
tion plants require substantial investments of energy, technology and capital.
Consequently, most of the world’s desalination plants are in the energy rich
countries of the Persian Gulf and are not economically feasible solutions for
most resource-hungry developing states. With recent technological advances,
desalinated water is becoming more economically feasible for drinking water,
but is still too expensive for agricultural use.4
In addition to technological advances, economic solutions, such as institu-
ting a market-based water-pricing system, would increase efficiency, but elites
are reluctant to introduce such measures. More realistic pricing, combined with
metering, stimulates the agricultural and industrial sectors to use water more
wisely. Pricing also encourages users to re-evaluate their overall use of water. It
alters the perception that because water is renewable and comes from nature it
is a common good that should be free. Since governments allocate a large
portion of available water to agriculture, even a small shift away from irrigation
can make a considerable difference for a national water budget. Moreover, the
economic returns from water used in irrigated agriculture are far less than in
domestic and industrial use. However, this economic reality remains largely
invisible when the state subsidizes water for agriculture. Overall, a rational
water policy becomes difficult if not impossible when water pricing does not
reflect all the costs of delivery and regulation.
Supporters of the non-conflict thesis are correct in saying that good dome-
stic and international institutions and human ingenuity have decreased the
water scarcity leading to violent conflict. Purchasing water-intensive crops
DEF6  7/31/02  10:36 PM  Page 112
Environmental security: water scarcity
through international trade, where water-poor states import ‘virtual water’ is
an example of this kind of thinking. To grow an orange in water-poor Gaza,
farmers use many gallons of water, but by importing that produce, the water
can be used for needed human consumption or for higher economic yield crops
such as flowers or planting seeds (Allen, 1996: 76). Of course, a state must have
the financial resources to be a food buyer on the international market. The
problem with the optimism of the non-conflict approach, then, is that some less
developed states do not have sufficiently strong institutions to facilitate ingenu-
ity, enough capital to invest or even the requisite political stability. Water-
conflict thesis proponents build on this real-world problem.
The water-conflict thesis
A recent CIA report acknowledges the real world obstacles to instituting the
ameliorative measures emphasized by the non-conflict approach:
Measures undertaken to increase water availability and to ease acute water short-
ages – using water more efficiently, expanding use of desalinization, developing
genetically modified crops that use less water or more saline water, and importing
water – will not be sufficient to substantially change the outlook for water shortages
in 2015. Many will be expensive; policies to process water more realistically are not
likely to be broadly implemented within the next 15 years, and subsidizing water is
politically sensitive for the many low-income countries short of water because their
populations expect cheap water . . . Water shortages occurring in combination with
other sources of tension – such as in the Middle East – will be most worrisome.
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2000: 17 and 18).
Proponents of the water conflict thesis have these obstacles in mind when they
argue that in the past fifty years both growth in population and development 
of industry and agriculture have resulted in increased water pollution and
demand, which, in turn, have augmented the odds of violent conflict over scarce
water resources (Gleick, 1995: 85; Gleick, 1993: 9). Contradictory interna-
tional water law, weak international institutions, conflictual political relations,
government bureaucracy, and the marketplace’s inability to adapt to the new
demands of scarcity will all intensify this trend. Population growth itself exacer-
bates scarcity in a somewhat complex fashion. Environmental scarcity heigh-
tens demand, which leads to either degradation or unequal social distribution
of renewable resources. In the most direct case, water pollution from growing
industrial and agricultural sectors can reduce the available supply of this scarce
resource. Even without industrial pollution, though, ecosystems are sensitive
and depletion itself can lead to pollution of the remaining supply. For example,
over-pumping ground water will not only diminish the resource but may induce
salt water to invade and pollute the remaining freshwater supply, such as has
occurred in the Gaza Strip (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1999: 5–7).
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Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that violent conflict results from the inte-
raction of many variables, only one of which is environmental resource scarcity.
However, this variable needs to be better understood because of its increasing
importance in the chain that often ends in violence (1991). Homer-Dixon’s
more recent research on environmental scarcity and acute conflict focuses on
fresh water scarcity in addition to other renewable resources such as fire-
wood and fish stock (1999; 1996a; 1994). Environmental scarcity increases
migration and inter-group tension, and reduces economic productivity. Weak-
ened states that are unable to adapt are more prone to ethnic conflicts, govern-
ment instability, and deprivation of the masses, which occasionally can lead 
to intra-state acute conflict. Homer-Dixon concludes that ‘environmental scar-
city rarely, if ever, causes inter-state war. Instead, it contributes to chronic 
and diffuse strife within countries’ (1996a: 46). However, he does argue that
‘the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate war is river water’
(1996a: 48).
Peter Gleick, who focuses on water scarcity threats, agrees, contending that
while most water resource disputes do not lead to violent conflict, in certain re-
gions, water scarcity is accelerating. Moreover, water’s importance for economic
and agricultural development has been increasing. As a result, ‘water is evolv-
ing into an issue of “high politics”, and the probability of water-related violence
is increasing’ (1995: 7). In regions such as the Middle East, states perceive water
as a crucial strategic resource. Disruption of access to adequate water supplies
can have a critical impact on a state’s capability to fight wars and to develop eco-
nomically. As for inter-state conflicts, Homer-Dixon points out that
wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbours are likely only
in a narrow set of circumstances: the upstream country must be able to restrict the
river’s flow; there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries; and,
most important, the downstream country must be militarily much stronger than
the upstream country. Research shows that conflict and turmoil related to river
water is more often internal than international; this conflict often results from 
dams and other major water projects that relocate large numbers of people. 
(Homer-Dixon, 1996a: 48; see also Lowi, 1993: 203)
Kimberly Kelly and Homer-Dixon explain the causal chain that leads from
intra-state water scarcity to violent conflict: water scarcity leads to agricultural
decline and health problems; this, in turn, exacerbates economic decline, weak-
ens state legitimacy, and increases grievances against leadership; the weakened
state then is unable to handle popular dissatisfaction and violence results
(Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1999: 67–107). Peter Gleick suggests several indices
for predicting the likelihood that the water issue will lead to violent conflict: first,
the degree of water scarcity; second, the extent to which two or more states or
intra-state groups share the supply; third, the relative power of those riparians
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or groups; and, fourth, the ease of access to alternative sources (Gleick, 1998:
108; 1995: 104–9).
Proponents of the water-conflict thesis are pessimistic about the likelihood
of a peaceful long-term outcome here, given the pressures on water resources.
Today, half the world’s inhabitants live in urban areas. In the past half-century
many cities have tripled or even quadrupled in size. The growing world economy
together with the demographic explosion has placed great pressure on the
planet’s renewable resources. Today, ‘per-capita water demands are increasing
and per capita water availability is declining due to population growth and
trends in economic development’ (Gleick, 1998: 1). This reality, some argue, is
damaging developing countries’ natural resource base, the national assets upon
which their economies and stable political order rely (Kahl, 1998: 81).
Global fresh water resources are not evenly distributed, a fact of nature that
could be overcome if financial resources were available. In some desert regions
there is almost no precipitation and in some tropical areas 30 feet of rain fall in
a single year. To make matters worse, in many water-poor regions precipitation
does not occur during the summer period, the time of greatest water demand.
Unfortunately, developing states lack an infrastructure such as irrigation net-
works to move water to where it is sought and to store it in reservoirs for when
it is needed.
To complicate matters, economically struggling states are drawn into a
water development dilemma. Developing countries first look to agriculture to
grow the economy through export earnings, to supply jobs, and to stem the
flight to overcrowded cities. For this policy to be successful, the agricultural
sector depends on a sustained supply of water that is cheap and reliable. Most
developing states, even those with a water deficiency, need to use 70–90 per cent
of all their fresh water supply for agriculture. A swelling population and grow-
ing cities lead to water supply cutbacks to agriculture, but less farming means
fewer rural jobs, lower export revenues, and more flight to urban areas. Reduc-
tions in agriculture also threaten a state’s policy of food security even where a
country is not as vulnerable to an international embargo of food as, for example,
Iraq was during the 1990 Gulf crisis.5 In many states, moreover, the agriculture
sector is politically powerful: policy changes relating to its water supply are 
perceived as a threat to farmers’ and landowners’ livelihood and thus opposed
vigorously.
On the international level, water-conflict theorists point out that riparians
share water supplies and thus states become vulnerable to the actions of others.
A significant portion of fresh water resources flows through international river
basins and this geographical dependence has led to disputes over common water
resources, including the Nile, Euphrates, and Indus. Indeed, some thirty states
receive more than 30 per cent of their surface water supply from across their
borders. In arid or semi-arid regions, where international rivers are the primary
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source of water and agriculture is a pivotal economic development component,
riparians deem these sources of fresh water to be critical national interests
worth defending. From a strategic perspective, upstream states have a geo-
graphical advantage in controlling the water, with downstream riparians more
vulnerable to the actions of the higher riparians, but relative military strength,
as discussed earlier, is also important. An upstream state that is weaker than a
downstream state will be reluctant to challenge the stronger state’s vital water
interests.
For the most part, international law and institutions do not have the 
capacity to resolve these difficult disputes involving shared water resources.
International courts and arbitrators might make rulings in specific disputes
based on international water law, but enforcement depends on the good will 
of the parties involved. Over the past fifty years international water law, like
international jurisprudence generally, has been ineffectual in settling difficult
conflicts. If the water-sharing environment was not conflictual, riparians tended
to negotiate agreements to share their common resource efficiently, but when
the situation was conflictual and the riparians were unable to agree on a system
of sharing a river, the ambiguous elements of water law became a tool to 
legitimize each party’s position.
In addition to the impact of population growth and weak international legal
institutions, poor state management also has exacerbated water scarcity. In fact,
water-conflict theorists argue that this inability to supply the ingenuity needed
to solve scarcity may be the core problem. Many developing states lack capital,
a trained work force, and a competent bureaucracy. In addition, they are not
able to rehabilitate infrastructure, reform institutions, provide incentives to
encourage conservation, invest in new technology or properly regulate users
(Homer-Dixon, 1995; 1996b). Some farmers and industries pollute scarce water
resources with fertilizers, insecticides or industrial waste, for example, and weak
states cannot stop them. Also, because water pricing subsidies to the agricul-
tural sector offset the economic punishment that results from wasting water,
farmers in dry areas occasionally grow water-intensive crops and use inefficient
infrastructure and methods, such as flood irrigation, that result in the consid-
erable loss of water to evaporation and ground seepage. Additionally, develop-
ing states’ urban centres waste as much as 50 per cent of their water supplies
through poor delivery systems and theft. Together, these domestic factors greatly
exacerbate a state’s need for additional water. These core problems are all
present in the following case study.
Intra-state conflict: the advent of the intifada
It is well documented that in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank6 the human popu-
lation and water pollution are on the rise and that fresh water quantity and
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quality are on the decline. Growing demand and scarce supplies have been prob-
lems for the region for the past half-century (Lonergan and Brooks, 1994). This
case shows how structural scarcity evolves and how the resulting environmen-
tal scarcity, along with weak domestic institutions, played an important role in
the advent of the intifada.
On 9 December 1987, an Israeli truck collided with oncoming Palestinian
cars in Gaza, killing four Palestinians and wounding seven others. This auto-
mobile accident was the precipitating factor in the popular Palestinian uprising,
known as the intifada, or ‘shaking off ’ (Bickerton and Klausner, 1998: 230). By
mid-1990, over 800 Palestinians had been killed by Israeli security forces and
the Palestinians had killed forty-seven Israelis (Bickerton and Klausner, 1998:
236). But to understand this violent conflict one must go beyond the precipi-
tating factor. The intermediate factors were many: the Palestinians suffered
under high unemployment and low living standards, as well as frustration with
other Arab states and with the exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
for not representing their political interests. The Arab Summit held in Amman
in November 1987, for instance, was preoccupied with the Iran–Iraq conflict,
and failed to raise the Palestinian issue, while for the first time West Bank 
and Gaza Palestinians were starting to feel the need to take matters into 
their own hands. While the deep or long-term issue was certainly the political
desire for Palestinian self-determination and an end to the Israeli occupation,
water scarcity did play an important part as an intermediate factor in the
intifada.
Between 1948 and 1987, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians had almost no
autonomous institutions which could foster the ingenuity necessary to mitigate
water scarcity because those institutions were dependent on the occupying
power. During Jordanian rule of the West Bank and the Egyptian administra-
tion of the Gaza Strip, investment in water infrastructure was minimal.
Moreover, by June 1967, Israel was dependent for approximately one-third of its
total consumption7 on ground water that originated in the West Bank and
flowed underground to Israel. Once Israel took control of the West Bank during
the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, it limited Palestinian water use through adminis-
tration of the territory and its water system, a policy that helped to maintain
Israel’s historical usage of West Bank ground water. In an effort to preserve
water resources for Israel and to increase Palestinian water efficiency, Israeli
water policy restricted the number of permits granted for digging new agricul-
tural wells. This policy was intended to augment agriculture productivity by
more efficient use of existing resources and by increased control over water use
at the individual farm level (Kahn, 1983: 26). In fact, while the Labour Party
did increase structural scarcity for Palestinians by diverting a larger percentage
of West Bank water to Israel, Israeli institutions prior to 1977 also attempted to
address supply and demand issues. The guiding principle of the Labour Party’s
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West Bank policy was that Israel must retain sections of the West Bank to have
defensible borders. However, they did not settle the densely populated Arab hill
regions, anticipating that they would trade this area in a ‘land for peace’ agree-
ment with Jordan.
Unlike the Labour Government, the Likud coalition did not concern itself
with maintaining the West Bank status quo. Between 1977 and 1992, Likud
led governments – at times in a national unity government partnership with
Labour – concentrated Israel’s resources on enlarging the West Bank’s Jewish
population. Government policy moved from Labour’s security-based settlement
plan to Likud’s treatment of the West Bank as Israel’s religious and historical 
heritage (Alpher, 1994: 10). Likud continued Labour’s policy of strict control
over Palestinian water use, but the Likud’s motivation differed from that of
Labour: it restricted Palestinian water use so that more water would be available
for the growing number of Israeli settlements. Likud’s new policies heightened
Palestinian tension over water because they increased scarcity. The Israeli water
agency Mekorot, which in 1982 took responsibility for managing the West Bank
water system, developed water sources primarily for settlements and continued
to make water use difficult for Palestinians (Elmusa, 1993b: 2; Schiff and Ya’ari,
1991: 97; Davis, Maks and Richardson, 1980: 13). The state comptroller’s office
– Israel’s official watchdog agency – reported one case where Mekorot expro-
priated land from an Arab owner to drill a well for a nearby Jewish settlement,
but failed to obtain permission from the Civil Administration and initially did
not compensate the owner for his land. Only later, after some news reports of
the case surfaced, did the company offer to compensate the owner (Schiff and
Ya’ari, 1991: 97). Israeli drilling of new deep wells in the West Bank to supply
water for irrigation of Jewish agricultural settlements in the arid Jordan Valley
lowered water tables and dried up some Palestinian springs and shallow wells.
One example of the impact of this drilling was that two-thirds of the farmers in
the Jordan Valley village of al-Ouja had to abandon their land when their 150-
year-old spring went dry (interview by author with Research Institute analyst,
Bethlehem, 13 May 1996; Beschorner, 1992–93: 14; United Nations, 1980:
13–15). The state comptroller reported that Jewish farmers were overusing their
water quotas by as much as 44 per cent, while Arab allocations continued to 
be strictly monitored. Additionally, because of subsidies in 1987 from non-
governmental organizations, Jewish settlers obtained their water at a lower price
than the Palestinians.8 The Likud Government made developing land in the West
Bank increasingly difficult for Palestinian farmers and increasingly easy for
Jewish settlers (Lowi, 1993: 190).
As a result of these policies, the rate of farm production growth and income
decreased in the West Bank Arab agriculture sector. Furthermore, Israel reduced
government assistance for West Bank agriculture – and for Israeli agriculture,
for that matter. Subsidizing West Bank settlements became the Government’s
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priority, and development initiatives for Arab agriculture became an activity of
the past (Benvenisti, 1986: 1–3; Kahn, 1983: 118). By the mid-1980s, West
Bank Palestinian farming could no longer function properly given the existing
water and economic constraints imposed by the Israeli Government. Moreover,
with a general economic downturn in the Middle East, job markets in Israel,
Jordan and the Gulf States were no longer able to supply employment opportu-
nities for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. The shrinking Palestinian agricul-
ture sector, which, prior to 1967, provided the majority of jobs, did not have the
capacity to hire the returning labourers. Rising Palestinian unemployment
combined with the Likud’s settlement policy intensified Palestinian awareness
of the inequitable water distribution between Israel and the West Bank and
between Palestinians and settlers. According to Brigadier F. Zach, Israeli deputy
co-ordinator for the occupied territories, West Bank Palestinians used 119 cubic
meters (cm) of water per capita, while Israeli settlers used almost three times
that amount in 1990 (‘A Dwindling Natural Resource’, Washington Post, 13 May
1992, A29). In Gaza, unequal water distribution and general scarcity of
resources were even worse than in the West Bank. Although the Gaza Strip does
not share a major ground water source with Israel, severe water scarcity 
has heightened tensions and instability between Gaza Palestinians and Israel.
The Gaza Strip is on the coastal plain bordering the Mediterranean Sea, the Sinai
desert and Israel. The climate is arid, with less than 200 millimetres (mm) of
precipitation annually. Surface water is only available following rainfall and
groundwater is contained in two shallow aquifers. But unlike the West Bank’s
aquifers, Gaza’s are shallow and easy to tap, and, historically, over-pumping has
been allowed by occupying powers. As well, during this period Gaza’s popula-
tion was expanding.
Currently, Palestinians in Gaza pump water from more than 2,000 wells,
primarily for irrigation. They withdraw approximately 110 million cubic meters
(mcm) per year, while the natural recharge provides only 70 mcm annually
(Water Resources Action Programme Task Force, 1994: 6). With hundreds of
illegal wells, many farmers use approximately 90 per cent of the pumped water
and water extract beyond their quotas. Palestinian farmers’ high water use for
citrus fruit accounts for two-thirds of Gaza’s agriculture – a water intensive
crop, citrus remains Gaza’s economic mainstay. The ongoing problem of over-
pumping has resulted in salt-water intrusion, both from the Mediterranean and
from lower saline aquifers. Additionally, heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides,
as well as poor sewage control, has polluted the aquifer. As a result, many Gaza
residents have been consuming contaminated water and are unable to use water
from their taps at home (Water Resources Action Programme Task Force, 1994:
6–7; Shawwa, 1993).
Between 1967 and 1977, Israel did attempt to regulate Gaza water usage
to prevent any further deterioration of the supply that occurred with the 
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over-pumping permitted by the Egyptian administrators prior to 1967. However,
under the Likud Government in the late 1970s, Israel also became laxer in reg-
ulating Palestinian pumping, a policy that can be attributed to the fact that
Gaza’s drinking source was not connected to Israel’s (interview by author with
former water commissioner, Tel Aviv, July 1995). As a result, the hydrological
situation in Gaza deteriorated even further. Along with severe poverty, 
Gaza Strip Palestinians lacked clean drinking water on a daily basis. In 1986,
estimated per capita consumption by Gazans was 142 cm, while that of the 
settlers was 2,240 cm (Elmusa, 1993a: 61; Roy, 1987).9 Prior to the advent of
the intifada, Gaza was experiencing all three environmental scarcity types:
demand, supply, and unequal social distribution. From 1967 to 1987, Israelis
often disregarded the economic and political needs of Arabs living under their
control and even came to look upon Palestinians as passive subjects. The inclina-
tion to ignore growing water scarcity in Gaza and the West Bank was part of
this picture. The Palestinian intifada forced Israelis to pay greater attention 
to the plight of the Palestinians and eroded Israeli public support for maintain-
ing the status quo.
In the summer and fall prior to the December 1987 outbreak of the intifada,
the Israeli Government and individual ministers took a number of actions with
strong symbolic significance that intensified Palestinian anxieties about the
intentions of the Israeli Government.10 For example, the water commissioner
and Mekorot announced plans to drill inside the West Bank and to transfer some
of this water to Jerusalem’s Jewish neighbourhoods. The plan was in direct
opposition to Israel’s stated policy of not mining West Bank water for transfer
across the Green Line to Israel proper. A quarter to a third of the pumped 
water was to go to Arab communities, with the remainder to go to Jerusalem
and to Jewish settlements. Large shafts were to be dug and 18 to 20 mcm were
to be pumped annually. The depth and scale of the wells, some Palestinian
hydrologists believed, threatened to dry out shallower wells serving large Arab
communities in the surrounding West Bank area (Tessler, 1994: 846, n. 5; see
also ‘Rabin Okays West Bank Water Drilling Project’, Jerusalem Post, 3 July 1987;
‘New Plan to Have West Bank Water Pumped to Israel’, Jerusalem Post, 26 June
1987). The drilling site was to be near Herodion, southeast of Bethlehem, where
Israel was already pumping water for both Jewish settlements and Arab com-
munities in the Hebron and Bethlehem areas. Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij
insisted that ‘this plan threaten[ed] our [the Palestinians’] very existence’
(Peretz, 1990: 29). Freij also stated that ‘those who try to obtain my agreement
to the plan do not understand that anyone who supports it will be considered
an unpardonable traitor’ (Schiff and Ya’ari, 1991: 98). Jordan, Egypt, the
United Nations, the European Community and the United States all opposed the
plan. The US state department’s legal advisers argued that Israel, as an occupy-
ing power, had the right to exploit West Bank water sources for the benefit of
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the local inhabitants. However, Israel was not entitled to transfer the water to
its own territory (Schiff and Ya’ari, 1991: 98).
In reply to Palestinian and international concerns, Israel promised to safe-
guard Palestinian interests, but the plan was ultimately dropped because of
opposition from all sides. Israel’s Co-ordinator of Activities in the Territories
Shmuel Goren stated that ‘if Arab rights are harmed, we will not allow this
project to get underway’ (‘No Water Project If Arab Rights Aren’t Guaranteed’,
Jerusalem Post, 7 July 1987). He pledged to commit this to a legally binding con-
tract and promised that the civil administration would demand compensation
for Arab communities if their water costs increased because of the project (‘No
Water Project If Arab Rights Aren’t Guaranteed’, Jerusalem Post, 7 July 1987).
He also vowed that Palestinian needs would receive first priority – should exist-
ing Palestinian wells in any way be damaged by the new Herodion wells, Israel
would compensate the Arabs with water from other sources. Upon hearing this
offer, Jewish settlers themselves rejected the plan as discriminatory. Palestinians,
for their part, believed that if the Israeli Government drilled these wells linking
Israel to such a large water source, the likelihood of Israeli withdrawal from 
the West Bank would diminish significantly. Palestinians perceived the plan not
only as another scheme to steal Palestinian water, but also as part of a broader
strategy to reduce Arab control of the West Bank, which would increase the 
likelihood of Israeli annexation. And opposition to the plan within Israel also
existed. The head of the West Bank’s civil administration, Brigadier General
Ephraim Sneh, resigned during the Herodion plan controversy because he 
had adamantly opposed the project and its handling by his superior, Goren. It
should be noted that Sneh planned to enter politics and had many serious dif-
ferences with Goren, but to him the water plan truly represented an unaccept-
able policy change (‘Sneh Resigns Over Drilling’, Jerusalem Post, 16 September
1987). Soon after, in October 1987, Israel dropped the plan because of division
within the Israeli National Unity Government and because of international
opposition. Nevertheless, these actions exacerbated Palestinian tensions over
Israeli water policies and West Bank directives. Two months later the intifada
began.
It is true that the intifada’s origin stemmed from a complex mixture of politi-
cal and economic forces. In fact, water was one of many functional and poli-
tical issues that played an important role in the advent and continuation of
the intifada. But, as Homer-Dixon argues, ‘water scarcity and its consequent 
economic effects contributed to the grievances behind the uprising both on the
West Bank and Gaza’ (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 14). The uprising began in Gaza
refugee camps, largely because of poor socio-economic conditions there 
that were partly produced by water scarcity. Lack of clean drinking water was
an important source of frustration, as was high unemployment due, in part, to
a shrinking Arab agricultural sector that did not have enough water supply 
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to thrive.11 The resulting popular support for and continuation of the up-
rising was due largely to political motivations – the desire for Palestinian self-
determination, and frustration with Israel’s policies of reducing Palestinian
control and furthering de facto Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Suspicions
of Israeli water ‘stealing’ and plans for water transference, through, were impor-
tant symbolic issues that heightened Palestinian–Israeli tensions before and
during the intifada.
In fact Schiff and Ya’ari have argued that socio-economic rather than polit-
ical factors precipitated the uprising, noting that the initial riots by Gaza
refugees were directed against both Israeli targets and against richer Arab neigh-
bourhoods. Granting their claim that the first stage of the intifada was motivated
by poverty and frustration with the socio-economic situation, it becomes clear
that water scarcity, the resulting unemployment, and the general lack of fresh
drinking water are exogenous factors. To be sure, theorists like Salah argue that
the advent of the intifada was wholly political; he asserts that it is ‘impossible 
to make a direct causal connection between economic trends and the rise 
and decline of the national struggle’ (Nassar and Heack, 1990), a claim that
would discount water scarcity as a necessary factor. In the end, though, Schiff
and Ya’ari’s analysis is the most convincing because it is supported by empirical
evidence. Schiff and Ya’ari in fact interviewed the first wave of detainees, and
states that they had not yet developed the requisite political or national con-
sciousness for starting an uprising.
Implications for the peace process
Israel and the rest of the Jordan River basin are in the midst of a critical water
shortage. As Mekorot, Israel’s water utility company, warned, by 2001 all 
three primary reservoirs would reach unprecedented low levels, and would 
be unavailable as a water source. In the midst of a serious drought, how will
water scarcity impact peace talks and what policy prescriptions can we cull from 
the above discussion on water scarcity and acute conflict? First, an Israeli–
Palestinian peace agreement must include a water annex. That part of the treaty
should incorporate an international component addressing such issues as how
water would be divided and how the parties would avoid pollution and over-
exploitation. Moreover, there ought to be a domestic water management section
in the international treaty, specifying that the parties agree to implement a
market-value pricing system for water. This would increase its efficient usage
and promote important domestic institutions for providing innovation and inge-
nuity, when needed.
Although the core issues of the peace talks include refugees, borders, secu-
rity and the status of Jerusalem, Israel will need to be especially conscious of the
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Palestinian ingenuity gap regarding water scarcity. Today, Israel is a developed
state capable of adapting to environmental scarcity. For the first time in Israel’s
history, it plans to import water from Turkey as an emergency measure. A 
discharge terminal will be built south of Ashkelon to receive the transported
water, and from there water will be pumped to a nearby reservoir. The project
will require laying a 13-km-long pipeline, and a converted 250,000-ton oil
tanker for transport and will cost a total of $20 million (‘Emergency Summer
Water Imports “Unavoidable” – Mekorot’, Ha’aretz, 20 June 2000). As a devel-
oping state, by contrast, a future Palestine will experience a water-related 
gap between scarcity and the ingenuity needed to address it, in other words, an
ingenuity gap. It simply does not have the domestic institutions to address water
scarcity.
As well, verification and compliance were issues already stressed during the
Oslo II negotiations, when Israel emphasized to the Palestinians that it could not
permit unsupervised water drilling in the West Bank. After Israel withdrew from
the Gaza Strip, some Palestinians drilled hundreds of unlicensed wells and it
seemed clear to Israel that the Palestinian Authority had lost control over its
own people in dealing with water conservation. Israeli policy makers feared that
such uncontrolled drilling would seriously damage the shared West Bank
ground water if the Palestinian Authority permitted it (interview by author with
senior Israeli water talks negotiator, Tel Aviv, 17 November 1995; also see ‘Again
Forgetting the Water’, Ha’aretz, 11 August 1995, B1 [in Hebrew]). Agriculture
Minister Yaakov Tsur stated that ‘water is the most political issue of all because
there is a shortage of water and water is linked to life. There is no doubt that we
will not be able to leave the [West Bank] area without supervisory measures to
prevent drilling’ (‘Tzur on Water Accord Supervision’, Qol Yisrael, 24 August
1995, [FBIS-NES-95-165, 25 August 1995, 17]). ‘Israel can’t leave the area’,
he stressed, ‘without the question of water being fully defined’, a strategy that
includes monitoring water pumping and quality. ‘We have to check what they
are pumping. We also have to check the sewage. If they don’t treat the sewage,
it will affect the groundwater.’12 Such comments suggest that water resource
management and institutions are gaining the importance they deserve in the
peace process.
In the end, this case has demonstrated a strong connection between envi-
ronmental resource scarcity and violent conflict. Therefore, it adds to the argu-
ment for including environmental security in overall security studies. It also
illustrates why policy makers need to go beyond points of conflict between states.
To realize environmental security, in particular water security, riparians and
users of a common river basin must focus on both the international politics of
scarcity and the peace partner’s ingenuity gap, in particular by trying to
strengthen its domestic institutions.
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1 Homer-Dixon defines acute conflict as one ‘involving a substantial probability of violence’
(1991: 77).
2 Wolf argues that there have been only seven such incidents in the past fifty years, two of
which occurred in the Jordan River basin (1997: 7–8).
3 The energy sector has also been successful for the past three decades in the wiser use of
electricity and gas, while cutting consumer cost and use at the same time.
4 At present desalinated sea water costs consumers $1 per cubic meter. Water priced higher
than $0.85 is not economically viable for agriculture, the biggest user. Unlike oil or other
natural resources, water cannot be transported economically in large quantities.
5 Complete self-sufficiency in food has proved unattainable in the Middle East, since all
states in the region must import large quantities of comestibles, especially cereals,
because of water scarcity.
6 This area is also known as Judea and Samaria, the administered territories and 
the occupied Palestinian territories. No political intent is implied by the term West 
Bank.
7 This figure is based on Israel’s total consumption of 1,400 mcm and use of West Bank
water. Israel’s other main water resources are the Lake of Tiberias and the coastal aquifer.
8 The comptroller reports that Jewish settlers pay Mekorot only 15 agorot pcm for agricul-
tural supplies while Arab farmers pay the civil administration almost five times that
amount (70 agorot pcm) for Mekorot-supplied water. Local Arab authorities charge
1–1.60 new Israeli shekels per cm for domestic use by Palestinians while Mekorot charges
settlers only 23 agorot (‘Territories’ Water Supply Drying Up with Overuse’, Jerusalem Post,
2 July 1987). Also see Kahn, 1983: 114.
9 The settler population in Gaza (1988–89) used 2 mcm or 3 per cent of the total ground
water, while the Arab population consumed 92 mcm or 97 per cent (Elmusa, 1993a: 61;
Roy, 1987).
10 Israel took control of most of the East Jerusalem Electric Company, then Industry and
Trade Minister Ariel Sharon purchased an apartment in the Muslim Quarter of the Old
City. See Shalev, 1991.
11 By 1987 the West Bank’s economy was dependent on outside employment. Increased
water supply would have created more jobs, but would not have created enough employ-
ment to absorb all of the returning Palestinian workers.
12 Tsur pledged to keep supplying West Bank settlements with water. Major settlements will
continue to be linked to separate Mekorot lines, and smaller settlements will be connected
to the Palestinian Water Authority but provided with emergency reserves in case the
Palestinians interrupt their supply (‘Water Dispute: No Immediate Solution On Tap’,
Jerusalem Post, 21 July 1995, 11).
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In the Middle East, security is strongly influenced by politicized forms offundamental belief systems. This chapter examines the dual role of politicalIslam, with specific focus on Palestine and the case of Hamas, the Islamic
Resistance Movement, in the West Bank and Gaza. In this context, political Islam
represents a general rejection of the Arab–Israeli peace process as well as an
instrument of political protest against an indigenous Arab regime.
Hamas is an excellent case study with which to demonstrate the role 
religion performs in political conflict. Currently, Hamas is gaining in popular
support due to renewed violence in the Middle East and the Palestinian popula-
tion’s increased endorsement of suicide or ‘martyrdom’ operations against
Israeli targets.1 Consequently, Hamas will continue to pose a significant threat to
peace and stability in the region with its seemingly unhindered ability to strike
deep inside Israel. Hamas thus represents both the most significant Palestinian
force opposed to the peace process, initiated by the secret talks between Israel
and the Palestinians in Oslo, Norway, and the only viable alternative to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority (PA)2 and its
dominance over Palestinian society.
In examining the issue of security in the context of the Middle East, it is 
the various actors themselves – groups, parties, movements – when forced to
interact within a structure of insecurity, that possess the potential to either con-
tribute to or undermine the peace process. In that sense, general insecurity exists
when neither the Israeli military nor the Palestinian Authority can truly guar-
antee the lives of their respective citizens. Extremists (or rejectionists) on both
sides attempt to exploit the weaknesses inherent in the security apparatus to
further their own interests. For its part, Hamas has consistently demonstrated a
willingness to derail the peace process in support of its own narrowly defined
objectives.
In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace process, although Hamas is a 
unique movement,3 it should be seen as representing a general oppositional or
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counter-hegemonic trend in the Middle East. Thus, Islamic movements in
general (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Turkey) have sought to present themselves as politi-
cal alternatives to the contemporary system by articulating the grievances 
of those segments of society that feel the most politically alienated, socially 
marginalized and economically insecure. In the case of Palestine, in spite of pro-
nouncements to the contrary, Hamas remains essentially a political movement.
This can be demonstrated by focusing on the essentially pragmatic or flexible
approach it has assumed toward the Palestinian issue and its tendency to
emphasize the national (i.e. political) aspects of the Israeli–Arab dispute over the
more universal (i.e. religious) orientation of Islam’s worldview.
Most specifically, Hamas’ main role in the Palestinian context has been to
provide a legitimate alternative to the PLO and to attempt to supplant what 
Hamas and its supporters perceive as the corrupt, oppressive and ineffectual 
rule of the PLO. In the current environment, Hamas’ alternative nature is most
clearly demonstrated by its rejection of the Oslo process and its embodiment as
its principal opponent. In terms of support, Hamas continues to garner most of
its popular backing when the peace process stalls and is perceived as providing
most Palestinians with few, if any, tangible benefits. This pattern can be observed
in the round of violence and instability gripping the Middle East since September
2000 to the time of writing. While Hamas faces an uncertain future, as long 
as peace continues to elude the two principal parties of the Arab–Israeli conflict,
it will remain a legitimate threat to the entire peace process and a necessary
‘evil’ that both the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority will be forced to
address.
Political Islam in the Middle East
Hamas in Palestine is a national manifestation of a more regional phenomenon
(Mishal and Sela, 2000: 1). Throughout the Middle East over the past two
decades Islam has appeared as the only true oppositional force to the proto-
typical one-party state. While perceived as essentially religious movements con-
cerned with issues of religious principle and moral doctrine, Islamist movements
should be more accurately interpreted as political movements utilizing Islam 
as an instrument of political protest to attack and denounce the legitimacy of
the ruling regimes. Consequently, ‘political Islam’ should be viewed primarily 
as an indigenous response to problems associated with attempts at economic
development and the subsequent failure to create a more inclusive political
structure (Faksh, 1997: xii; Sivan, 1997: 125). Most individuals who support
the Islamists do so not necessarily for religious reasons, but because they possess
a deep-seated discontent with the status quo and desire a radical restructuring
of the current order (Esposito, 1995: 189), a change it is believed that can only
be provided by contemporary Islamic movements.
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Political Islam has been able to most effectively articulate and express the
grievances experienced by an ever-expanding segment of the population in 
the Muslim world. Increased frustration with growing unemployment, the lack
of adequate housing and the loss of cultural identity, in addition to feelings 
of marginalization and alienation resulting from the perception that the
Government is unresponsive and that there is still a lack of real participation
within the system, has continued to draw individuals to the Islamist cause (see
Sivan, 1997: 125; Esposito, 1995: 15–16; Ayubi, 1991: 158–60; and Qureshi,
1983: 76–7). In the current environment, it is Islam that has been most effec-
tive in expressing the social, economic and political injustices experienced by a
large segment of the masses in the Middle East.
The Islamists continue to garner most of their support because of their
ability to provide a counter-force to the current regimes. It has been this ‘unity
through opposition’ that allows all those individuals disenchanted with the
present system to coalesce around the Islamists, while the Islamists have capi-
talized on the fact that only they have been able to portray themselves as an
authentic alternative to corrupt, inefficient and sometimes repressive regimes.
According to Ayubi:
A wide variety of groups are attracted to the Islamist thesis because . . . [it] imparts
a certain sense of intimacy and assurance, and because they also share with the
militants a certain degree of antagonism towards the existing social order and 
the state that keeps it in place. The Islamic language therefore most fundamentally
represents a broad alternative system of meaning and power to the hegemonic
system represented by the existing social – political order which invariably margina-
lizes and/or alienates certain individuals and certain social groups. To an extent, the
details of the Islamic thesis become less important than the fact that it is a very dif-
ferent thesis from that advocated by the State. (1991: 175)
In the Muslim world there clearly exists a need for some type of oppositional
force to counter the Government’s hegemonic domination over all facets of the
State and civil society. There are two principal reasons for the effectiveness of
the Islamists in filling this void as opposed to other opposition groups. First,
political Islam utilizes vocabulary and imagery that already deeply resonate
with a large segment of a population nurtured on such rituals and ideas,
bestowing on Islam a legitimacy that no other ‘ideology’ can attain.4 Second,
Islam remains essentially ‘uncontaminated’. With the exception of Iran, Islam
is the one ideology that has not been tainted by the actual exercise of power and
proven ineffectual in terms of solving the problems of the various populations.
Past hegemonic ideologies, such as National Socialism, Pan-Arabism, and even
the contemporary variant of Liberal Democracy have all demonstrated varying
degrees of failure in this regard. As AbuKhalil has succinctly stated: ‘Since 
the 1970s, Islam has emerged as the one political ideology that has not been
tried and exhausted. Its distance from the actual political process represents its
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greatest advantage at a time when all ruling ideologies are perceived as bank-
rupt’ (1994: 677; see also Faksh, 1997: 34–45).
Hamas (the Palestinian context)
Political Islam in Palestine performs a very similar role to that of other Islamic
groups throughout the Muslim world. Most specifically, it represents an opposi-
tional force (i.e. a practical alternative) to the dominant power(s) and articulates
the grievances of those marginalized and frustrated by the current system and
ruling elites. In that sense, the individuals who tend to support Hamas do so
more for what they oppose – the status quo – and less for what they propose –
an authentic Islamic state (i.e. one based on the Sharia5) situated in the entire
mandated area of Palestine (including Israel and the West Bank and Gaza
Strip).6
However, the situation in Palestine is unique for two fundamental reasons.
First, the environment of occupation has clearly exacerbated the problems asso-
ciated with marginalization and alienation. Three decades of Israeli occupa-
tion have included such policies as land expropriation,7 collective punishments
(including house demolition), deportation, the usurping of Palestinian water
(preventing widespread agriculture) and continuing Palestinian economic
dependence (see Abu-Amr, 1994: 53).8 Consequently, while feelings of margina-
lization and alienation are seen as determining factors in the decision of certain
individuals to lend their support to Islamist groups in general, Ahmad argues
that the conditions of Israeli occupation have added an extra dimension to 
such experiences, especially among the more educated members of Palestinian
society frustrated and embittered by their current circumstances (1994: 27–9).9
Second, Hamas does not confront a single hegemonic force, but instead two
– the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis. This unique circumstance is based
on the fact that the Islamic movement in Palestine is engaged in fighting not
simply an indigenous government or regime, but a foreign occupying power.
This colonial status obviously constitutes a distinct situation for the Palestinian
Islamists.10 Yet, although Israel will remain Hamas’ principal adversary so long
as the occupation of Palestine continues, the Islamists still ultimately seek to
supplant the PLO as the dominant or hegemonic force within Palestinian society.
In other words, the actual armed conflict may be against Israel, but Hamas’ 
political struggle is clearly focused on the PLO and Yasser Arafat (see Usher,
1995: 70).
In terms of the PLO’s status in the occupied territories (the West Bank and
Gaza Strip), while it is true that it does not posses all the instruments of power
or the autonomy of a state in the traditional sense of the word, the PLO does
represent the primary source of legitimacy in the territories, in terms of both
domestic and international recognition. This was reinforced with the signing 
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of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 (Legrain, 1997: 169). While it only
recently acquired the state-like apparatus of a police force and a more fully-
defined administrative structure, the PLO has long been the principal distri-
butor of services and patronage through its control of civil institutions and
financial resources (Mishal and Sela, 2000: 149) and, more importantly, has
long been recognized as the true governing power in the occupied territories by
the Palestinian people themselves. Prior to the intifada, according to Mishal and
Sela, ‘no serious Palestinian political or military group existed outside the PLO’s
sphere of influence. All the major groups were either affiliated with or identified
with the PLO. It had become the dominant force in Palestinian political life, its
symbolic status, charismatic leadership, and political influence among the
Palestinian people were beyond question’ (2000: 149).11
Hamas (a political movement)
In attempting to present itself as a legitimate alternative to the PLO, it must be
demonstrated that Hamas is a political movement interested in acquiring power
rather than a religious organization concerned solely with moral pronoun-
cements and issues of religious doctrine. First, Hamas’ pragmatic approach to
the Palestinian issue is examined to demonstrate that political considerations
have always assumed more significance than dogmatic (i.e. religious) prin-
ciples in its views and actions toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Second, in 
spite of Islam’s international orientation and universal declarations, Hamas
has always focused on the specific national (i.e., Palestinian) context over this
more global worldview. In other words, Hamas’ aims have always been primar-
ily motivated by its national aspirations and its desire to protect Palestinian
interests.
Though there is little doubt about their religious devotion and their belief
in the fundamental principles of Islam, the Islamists in Palestine have con-
sistently demonstrated a willingness to adopt a more pragmatic stance when
deemed necessary. In fact, the degree of flexibility assumed by Hamas in all areas
of its struggle is cited by a number of authors as its defining characteristic.
According to Mishal and Sela, ‘Hamas is fully acquainted with and adaptable 
to the political world, driven by primordial sentiments, conflicting interests, and
cost–benefit considerations, a world of constant bargaining and power broker-
ing, multiple identities and fluid loyalties – in which victory is never com-
plete and tension is never ending’ (2000: viii; see also 85–6 and 147). As 
Milton-Edwards succinctly puts it: ‘In this field the leadership of Hamas has
turned the politics of pragmatism into a fine art and positive attribute’ (1996:
216).12
It is not surprising that Hamas’ pragmatic approach to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict has intensified in recent years. This more flexible stance is
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in response to both the perception of the antiquated nature of some of its poli-
cies (e.g. a Palestinian state in all of the mandated area of Palestine through
jihad13), and the belief within the leadership in the importance of increasing the
potential for growth in the post-Oslo environment. As a result of this willing-
ness to be both ideologically flexible and more pragmatic in its approach to the
conflict, Hamas remains the most significant and only real legitimate threat to
the PLO. As Al Jarbawi argues: ‘Thus, while expectations are limited for the
influence to be exerted by the . . . other Islamic movements on the future of
political life in Palestine, the scope of possibilities for Hamas, in addition to its
pragmatism and multiple options, make it a major and fundamental element for
the future’ (1994: 153).
As head of the ‘moderate’ wing of Hamas, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin has on
various occasions demonstrated his readiness to be pragmatic for reasons of
political gain and a willingness to adapt his strategy to the realities of the situ-
ation. As early as September 1988, when asked if Hamas might negotiate with
Israel, Yasin did not quote the recently published Hamas Charter (August 1988),
which explicitly forbids any talks with Israel, but instead put forward certain
pre-conditions for future negotiations (Klein, 1997: 116). In 1993, Yasin explic-
itly differentiated between full-fledged peace (sulh) with the Jews and a tempo-
rary armistice (hudna) which he would accept if Israel would immediately
withdraw from the occupied territories.14 In addition, in late 1995, Yasin led the
moderate wing of the Party in endorsing Hamas’ participation in the Palestinian
elections of January 1996, though hard-line members of Hamas eventually
forced the movement to boycott those elections (Amayreh, 1995: 8).
In terms of the primacy of political considerations over issues of religious
doctrine, Hamas has had to confront the type of fundamental dilemma that has
faced Islamic movements throughout the Middle East. Essentially, all Islamist
movements are torn between the need to consider the practical implications of
a strategy emphasizing the primary importance of their unique national con-
text, versus a more internationalist approach as demanded by the universalism
of their ideology: in other words, while the religion of Islam demands a univer-
sal approach, their audience and its particular goals are clearly national in
scope.15
In the Palestinian context, prior to 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood had
assumed a decidedly international approach to this question by preaching the
need to spread Islam throughout the Muslim world, while deliberately de-
emphasizing the centrality of Palestine in terms of the Israeli–Arab dispute.
With the outbreak of the intifada,16 a fundamental shift occurred in terms of
the Islamists’ overall strategy from the universalist approach of the Muslim
Brotherhood to the more nationalist orientation of Hamas. The Hamas Charter
(published 18 August 1988) gives the clearest indication of this fundamental
change in orientation from a universal strategy to one emphasizing the primacy
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of the Palestinian issue. In terms of its Palestinian dimension, the Charter
asserts that Hamas ‘is an outstanding type of Palestinian movement’ (Charter
of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine, 1993: Article 6), and
that ‘Palestine is the heart of the earth, the meeting of continents, and the lure
of the avaricious since the dawn of history’ (Article 34). Consequently, ‘the 
liberation of Palestine is obligatory for every Muslim, no matter where he is’
(Article 13). Klein summarizes this transformation in Hamas’ strategy, and the
change in focus from its universal orientation to the national context and,
hence, from the religious to the political realm: ‘Since its inception, Hamas has
“Palestinianized” the universal claim of Islam and given the movement a
national–religious–political profile. This trend may be interpreted as the Hamas
leadership giving preference to “Palestinianizing” Islam over “Islamicizing”
Palestine’ (Klein, 1997: 112–13).17
Hamas: the only alternative
Throughout its short history, Hamas has continued to depict its movement 
most fundamentally as a clear and viable alternative to the secular forces led 
by the PLO. Hamas’ basic nature as a counter-force to the PLO was originally
articulated in its Charter. Another consequential repercussion of the Charter
was that it helped to clarify the crucial distinctions that existed between the
secular and Islamic forces within Palestine, especially those differences vis-à-vis
Israel.
The Charter explicitly mentions Hamas’ relationship to, and views of, the
mainstream PLO: it specifically refers to the Hamas–PLO relationship as that ‘of
a son toward his father, and the brother toward his brother, and the relative
toward his relative’, and states that ‘our nation is one, plight is one, destiny is
one, and our enemy is the same’ (Charter, 1993: Article 27). Furthermore, the
Charter states that ‘all nationalist elements working in the arena for the sake of
liberating Palestine should be assured that it is a helper and supporter and will
never be anything but that’ (Charter, 1993: Article 25).
However, the Charter is also very clear regarding Hamas’ distinctive nature
vis-à-vis the mainstream PLO. With reference to ‘liberating Palestine’, Hamas
rejects the two-state solution and any negotiation with or recognition of the
State of Israel.18 In fact, Article 13 states that ‘as far as the ideology of the
Islamic Resistance Movement is concerned, giving up any part of Palestine is
like giving up part of its religion’. Furthermore, with specific reference to the
PLO, Article 27 asserts that ‘we cannot exchange the current and future of
Islam in Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature 
of the Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our din (ideology and way of life)
and whosoever neglects part of his din is surely lost’.
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By fundamentally opposing the PA over the nature of the future Palestinian
state (secular or Islamic), the shape of that state (two-state or all of Palestine),
and the means to the creation of that state (negotiation with Israel or jihad) (see
Abu-Amr, 1994: 29–30), it is clear that the PLO and the Islamists are offering
the Palestinian people two contrasting visions of the future. As a result, it is
obvious that one of the principal aims sought in the declaration of its Charter
was to allow Hamas to present itself as a clear alternative to the current hege-
monic position of the PLO within Palestinian society, especially in terms of the
continuing struggle against Israeli occupation (Abu-Amr, 1993: 13; see also
Frisch, 1994: 52).
Throughout the early years of the Palestinian uprising, Hamas continued
to emphasize the fundamental distinctions that existed in terms of its ideology,
organization and strategy vis-à-vis the other participants in the intifada, espe-
cially Fatah19 and its dominant position within the PLO (Ahmad, 1994: 51; see
Peretz, 1990: 15–16). One of these crucial differences involved Hamas’ focus on
building an independent social infrastructure (e.g. schools, hospitals, sports
clubs) separate from the PLO’s, and in aiding those segments of Palestinian
society most detrimentally affected by the continuing Israeli occupation. This
emphasis on its social policies was further accentuated when Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States transferred their financial support from the PLO to the Islamists
as punishment for the PLO’s decision to back Iraq in the 1990–91 Gulf War. In
September 1992, Hamas crystallized its opposition to the PLO by fronting a ten-
faction group of parties opposed to continued Palestinian participation in the
Madrid peace talks. While parties both within the PLO umbrella organization –
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) – and outside – the Islamic Jihad –
were represented, it was clear that Hamas was the dominant group within 
this newly formed ‘rejectionist’ coalition, as well as the largest of all the factions
represented. As a result, by September 1992, Hamas was ‘offering an alterna-
tive political program that rejected the peace process, and by expanding its orga-
nizational infrastructure in the territories at the expense of the PLO’s network
. . . emerged as the most serious challenge yet to the PLO’s claim of exclusive
representation of the Palestinian people’ (Litvak, 1992: 267).
By presenting itself as a viable alternative to the entrenched position of the
PLO, Hamas has continued to deny the PLO’s self-appointed position as ‘the only
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ (Milton-Edwards, 1996:
208, see also Litvak, 1989: 23). In fact, Hamas has openly challenged the legit-
imacy of the PLO, while proclaiming itself as the ‘sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people’s holy war’ (Litvak, 1992: 269; see also Litvak, 1990:
252). In reference to the rejectionist front it helped create in 1992, Litvak
observes that Hamas was essentially ‘advocating that the ten factions form an
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alternative provisional leadership under its domination that would con-
stitute the authentic representation of the Palestinian people’ (1993: 194).
Throughout this period, Hamas stressed its Islamic ideology as opposed to the
secularism of the PLO, provided an efficient network of social institutions as 
a substitute for the PLO’s bankrupt one, and escalated its armed struggle as
opposed to the PLO’s route of negotiation and moderation (Litvak, 1993: 194).
The uncompromising position assumed by Hamas, toward both Israel and
the PLO moderates willing to negotiate with the Israelis, is clearly intended 
to gain adherents to Hamas’ more ‘revolutionary’ approach to the Palestinian
issue. In this sense, Hamas’ entire existence is based on Palestinian discontent
with the status quo (Ahmad, 1994: 106; Zahhar, 1995: 83). In addition, ‘the
abandonment by PLO factions of ideological and revolutionary discourse’ 
(Abu-Amr, 1994: 86) remains a key factor in Hamas’ appeal. According to Yezid
Sayigh, Hamas continues to attract ‘an increasing number of adherents, who
support its call for armed resistance to the military occupation and rejection of
compromise’ (1993: 17).20
Therefore, on the one hand, because of the colonial status of the
Palestinians as an occupied people, Hamas has assumed an almost ‘necessary’
revolutionary function within the Palestinian political landscape as a force of
national liberation against Israeli rule. Yet, on the other hand, Hamas is also
viewed as a legitimate alternative to the PLO for those Palestinians who accept
its declarations regarding the need to change the current political, economic
and social structure within Palestinian society itself and, in the process, replace
the current indigenous hegemon in the occupied territories, the PLO (Ahmad,
1994: 117).21
An additional factor in Hamas’ ability to provide the only effective opposi-
tion to the PA’s dominance in Palestinian life has been its conscious attempt to
portray itself as both completely separate from and independent of the PLO. In
fact, the Islamists, especially Hamas, have gone to great lengths to argue that
only they – as opposed to other radical factions within the Palestinian move-
ment such as the PFLP and the DFLP – have remained a truly independent
Palestinian force (Kodmani-Darwish, 1996: 31). As Andoni comments in refer-
ence to Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad: ‘Neither [was] born
out of the PLO womb and neither feels obliged, morally or politically, to adhere
to policies that they had no part in formulating’ (1994: 18). Hamas has main-
tained this independent stance by continually reasserting its intention to remain
outside the PLO umbrella, in spite of the PLO’s offer of seats on the Palestinian
National Council (PNC). The importance of such assertions of independence
cannot be overestimated when assessing its self-professed role as the only
genuine counter-force to the PLO. As Kodmani-Darwish states: ‘The movement
does not want to bear responsibility for the PLO’s collapse. But if the PLO did
collapse on its own because of the wrong choices it made, the Islamist move-
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ment would present itself as the only structured alternative with its own base
within the population independent of the PLO and capable of relieving it’ (1996:
29). In effect, this statement summarizes the belief held by many members of
Hamas that only it can provide a truly separate and independent alternative to
the PLO and its hegemonic position within Palestinian society.
While the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 clearly forced
Hamas to embark upon a decidedly more pragmatic approach, it has continued
to follow a strategy that accentuates its fundamental nature as an alternative to
the PLO. Hamas still refuses to recognize the sole representative status of the PLO
(i.e. the PA), and now promotes itself primarily through its opposition to the 
Oslo peace process (see Milton-Edwards, 1996: 210).22 In that sense, the Oslo
Accords have done little to alter Hamas’ self-image as the only option to the PLO’s
route of negotiated settlement.
[T]he Oslo agreements do not seem to carry the promise of a near and real peace as
much as they open the way for the Islamists to compete for power. It follows that the
stake has become a struggle for power between two competing claims of legitimacy:
that of the PLO, acquired through 25 years of armed struggle, and an Islamic move-
ment that claims that same legitimacy in the name of its present resistance in the
territories, the only means it sees (as opposed to peaceful settlement) to force Israel
to evacuate the territories. (Kodmani-Darwish, 1996: 28)
In its contemporary context, it is this staunch rejection of the Oslo Accords and
the entire peace process that best represents its current oppositional nature and
its position as the only true alternative to the PA and its ‘bankrupt’ policies. In
the view of most members of Hamas, the Oslo Accords offer little hope of a fair
and just peace for the Palestinians and their national aspirations. In fact, to
many within Hamas, Oslo is less a peace process than a security pact between
the PA, Israel and the United States, with the ultimate aim of obliterating their
movement.23 While Oslo was presented by Arafat, and by others in the Fatah
movement, as the first step towards satisfying Palestinian national aspirations
for eventual statehood, Hamas argued that Oslo did little more than shift the
burden for controlling Palestinian society and the security apparatus in the
occupied territories from the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) onto the Palestinian
Authority.
While fundamental divisions still exist within the leadership of Hamas over
questions of strategy and ideology (see below), it is unequivocal in its damna-
tion of the whole Oslo process. In March 1997, after a suicide bombing attack
in Israel24 Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghoshah argued for the need to bury once
and for all ‘Oslo, the PA, and the so-called peace process’ (cited in The Economist,
9 August 1997: 8). Moreover, in April 1999 Yasin was urging the Palestinian
leadership to ‘extricate us all from this calamity called Oslo’, stating that
‘freedom from Oslo is essential for building national unity’. He added that the
aim of Hamas remains to shed the ‘crippling restrictions’ imposed on the
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Palestinians by the Oslo Accords, and ‘to reaffirm our opposition to the Oslo
Process’.25 Hamas’ strident rejection of the Oslo Accords has become the primary
factor in unifying the very divergent factions that exist within the Islamic 
movement, and it remains the most discernible difference between the PA 
and a Hamas movement that continues to depict itself as the only legitimate
alternative to that rule. It has also been this opposition to the Oslo Accords and
its damnation of the entire process that has accounted for the core of Hamas’
support.
Support
A definite trend has developed in Hamas’ support base since its creation as a 
separate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in January 1988. Hamas’ popular
support is most directly linked to the peace process and the willingness of
the Palestinian people to back violent resistance to Israeli occupation. Public
opinion surveys and various elections conducted for student unions, profes-
sional syndicates, and the chambers of commerce exhibit a clear pattern in
growth for Hamas. At those times when the lack of significant progress in the
peace negotiations has led to increased feeling of disenchantment and hope-
lessness among the Palestinian people, many Palestinians have demonstrated a
greater readiness to back the Islamic cause.26
Within two years of the outbreak of the intifada, Hamas achieved some spec-
tacular gains in terms of its support within Palestinian society.27 While backing
for Hamas steadily rose during this period, no one event garnered Hamas as
much sympathy and support as the Israeli deportation of 418 ‘suspected’
Islamic activists in December 1992.28 The media’s depiction of the deportees
stranded in ‘no man’s land’ just inside the Lebanon border greatly enhanced the
image of the Palestinians as victims of continuing Israeli repression. According
to Litvak:
the deportations at the end of 1992 boosted Hamas’ popularity in the territories 
and enhanced its image of being at the forefront of the struggle against Israel.
Furthermore, the strike at the Hamas organisational infrastructure, mainly at
welfare and religious institutions, was perceived in the territories as an attack upon
Islam itself, rallying many around the Movement. (Litvak, 1993: 195)
To many Palestinians, not only did the deportations demonstrate the true futil-
ity in the PLO’s misplaced hopes for a negotiated settlement,29 but Hamas, not
the PLO, was now perceived as the vanguard in the struggle against Israeli occu-
pation (Litvak, 1992: 275).
According to actual public support received throughout this period
(1988–1993), Hamas had come to represent a legitimate threat as a national
alternative to the mainstream PLO. In terms of pure public opinion and by some
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estimates, support for Hamas as much as tripled during this time. In one of the
earliest measures of Hamas’ backing in the occupied territories, polls placed
Hamas’ support at somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent of the Palestinian
population.30 Yet, by December 1992, in the wake of the large-scale deporta-
tions of Islamic activists, some experts claimed that as many as 40 per cent 
of Palestinians in the occupied territories were now supporting Hamas, while
similarly rejecting the more moderate policies of the PLO (The Economist, 19
December 1992: 39). While this zenith of support may have just indicated 
an upsurge in sympathy for Hamas in the aftermath of the mass deportations,
even by February 1993, Hamas was still estimated to be enjoying the backing 
of approximately 30–40 per cent of the population in the Gaza Strip and 20–
5 per cent in the West Bank (The Economist, 20 February 1993: 39).
Public opinion surveys alone are not always an accurate indicator of a
certain individual’s actual voting intentions, but a number of elections held
throughout the occupied territories during this period confirm the increased
popular support for the ‘Islamic Bloc’, led by Hamas.31 According to Iyad
Barghouti, ‘in the 1992–93 elections, a systematic increase in Hamas’ popu-
larity was demonstrated, even in liberal institutions such as Bir Zeit University
[in Nablus], with the group typically obtaining between 35 and 40 per cent of
the vote’ (Barghouti, 1996: 168). While the victory at the liberal-leaning Bir
Zeit surprised many PLO officials, it was the startling success of the Islamists in
the Chamber of Commerce election in Ramallah in March 1992 that ‘sent a
chill down nationalist spines’ because Ramallah was a heavily Christian centre
and had always been a nationalist stronghold (Kuttab, 1992: 6).
However, according to Elie Rekhess, the PLO defeat in Ramallah was not an
aberration but instead represented a systematic pattern of increased Islamic
support that had been occurring ever since the PLO had entered the Madrid
peace talks. Prior to this defeat, other losses had occurred in the Hebron
Chamber of Commerce, Hebron University, the Union of Electric Company’s
employees and the Employees’ Union of the East Jerusalem Maqasid Hospital
(Rekhess, 1992: 299).
To demonstrate the degree to which the Islamic Bloc was gaining in terms
of its popular support, in the fall of 1992, Mahmoud al-Zahhar examined more
than twenty election campaigns conducted in the territories during 1991–92.
According to Al-Zahhar, 34,221 Palestinians voted in these elections, with the
Islamist candidates winning 43 per cent of the overall votes.32 While it is evident
that by the summer of 1993 Hamas represented a legitimate alternative to 
the PLO, according to Dilip Hiro, what is more remarkable is that ‘within four
years Hamas came to rival Fatah, which had been active for a generation’ (Hiro,
1997: 17).
While Hamas’ success over this period was based primarily on the inabi-
lity of the PLO to achieve any significant results during the Madrid peace 
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negotiations in Washington, the surprise announcement and subsequent
signing of the Oslo Accords in August and September 1993 had an equally 
dramatic impact on Hamas’ growing support. Almost immediately after the
Accords were signed a poll showed Hamas’ support had plunged to 13 per cent
(Al Jarbawi, 1994: 141).33 Backing for Hamas remained at that level over the
next few years, even in the face of its new strategy of suicide bombings from
April 1994 to March 1996.34 In December 1995, it was reported that Hamas’
support was stuck at 15 per cent, after a high of nearly 40 per cent just before
the Oslo Accords were signed (The Economist, 2 December 1995: 41; also see
Mishal and Sela, 2000: 134 and 137). That figure further declined to 10 per
cent in the former stronghold of Gaza after Hamas decided to boycott the
Palestinian General Elections in January 1996.35 Thus, there was a direct link
between the ability of the Accords to exhibit tangible territorial and economic
benefits on the ground and Hamas’ declining support.
Conversely, it is not surprising that the corresponding support for both
Yasser Arafat and the overall peace process continued to increase over the same
period. From September 1995 to January 1996, support for Arafat climbed from 
54 to 58 per cent while backing of the Israeli–Palestinian deal rose from 66 
to 72 per cent (The Economist, 30 September 1995: 46 and 5 January 1996: 
52). Furthermore, both Yasser Arafat’s election as president and the sweeping 
to power of his Fatah party in the January 1996 elections were interpreted 
as an overwhelming endorsement of the PLO’s platform of negotiation and 
moderation.
However, developments since the early 1990s demonstrate that it would be
premature to discount Hamas and the influence it still exerts on the Palestinian
political scene, especially regarding the peace process. At those times when the
Oslo peace process seemed in jeopardy of self-destructing, Hamas had been able
to make credible gains. In November 1993, when negotiations for the first stage
of Israeli withdrawal from the territories were near collapse, student council
elections at Bir Zeit produced a ‘Rejectionist Front’ coalition, with the PFLP
DFLP and Hamas acquiring a clear majority with 52 per cent of the vote (Kuttab,
1993: 5–6). Two years later at the same university, when negotiations for the
second stage of Palestinian autonomy were stalled, the rejectionists won 27 out
of a total of 51 seats – Hamas alone winning 18 seats.36
Such gains for Hamas were even more notable during the three-year reign
of Benjamin Netanyahu when not only did peace talks remain essentially
dormant, but many Palestinians perceived the Likud Prime Minister’s policies 
as inflammatory and provocative not just to the peace process, but to Israeli–
Palestinian relations in general. In December of 1996, both in the wake of
Netanyahu’s ascension to power and in response to the large scale fighting 
in the territories in September 1996,37 Hamas emerged as the leading party 
in student elections at the Najah University in Nablus, a traditional Fatah
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stronghold (Amayreh, 1996: 4). In fact, by the end of 1997 – Netanyahu’s first
full year in power – the Islamic Bloc controlled the student unions at 6 of the 7
Palestinian universities (See Amayreh, 1997: 4; Hiro, 1997: 19). This public
shift away from the negotiated option, proposed by Arafat and the PLO, was also
exhibited in a January 1999 poll (i.e. Netanyahu’s last year in power) conducted
by the Nablus-based Centre for Palestine Research and Studies. According to the
poll, the number of Palestinians who supported armed resistance had risen from
41 to 53 per cent in the previous two months, while the number who backed
the peace process had dropped from 75 to 66 per cent (Hamzeh-Muhaisen,
1999: 7).
Since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, the descent
into open warfare between the Israelis and Palestinians – and the apparent
death of the peace process – has been reflected in increased backing for violent
resistance to Israeli occupation and growing support for Hamas. A recent poll
conducted by Bir Zeit University showed that 74 per cent of Palestinians now
support suicide operations inside Israel (The Economist, 16 June 2001: 46). In
addition, a February poll demonstrated that the combined support for Hamas
and Islamic Jihad now rivalled that of Arafat’s Fatah party.38 Clearly, Islamist
movements continue to benefit the most from the growing insecurity and vio-
lence in the Middle East. Thus, while many Palestinians still support the peace
process as the best option for achieving Palestinian national aspirations, armed
attacks, and Hamas’ utilization of such a strategy, remain a viable option to the
policies of negotiation and moderation long advocated by the PA.
The future
Many factors demonstrate Hamas’ future as a viable oppositional force to the
PLO including those that are seemingly beyond Hamas’ control. If final status
talks produce a generally acceptable solution for the majority of Palestinians,
Hamas’ significance as a political force would come under scrutiny. In addition,
continued joint repression at the hands of both Palestinian and Israeli security
forces might disable the movement to such an extent that its future viability 
is negligible. Yet, in terms of its own internal position and those components
Hamas can influence, it would seem that there are two areas Hamas must add-
ress if it wants to be considered a legitimate vehicle of political counter-protest
on the Palestinian political landscape. The first is the necessity of healing the
rifts and divisions that have become more pronounced within Hamas in the latter
half of the 1990s, especially in terms of strategy. The second is the seeming
necessity of working with the PA/PLO in some type of ‘national unity’ govern-
ment, at least while the current violence continues unabated, or even to return
to the type of strategy conducted so effectively by the Muslim Brotherhood
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Basically, this involves a strategy of
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non-violent resistance and building support at the grassroots level to represent
that segment of society opposed to the PLO’s secular orientation, and general
policies, in addition to any capitulation of Palestinian rights.
Although there have always been splits within the movement, divisions
within Hamas have played a prominent role in undermining its efforts to provide
an effective oppositional force. In fact, the very creation of Hamas as a separate
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood was partially in response to the differences 
that existed between older, more moderate, members of the Brotherhood and
the younger, more radical, Islamists. Thus, according to Abu-Amr, during the
first month of the intifada,
the question debated [about actively joining the intifada] was whether it was incum-
bent upon the society to delay the jihad against the Israeli occupation until an
Islamic society is founded or whether it was the Brotherhood’s duty to enter into the
confrontation immediately. Traditional Brotherhood leaders were not enthusiastic
about an early participation in the intifada, but the young leaders were able to impose
their will and vision in this regard. (1994: 83)
Deep-seated divisions have always existed within Hamas over fundamental 
questions of ideology, organization, and strategy.
In terms of ideology, it is evident that there is a fundamental division
between those Palestinians who tend to support Hamas for its conservative and
religious orientation, and those who are clearly drawn to Hamas because of its
revolutionary appeal as a force of national liberation. In fact, these differences
appear to have become even more pronounced in the new environment created
by the Oslo Accords. According to Graham Usher, ‘reconciling these strains of
social conservatism and radical nationalism within the same movement is the
dilemma Hamas faces on the changed terrain of autonomy’ (1994: 9).
In addition to the ideological disputes, an organizational schism has de-
veloped between various branches of the movement over questions of strategy.
With each department responsible for fundamentally different aspects of the
organization’s orientation – military, political, charitable39 – splits between 
the various wings, or even within a specific branch, was a real possibility.
Consequently, by 1996, it appeared that the organization’s internal polarization
had openly splintered between its hard-line military wing (i.e. the Iz al-Din 
al-Qassam brigades) and the more moderate members of the movement 
(Al Jarbawi, 1996: 33; see also Webman, 1996: 129–30). The rash of suicide-
bombings in the spring of 1996 was indicative of the fundamental nature of
that split (The Economist, 9 March 1996: 15).
Moreover, the 1996 suicide-bombing campaign revealed a schism between
Hamas’ political leadership both within the occupied territories and between 
its internal and external leadership. In Gaza, the more moderate leaders of the
movement opposed the bombings, while the military wing of the party in the
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West Bank supported such a strategy (The Economist, 18 April 1998: 41). In
addition, divisions have surfaced between the leadership within the territories
(which has tended to advocate a more restrained strategy and is fearful of
the cost of PA repression linked to the bombing campaign) and the leadership
outside of the territories which has maintained that only an active military 
presence can ward off such repression (The Economist, 22 August 1998: 38).
According to Webman, especially in the post-Oslo era, fundamental divisions
within Hamas have become severe enough to threaten the very existence of
the movement: ‘the issues of handing over of arms, the continuation of a radical
operations against Israel and the acceptance of the PA were controversial within
Hamas, threatening to split it apart . . . Various reports referred to divisions
between a moderate and a radical camp, between the political wing and the 
military wing, between activists inside and outside the territories, and even
between activists in Gaza and the West Bank’ (Webman, 1996: 129).
Hamas continues to allot primary importance to presenting a united front
in the face of constant repression and PA attempts to sow disunity by ostraciz-
ing and delegitimizing its external leadership in Jordan, Iran and Syria
(Amayreh, 1998: 10). However, such divisions must be addressed if Hamas is 
to once more threaten the position of the PLO/PA as the dominant force within
the occupied territories.
Currently, there have been various attempts to transform Hamas into a
legitimate political party (i.e. a loyal opposition), as demonstrated by the
‘national unity’ talks initiated by Arafat with Hamas on 7 August 2001 
(The Economist, 18 August 2001: 33). A competing view is that Hamas would
be better served by returning to the Muslim Brotherhood’s grassroots strategies
(i.e. ‘Islamization’) that helped the movement increase its support in the 1970s
and 1980s.40 Through its extensive network of social institutions such as
Islamic charity associations, nursery schools, kindergartens, neighbourhood
libraries and sports clubs (Abu-Amr, 1994: 14–15), the Muslim Brotherhood
championed a strategy of evolutionary change. In doing so, it sought to trans-
form Palestinian civil society from within, while bringing it into accordance
with the principles of Islam and the rule of the Sharia. In this period, the Muslim
Brothers assumed the view that the foundations of an Islamic society must 
first be created, primarily through Islamic education, before jihad could be 
legitimately and successfully undertaken.41
In the end, whatever future strategy Hamas decides to pursue, it will focus
on a grassroots and incremental strategy to build opposition to the entire Oslo
process and, in its opinion, allow it to ‘crumble’ under its own contradictions
(Al Jarbawi, 1994: 148). According to Mahmud Zahhar, one of Hamas’ prin-
cipal spokesmen, ‘Hamas is not in a hurry. We know that the PLO’s practice will
inevitably lead to its downfall . . . Communism had to be allowed to go to the end
of its capacities, and it fell of its own weight’ (1995: 83).42 Many members of
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Hamas have realized that in the current environment, the PA – especially when
it co-operates with Israel – is too powerful to overthrow militarily from its
entrenched position as the dominant force in the occupied territories. Yet, as
Khalil Shikaki cautions:
Hamas remains the sole credible alternative to Fatah and the mainstream nationa-
lists. Those who have deserted the Islamists have not changed loyalties; most have
simply sat on the sidelines. They could become a reservoir for an Islamist revival.
One of the reasons that Yitzhak Rabin . . . went to Oslo was his fear that his choice
was to deal either with the PLO today or Hamas tomorrow. [Israel still] faces the
same choice (1998: 43).
Conclusion
In the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, unless the Oslo process can eventually
produce the type of minimal territorial concessions and economic benefits
sought by a significant segment of the Palestinian population, Hamas will con-
tinue to dictate and shape strategic calculations and security considerations in
the region. By portraying the PLO–PA as a weak, corrupt and ineffective regime,
and as little more than an extension of the Israeli security apparatus, Hamas
remains a significant force. Hamas is strengthened particularly through its
ability to most effectively articulate the grievances of those individuals margina-
lized and alienated by the current regime and its policies. In the climate of the
recent violence and the re-emerging support for suicide bombings, Hamas has
achieved prominence as the vanguard in the struggle to protect Palestinian
interests and security in the occupied territories. Hamas can neither be com-
pletely destroyed nor simply wished away and, as the primary rejectionist power
within the Palestinian Bloc, Hamas continues to constitute the most significant
threat to both the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and to the general stability
of the region.
notes
1 This latest round of violence, referred to as the al-Aqsa intifada, followed Ariel Sharon’s
visit to the al-Aqsa mosque on 28 September 2000 as a show of Israeli sovereignty over
east Jerusalem.
2 Henceforth, the ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ and ‘Palestinian Authority’ will 
be freely interchanged. While it is recognized that they constitute two fundamentally 
different entities, both are dominated by Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement and by Arafat
himself.
3 As will be demonstrated, Hamas is a unique movement among political Islamist groups
because its target is both external (i.e. the Israelis) as well as internal (i.e. the indigenous
regime) in nature.
4 According to Dekmejian: ‘In the absence of other institutional and ideological channels
of opposition, fundamentalism has provided a religiously sanctioned means for the 
articulation of popular dissatisfaction’ (1985: 176. Also see Mishal and Sela, 2000: 4).
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5 The Sharia, or more specifically Islamic Law, is derived primarily from the Quran.
6 Hamas was not originally created for the purpose of providing an alternative to the 
PLO, but rather for the purpose of responding to the intifada and the continuing Israeli
occupation. However, it has become clear that Hamas now sees the PLO’s presence in
Palestinian society as the main obstacle to increasing its own power. For an explanation
of this change in Hamas’ strategy, see Usher, 1995: 67–8.
7 Israeli officials have confiscated over 60 per cent of the land in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
8 The PA is dependent on Israeli goodwill for much of its tax revenue while many
Palestinians provide cheap migrant labour for the Israelis.
9 Several other authors take a similar position, arguing that Hamas’ support tends to be
over-represented among the more educated segments of Palestinian society (especially
university students and professionals). For the best examples, see Mishal and Sela, 2000:
23 and 37; Shikaki, 1998: 31–2; Abu-Amr, 1994: 6, 18, 21; Hoffman, 1994: 19; and
Satloff, 1989: 392.
10 In the post-Oslo period, a good historical example may be that of Egypt after the Second
World War, when a retreating Britain transformed the Muslim Brotherhood from a force
primarily concerned with fighting Western colonialism into a ‘true’ counter-hegemonic
force desiring the overthrow of, first, the indigenous Royalist forces and, subsequently,
the Nasser regime.
11 This domestic view of the PLO concurs with the international status it received as 
early as 1974, when it was given observer status at the United Nations (UN) and was 
recognized by the Arab governments of the Middle East as the Palestinian people’s ‘sole
representative’.
12 Other authors who emphasize this pragmatic nature of Hamas include Legrain, 1997:
173; Abu-Amr, 1994: 133; Ahmad, 1994: 55, 73, 88 and 117; Al Jarbawi, 1994: 136,
145, and 153; and Barghouti, 1993: 11.
13 Jihad is, of course, a highly contested concept within Islam. While many have focused
exclusively on its military character, others have interpreted jihad as more inclusive.
According to Armstrong, ‘the root jhd implies more than a “holy war”. It signifies a 
physical, moral, spiritual, and intellectual effort’ (1992: 168).
14 According to Litvak, Yasin defended this apparent change of position by arguing that 
it ‘is lawful for Muslims . . . to accept such an armistice if the enemy is powerful while 
the Muslims are weak and need time to prepare and recover their strength’ (1998: 
160).
15 A number of authors examine this national–universal paradox in the context of Hamas.
For examples, see Klein, 1997: 112–13; Frisch, 1994: 45; Litvak, 1989: 238.
16 When the intifada, or Palestinian uprising (literally, ‘shaking off ’), erupted in December
1987, the Muslim Brotherhood, though preaching the peaceful spread of Islam, feared
that its failure to engage more actively in the intifada would adversely affect its support,
and that consequently it would forfeit whatever gains it had achieved over the previous
twenty years. Therefore, the decision was made by the Muslim Brotherhood to create an
ostensibly separate organization (i.e. Hamas) to actively participate in the intifada. For the
best explanation of these developments, see Abu-Amr, 1994: 63–8.
17 Frisch reaches a similar conclusion about Hamas when she states that ‘the Palestiniza-
tion of the movement is probably its [the Muslim Brotherhood’s] most prominent inno-
vation incorporated into the Hamas document’ (1994: 52). See also Mishal and Sela,
2000: 41.
18 While earlier comments regarding Hamas’ pragmatic nature and willingness to negoti-
ate a two-state solution with Israel would appear to contradict this stance, it must be
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noted that even Yasin stated that any truce would be only a temporary armistice (hudna)
and, thus, the first stage in the eventual reacquisition of all of Palestine. See Mishal and
Sela, 2000: 108–9.
19 The PLO is basically an umbrella group comprised of various Palestinian groups. The
Fatah wing, led by Arafat, is clearly the dominant group within this movement.
20 In the spring and summer of 2001, in an atmosphere of escalating violence and growing
insecurity, Hamas’ endorsement of armed resistance remains the primary factor in
increasing its support among Palestinians. See The Economist 18 August 2001, 33.
21 According to Khalil Shikaki, many Palestinians support Hamas because of their general
disillusionment with the PA over ‘issues like corruption, mismanagement, and lack of
democratisation’ (1998: 32). For a similar explanation, see Mishal and Sela who argue
that part of Hamas’ success is based on its ability to project ‘credibility, dedication, 
and integrity compared with the PLO’s outdated and notoriously corrupt leadership’
(2000: 89).
22 See also The Economist, 22 April 1995, 46.
23 The Economist 22 August 1998, 38. For example, Hamas spokesman Shaykh Naif Rajub
dismissed the agreement as a ‘total surrender’ and described it as a ‘security pact’, saying
‘the Israelis, Americans, and PA are all after Hamas’ (quoted in Khaled Amayreh, ‘Hopes
But Mostly Fears’, Middle East International, 30 October 1998, 7).
24 In reaction to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to build additional
settlements in disputed lands on the outskirts of east Jerusalem, what the Palestinians
refer to as Jabal Abu Ghneim, on 21 March a Hamas suicide bomber destroyed a café in Tel
Aviv, killing three and injuring nearly fifty.
25 Yasin as quoted in Khalid Amayreh, ‘Arafat Evades the Issue’, Middle East International,
23 April 1999, 6.
26 According to Mishal and Sela, this support for Hamas is most apparent when ‘Yasir Arafat
and the Palestinian Authority fail to translate Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations into
tangible territorial achievements and economic benefits’ (2000: ix).
27 See The Economist, 2 December 1989, 47. In addition, this growth occurred in spite of
the fact that in May 1989 Israel formally outlawed the Hamas movement and arrested
its leader Shaykh Yasin, seven other senior leaders, and over 200 leading activists.
28 For a more detailed examination of this event, see Barghouti, 1993: 11; Ahmad, 1994:
80–2; and Milton-Edwards, 1996: 203–4.
29 The PLO at this time was involved in the doomed Madrid peace talks that had begun in
October 1991.
30 See The Economist, 22 December 1990, 49, and Steve Sherman, ‘Gazans and the Intifada:
United and Steadfast’, Middle East International, 13 April 1990, 18.
31 In terms of the ‘Islamic Bloc’, other Islamist organizations are included in this group,
most notably, Islamic Jihad. Hamas represents by far the largest single group within this
bloc.
32 See Ahmad Rashad, The Truth About Hamas, available online: www.iap.org/politics/misc/
truth.html (p. 5).
33 The Oslo Accords had the impact on Hamas that the PLO had intended. Hiro establishes
a link between Hamas’ support and the Oslo Accords by arguing: ‘In the absence of a fast-
growing Islamist movement among Palestinians, it is doubtful that Rabin would have
negotiated with Israel’s sworn enemy, a point made publicly by Chaim Herzog, president
of Israel from 1983 to [19]93’ (Hiro, 1997: 17).
34 According to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Research Centre in Nablus in May 1995,
Hamas only had 12 per cent support among the Palestinian population. See Mishal and
Sela 2000: 134.
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35 The Economist, 5 January 1996, 52. In addition, decreased popular backing for Hamas
was directly linked to a decline in support for armed attacks against Israel. According to
Shikaki: ‘Support for attacks against Israelis dropped from 57 per cent in November
1994, to 46 per cent in February 1995, to 33 per cent a month later, and to 21 per cent
in March 1996’ (1998: 35).
36 ‘West Bank Student Elections’, Middle East International, 9 June 1995, 4.
37 In September 1996, Netanyahu opened an ancient tunnel that ran alongside the Haram
al-Sharif, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. In the ensuing violence 73 people
were killed, 58 of them Palestinians, and over 1,500 were injured.
38 According to Usher 2001: 13, the Bir Zeit poll gave the Islamists 22 per cent 
support compared to 26 per cent for Fatah. However, according to The Economist, a poll
conducted in mid-2001 by Bir Zeit University showed that backing for the Islamists 
now outstripped support for Arafat’s Fatah movement. See The Economist, 16 June 
2001, 46.
39 For a more thorough examination of the structure of Hamas, some good sources include
Mishal and Sela, 2000: 58–9; Abu-Amr, 1994: 63; Litvak, 1993: 194; Litvak, 1990:
237; and Rashad, The Truth About Hamas: 2–3.
40 See Tamar Hausman, ‘Experts: Hamas Has Reasons to Refrain from Terror Attacks’, The
Jerusalem Post, 18 February 2000. Ely Karmon, 2000: 8, also examines the likelihood of
Hamas returning to this type of strategy.
41 According to Robert Satloff, the Brotherhood sought ‘evolutionary change over radical
revolution’ (1989: 396). Also see Legrain, 1997: 163; Ahmad, 1994: 15–17, for a more
thorough explanation of the Brotherhood’s strategy at this time. This idea of patience or
forbearance (sabr) has gained many adherents within the Islamic movement over the past
few years. Hamas spokesman Abu Marzuq argued that the key to the movement’s sur-
vival was patience, while Ibrahim Ghoshah endorsed a ‘wait and see’ attitude and
declared ‘that the agreement’s collapse was only a matter of time’. For an example of
their views on this issue, see Mishal and Sela, 2000: 102 and 139.
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The end of bipolarity brought to light the difficulty inherent in using Cold War concepts of security to explain international relations in thedeveloping world. As well, it has often been argued that international 
relations is basically an American (with some British input) enterprise (Azar 
and Moon, 1988b: 1; Hoffman, 1977), with the consequences that only threats 
that concerned American interests (i.e. military threats from the Soviet Union)
were considered security threats.1 In the contemporary international system,
however, issues of security are now much more than superpower competition
and interests, and these raise questions as to the nature and practice of security
(Dalby, 1997: 4). As Brian Job notes, ‘it is increasingly taken for granted that the
world is a secure place for First World [i.e. developed] states and their citizens’,
while the same is not true for developing world countries (Job, 1992: 11).
This chapter’s purpose is to broaden the definition of security by including
regimes and societies as essential referent objects of security. Demands for social,
economic and political rights across the Middle East have threatened the posi-
tions, indeed the very safety and perhaps even the survival, of regimes that have
been in power for many years. Focusing on the Arab world, these demands are
the result of declining socio-economic conditions within the region. Efforts to
placate such appeals, previously effected by focusing attention on foreign policy
agendas, through political reforms are perceived by these regimes as under-
mining their security. In response, regimes have engaged in repression, which
in turn undermines the security of their societies not only through violence and
ill-treatment, but by not allowing the requisite reforms to take place – thus
ignoring the socio-economic plight of their citizens. As a vicious circle, this has
the effect of angering populations even more, so that demands for change
become more strident, more common and, perhaps eventually increasingly
violent. This contributes to increased regime insecurity. Thus, the sense of threat
that prevails in the developing world (within the state) is to and from the regime
in power.
8
The effects of political liberalization 
on security
Brent E. Sasley
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To that end, the chapter is set out in the following manner. The first part 
is a clarification of the difference between political liberalization and demo-
cratization, as the two processes, though related, are distinct. The second section
formulates the theoretical arguments of this chapter, namely that regimes and
societies are two important referent objects of security which, though neglected
by traditional security studies literature, are consequential; and that the two 
are inextricably linked. This is followed by the chapter’s empirical case study, 
the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority. Finally, the conclusion offers
some preliminary thoughts on the usefulness of this addition to security studies
in the light of the Middle Eastern context.
Political liberalization versus democratization
It is necessary first to make a distinction between liberalization and demo-
cratization, since they are different processes. One important study on this 
topic differentiates between the two as follows: political liberalization ‘involves 
the expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil 
and political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to
engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common
interests’; whereas political democratization is defined as ‘an expansion of politi-
cal participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of meaning-
ful collective control over public policy’ (Brynen, Korany and Noble, 1995: 3).
Many Middle Eastern states have engaged in some democratic forms, 
primarily focused around elections.2 This is a Dahlian notion of democracy,
however, that relies on procedural aspects to determine whether a state is demo-
cratic or not (Dahl, 1971). However, since these elections are not always regular
or fair, and because in many cases their gains have been offset by other legal and
political manoeuvrings by regimes to negate their effects, the term ‘democrati-
zation’ will not be used. Liberalization is a much more suitable term, since it
implies political openings that can include a variety of forms and aspects, and
can take place in some areas but not others. Augustus Richard Norton defines
liberalization as ‘reformist measures to open up outlets for the free expression 
of opinion, to place limits on the arbitrary exercise of power, and to permit poli-
tical association’ (Norton, 1995: 33). Efforts in this vein, he contends, have 
been made in the Middle East, while steps towards democratization have not.
Other authors agree that liberalization can take place without democratization
(Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16). Following these definitions, the term ‘liberaliza-
tion’ will be used, as it corresponds to reality in the Middle East more so than
‘democratization’.3
A caveat should be added here. There is inherent in any examination of
political reform in non-Western countries a danger of ethnocentricity, especially
concerning levels of democracy; or of ‘reading processes deriving from one 
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specific set of historical and political circumstances into other, very different, 
contexts’ (Brynen, Korany and Noble, 1995: 3). To overlay Western values of
democracy onto a region such as the Middle East, which has experienced com-
pletely distinct economic, political, cultural, religious and geostrategic condi-
tions, is to risk analysing levels of political liberalization according to Western
standards. This simply should not be the case, as the conditions and time frame
under which North American and European democracy evolved do not compare
to Middle Eastern conditions.4 Despite this, and without wading into the debate
on the ability of the Middle East to democratize, this chapter takes the values 
of political liberalization as ‘good’, insofar as such reforms contribute to the 
security of people. At least one Palestinian politician and scholar believes that
democracy’s Western origins should not be bothered with, since it has by now
become a ‘universal value in itself [and] many of its principles and attributes have
assumed a global character and relevance’ (Abu-Amr, 1996: 93).
Inside the black box: the necessity of other referent 
objects of security
In an effort to defend the more realist notions of security studies, Stephen Walt
wrote that the main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of inter-state
war (Walt, 1991: 212). Fred Halliday argued that international relations is about
‘relations between states, war, power, the intersection of military and economic
interests’ (Halliday, 1995: 733). The question to be asked is whether such defini-
tions of security account for international politics across the world – and the
answer must be ‘no’. Primarily, this is because the overwhelming number of
violent conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Second World War has
taken place in the developing world. Moreover, these conflicts have been mainly
intra-state (Ayoob, 1997; Holsti, 1991). These very statistics call into question
the utility of the rational, unitary, realist state focused on external military
threats, and therefore indicate a need for a redefinition of security.
Simon Dalby points out that ‘security as conventionally formulated is about
the protection of a political community of some sort’ (1997: 9). From this, the
realists took the notion that political community referred only to states, since
they were the most important actors in the international system and the
primary referent objects of security.5 By designating states as ‘black boxes’,
realism ignores the series of complex interactions within states, and the ‘indi-
vidual’ nature of people, or citizens; instead, it constructs security around the
notion that people are citizens of states – hence, their security is protected by,
and tied into that of, the state itself, as represented by regimes (Krause and
Williams, 1997: 43).
The liberal paradigm is generally also not helpful, since although it rejects
the idea of a black box, it looks at domestic politics mainly as an explanation for
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state behaviour. The overwhelming politics of security in the developing world
is not, however, conditioned around inter-state relations: the politics of security
concerns the internal contests for security within states.
As well, norms have arisen since the beginning of the 1990s that are
becoming much more global in their acceptability and applicability than 
anything that appeared during the Cold War (although, perhaps predictably,
these norms begin within the Western world as much as any of the more tradi-
tional security norms did) – namely, that repression of populations can no
longer be justified in the name of ‘security’ (bipolar rivalry or any other). Thus,
the populations that realism assumed were protected by the state are in fact
facing insecurity because of the state. Because this occurs overwhelmingly in the
developing world, ‘critical security studies cannot ignore the politics of security
provision in differing political circumstances’ (Dalby, 1997: 23).
All this questions the claims of the state to realist types of sovereignty, from
which flow their particular conceptions of security (Krause and Williams, 1997:
45). The disjuncture between state and society leads to Ken Booth’s question:
how can states be the primary referent objects of security, when not all states
are in the business of providing security – and in fact may provide the opposite,
namely insecurity? (Booth, 1991: 320). Security, Barry Buzan points out, is 
not about power – as it had been primarily conceptualized during the Cold 
War – but rather is about actual security from threats (Buzan, 1991: 3). Quite
simply, ‘overt violence and conflict aside, most developing countries have
become insecure places to live’ (Azar and Moon, 1988b: 3). That is because of
the insecurity faced by populations themselves, not by states. Since, in the devel-
oping world, states face far fewer threats than societies or regimes (from each
other), the Cold War conception of security must be broadened to include 
these referent objects as well. We must therefore separate the various referent 
objects of security by asking whose security is affected – the state’s, the regime’s,
or society’s, particularly since frequently certain types of security are affected
while others are not (see Job, 1992: 15).
By redefining the object of security from the state to the individual or the
regime, or to populations or communal groups as themselves, allows them to
become important factors of consideration in a (necessarily) comprehensive
analysis of security. An examination of regime–society relations in the devel-
oping world in general and the Middle East in particular highlights the 
inadequacies of traditional formulations of security.
Regime security
One of the most important referent objects of security in the developing world
must be the regime that governs the state; yet, it is also one of the least studied
elements of security in the critical studies literature, in comparison to security
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studies on gender or intra-state communal group conflicts. In conventional
security studies, where conceptions of security are formulated around inter-
state relations, the state is understood in its Weberian sense, as an actor in 
the international system with a centralized authority controlling a recognized
territory. In the developed world,6 this is appropriate, since there democratic
modes of governance depend on the separation between governments and 
the state; that is, governments can change, but they all still use the same state
institutions to conduct policy. Moreover, as these governments are dependent on
electoral votes to remain in power, they must use these institutions to make
policy to the electorate’s satisfaction. Here, the ‘rules of the game’ delineate who
takes power and when it is given up.
But this does not correlate with developments in non-Western areas.
Instead, regimes that come to power do not leave power willingly, if they leave
at all. In instances of power sharing, or power grabbing, the rules are not clear
– if there even are rules – or the rules exclude various groups and ideologies 
(i.e. those who do not agree with the authoritarian nature or the policies of
the regime in power).7 In the meantime, incumbent regimes construct and
control state institutions for their own benefits more than for the benefits of
their populations. These include both political and security institutions (such 
as secret policy and intelligence agencies; see Ayoob, 1997). This occurs to 
the extent that, when examining domestic circumstances, the regime becomes
identical to the state, and the difference between state and regime becomes 
negligible (see Ayoob, 1997: 130).8 Thus, regime security is a concept more
applicable to the developing world – as are most of the reformulations of secu-
rity in the post-Cold War theoretical and practical arenas.
In the Middle East, most regimes are associated with the state – whether 
tied together through familial, tribal, ethnic or religious links, or through shared
interests, they utilize the state’s apparatuses, coercive and others, to protect 
their interests,9 to the point where regime and state become identical.10 Be-
cause of this, pressures for liberalization threaten to weaken the legal and 
political foundations that regimes base their positions of power (i.e. their 
security) on.11
During the 1980s and early 1990s, many Arab governments initiated 
liberalization efforts, including Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and the Maghreb states
(Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco), to varying degrees. Yet the reasons behind 
such reforms are as important as the reforms themselves, for what they tell 
us about security. Regime security has been defined as the ‘maintenance of
the core values of the regime, especially maintenance of its basic rules and 
institutions’ (al-Sayyid, 1999: 48), without which the regime cannot survive.
To this should also be added the safety and survival of the members of the
regime.12
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Regime security can be affected by society taking up arms against it, due to
its inability to look after society’s basic needs, or at least to provide effective
channels through which citizens feel they can have their concerns heard and
responded to. Even without resorting to armed confrontation, citizens might
withdraw passive support from the regime, in the form of civil disobedience or
non-voluntary co-operation, which might sap the regime of its resources, and
certainly of its legitimacy.
Demands for economic liberalization are equally dangerous for regimes,
because they can lead to demands for political change. As sectors of the
economy benefit from its liberalization (through less state interference in 
the economy), groups become empowered through greater prosperity. This 
leads them to desire more freedoms, necessary for the free market and their own
generation of wealth, such as access to information and the right to associate.
As well, they will demand a greater say in policy-making.
The end result of these demands is that they increase perceptions of regime
insecurity. To ameliorate such concerns, regimes can choose one of two options.
First, they can adopt liberalization efforts, in what one scholar has termed self-
preservation ‘survival strategies’. Here, ‘the goal of a political survival strategy
is to open up the political arena to a degree of participation sufficient to attract
support from groups with an interest in political reforms . . . without at the
same time creating conditions that might give these groups a means to under-
mine the hegemony of the ruling elites’ (Brumberg, 1995: 235; see also Norton,
1995: 3).13
The second option springs from the regime’s belief that any liberaliza-
tion efforts will only endanger it further. Never having been accountable to their
citizens in the past, regimes fear what could happen if they do become account-
able. Instead of finding out, they opt to use their control of state institutions to
repress, if not crush outright, any agitation for change. This has been the case
in Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq.
There are security problems with both of these options. In the first 
case, popular dissatisfaction with the regime has often been cited as one 
of the main reasons behind the liberalizations (Kazemi and Norton, 1999;
Ibrahim, 1995; Brynen, 1992; Hudson, 1991: 424–425). Consequently, re-
gimes that have liberalized do not hold any belief in the inherent value 
of reforms, and only view them as a strategy, or a means to an end – namely 
the furthering of their own security. Thus their commitment to these reforms 
is fragile, with the consequent possibility that once regimes perceive the 
threat to be effectively dealt with, they will roll back such reforms. Alter-
natively, if they perceive that reforms have only created the conditions for 
more demands for change, they will forego this option as too dangerous to their
security.
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At the same time, by utilizing the second option, regimes not only create
insecurity for society (see below), they also harden opposition to the regime and
may even force adversaries to use their own forms of violence against the
regime. Many militant Islamic groups have followed this strategy.
Societal security
Societal security14 can be defined as the ‘protection of the core values of that
society, namely, protecting the right to life of its citizens, safeguarding its
national values, and ensuring its welfare, or at least satisfaction of the basic
needs of its inhabitants’ (al-Sayyid, 1999: 48). National values, while impor-
tant, are not relevant here because the focus is on society’s security from the
regime, which itself normally formulates such national values.
This definition of societal security does not refer specifically to ethnicity 
or any other communal distinction (though it clearly does apply to such 
distinctions) and the effects it has on intra-state conflict. Such a locus takes 
up much of the critical security studies literature, which distinguishes this 
intra-state war from the conventional inter-state security dilemmas. But 
societal security is not just about intra-state war, though it is equally impor-
tant and relevant. Rather, the idea here is that the security of societies, 
or segments of societies, or individuals, can be affected by the state/regime
itself.15
The object of security must also be individuals as individuals, not only as
parts of the whole (the state) – people are to be secured as individuals, or as soci-
eties. Realist or other systemic theories’ focus on the state simply preclude this
type of conception, since the black box of the state need not be examined in
order to determine why states behave as they do – which is the primary, if not
only, focus of structural or systemic theories. According to this redefinition of
security, the state cannot, or does not, provide security for its citizens, because
it may be the source of that very insecurity.16 In such cases, the state itself, as
wielder of the most effective forms of coercion and violence within its territory,
provides the most serious threats to society.
In the Middle East, societies have long been in danger from their own 
governments. This is a direct result of the lack of control societies have over
policy making in their countries, which in turn flows from the lack of account-
ability of Arab regimes to their citizens. A 1998 Middle East Report summary,
for example, declared that despite several multiparty elections in the region,
executive authority remained an uncontested position, that vote-rigging was
common, and that political opposition had restrictions placed on it that 
seriously hampered its ability to freely compete. The report also pointed out 
that parliamentary elections in the Middle East are designed in such a way 
that usually guarantees the regime the most support (Middle East Report,
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 156
Effects of political liberalization
1998). Lack of effective opposition to the state means a lack of ability to influ-
ence policy.
The ‘resurrection’ of civil society in the Arab world – particularly since 
the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s – is a good indicator of the
increasing demands being made on Arab regimes, and the efforts by society 
to have its needs met. Characterized as the autonomous space between state 
and society, and effective as a buffer against the state, civil society is considered
vital for democracy, as it
protects the individual against possible hegemony by the state, creates channels 
of communication between rulers and ruled, contributes to the dissemination of
views independent from those in power, fosters initiative and responsibility-taking,
and provides avenues through which the population can make its voice heard, par-
ticipate in public life, lobby the state, and force the government to account for its
actions. (Denoeux, 1996: 32)
The ability of civil society to function properly and effectively within a 
given space is an integral aspect of political liberalization, both in terms of
being allowed this space in which to flourish, and because a stronger civil 
society is better able to push for political reforms and thus increase societal secu-
rity. The very growth of civil society highlights the need and desire for these
changes.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Arab states expanded in the
name of modernization, at the expense of civil society. In the current conditions,
as the state retreats, unable to fulfil its obligations to its citizens, civil society is
filling the gap (though not necessarily all of it). Islamist movements have been
particularly effective because of their social welfare problems and the tug on the
emotional–psychological bond people have toward their religion, particularly
during times of hardship.17
But increased social mobilization endangers regimes that have historically
ignored societal security by relying instead on religious or historical symbols and
emotions (Azar and Moon, 1988a: 81), or foreign policy distractions to deflect
internal concerns. This crisis of legitimacy puts regimes in danger. Irregular
political processes based, for example, on ‘hereditary political succession, along
with repressive and arbitrary political rule based on the personal whim of rulers,
deepen the legitimacy crisis and reinforce the vicious cycle of societal insecurity’
(Azar and Moon, 1988a: 82). Regime backlashes against militant Islamic
groups, for example, affect all elements of civil society, as governments undertake
to quash all pressures for change (Sivan, 1997).
There is a vibrant civil society in most, if not all, Arab countries in the
Middle East, but it is constantly in danger from the regime. Its existence 
proves that populations in the region do want to play a role in determining
domestic policy, and are not so content under authoritarian rule (Schwedler,
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1995: 24). However this does not translate into government willingness to
acquiesce in these desired changes; in fact, as noted above, regimes are more
likely to either ignore these demands or respond harshly to them. Such condi-
tions create the cycle of insecurity that characterizes much of the developing
world.
The regime–societal insecurity loop
In the developing world, regime security and societal security are not often 
the same (al-Sayyid, 1999: 48). Regimes pursue their narrower interests at 
the expense of the majority of their populations. As Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde point out, ‘only rarely are state and societal boundaries coterminous’
(1998: 119). The Middle East is a prime example of this, where the legacy of
colonialism left various ethnic, linguistic or religious groups lumped together
under a single authority in a single territory.
Yet the two are inextricably linked together. The growth of civil society and
its ability to help pressure governments into initiating liberalizing reforms have
placed increasing demands on the state, at the same time as the state is less 
able to effectively respond to these demands and needs. In turn, this creates a
sense of insecurity for governments, who worry that such demands will under-
mine the foundations upon which they have built their regimes. Most often, 
they respond by repressing these pressures, thus creating insecurity for their 
societies. The result can be called the regime–societal insecurity loop – similar,
in a sense, to the security dilemma realists note is present in the anarchic inter-
national system, though there are clear differences. Another way of putting 
it can be taken from Dalby’s idea that ‘in the process of providing various forms
of security, insecurities are also reproduced, often in ways that either actually
undermine the initial production of security or that merely perpetuate the 
problems to which they are supposedly providing solutions’ (Dalby, 1997: 12;
emphasis added). Although he is not referring specifically to regime security,
Dalby’s conception is relevant and appropriate.
An essential part of this loop is the perception that regimes have of their
popular legitimacy, the loss of it, and the measures they take to rectify matters.18
In the developing world, the existence of a plurality of communal groups within
the state means the regime usually lacks the support of some parts of society,
perhaps even a majority, since it represents the interests of only specific groups
or sectors. This automatically translates into a lack of widespread legitimacy
(Job, 1992: 17).
Azar and Moon (1988a) refer to this as a ‘software’ factor. ‘Popular support
and acceptance’, they contend, ‘facilitate the smooth mobilization and alloca-
tion of domestic resources’ (1988a: 81), which creates security for society, and
this in turn creates security for regimes, since they do not need to fear being
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toppled by a dissatisfied population demanding more. But since ‘demands for
economic redistribution and political participation perennially outrun state
capacities and create major overloads on political systems’, such anxieties are 
a regular facet of regime security considerations (Ayoob, 1997: 128).19
Such concerns have been manifested in the public riots that occurred in
several Arab countries in the 1980s, reflecting widespread anger and frustration
– as, for instance, in Jordan in 1989, Egypt in 1986 and Algeria and Tunisia 
in 1988. In fact, there is little doubt among analysts that continued lack of
legitimacy remains a problem for many, if not most, Arab regimes (Ibrahim,
1995; Korany, 1994).
The reasons for the riots have both an economic and a political strand: in
the first place, poor economic performance has led to declining standards of
living across the region. Population growth20 and urbanization, particularly 
in the non-oil states, in addition to placing heavy burdens on social welfare 
services, contribute to decline by forcing countries to significantly increase 
food imports (given that many Middle Eastern countries do not grow their own
food), which results in higher foreign debts and an attendant loss of ability to
fund domestic projects (see, for instance, Dessouki, 1993). The oil-rich states 
of the Persian Gulf have fared no better: here, economic mismanagement and
declining gross national products and state revenues – while continuing mili-
tary build-ups – have been the norm. At the same time those states have had 
to cope with greater expenditures because of regional conflicts – first by sup-
porting Iraq against Iran in the 1980s, and then helping to finance the 
1991 Gulf War against Iraq.
Politically, these have been manifested in a decreasing legitimacy accorded
to the regime. Prior to these financial declines, the ability of states to secure
exogenous geostrategic rents released governments from having to rely on
domestic taxes for significant revenue, thus negating any domestic accoun-
tability (Anderson, 1995b: 32).21 This was accepted as a social contract of sorts,
where, in return for quiescence in the political process, the government would
provide for adequate socio-economic standards of living (al-Sayyid, 1999: 49).22
But beginning with the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, these trade-offs
began to be seen by the population as unworkable, since the defeat called into
question the capabilities of the regimes (Ibrahim, 1993: 293). The inability to
effectively deal with other regional conflicts also contributed to a decrease in
legitimacy (Ibrahim, 1995: 34).
Despite the widespread government inefficiency and corruption, and
human and civil rights abuses, among both the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ of
the Arab world, however, the existence of these hardships do not of themselves
provide the basis for regime insecurity. It is important to note that it is once the
government is seen as not responding adequately to them that they form the
basis of threats to regime security (Kazemi and Norton, 1999: 80).
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For a time, pressures for societal (and social) security and political rights
were generally either ignored by Arab regimes or, more commonly, placated 
by focusing on external adventures or foreign policy goals, thus deflecting 
attention from the regimes’ failures to achieve economic, social and political
expectations. The Arab–Israeli conflict, in particular, was a ‘stopgap, legitimacy-
rich mechanism’ (Sela, 1998: 27), but other inter-Arab and inter-Muslim 
disputes were also used in this manner (Sela, 1998; Tessler and Grobschmidt,
1995: 144). As one study asserts, ‘all Arab states tend[ed] to ensure regime
security by provoking national security concerns’ (Azar and Moon, 1988a:
83).23 The Palestine issue, for example, was often used to justify censorship and
oppression to ‘strengthen’ Arab states against Israel (Brynen, 1991: 607–9).24
This belligerence, it has been argued, is how regimes maintain their autho-
rity, and prove to their subjects that they are ‘doing something’, something
worthwhile and deserving of resources and loyalty. It also means that they 
can use it as justification for repressing internal disagreement, in the name of
the unity needed to face the external threat. Because of this, Lisa Anderson has
argued, many regimes find foreign security threats easier to attend to than
domestic threats engendered by inferior socio-economic conditions (Anderson,
1992: 166). However, such exercises in foreign policy sometimes lead to a
serious depletion of state capacities. This in turn means there are less resources
for citizens, which in turn leads to less legitimacy for the regime, as their poli-
cies are questioned and loyalty is declining (Azar and Moon, 1988a: 84. See also
Lenore Martin’s contribution to this volume.).
Some regimes opt, therefore, to enact political reforms, hoping that the 
illusion of effective political participation will satisfy pressures for change. As
one observer has put it, ‘political reforms following mass riots are often carried
out with the intention of manipulating the public and defusing serious crises of
legitimacy and challenges to the rulers’ hold on power’ (Sadiki, 2000: 89). The
uprisings in Jordan, for instance, were widely seen as a sign of the monarchy’s
declining legitimacy, because the rioters were mostly ‘East Bankers’, non-
Palestinian Jordanians who traditionally formed the core of the Hashemites’
strongest support group. Thus, the liberalization efforts after the riots were moti-
vated by a need to reproduce some of this crumbling legitimacy (Rath, 1994:
553). In Egypt, public anger at the reported fixing of the 1995 parliamentary
elections forced President Hosni Mubarak to decree a cabinet shuffle in January
1996, bringing in a prime minister who reached out, for a time, to some of
the alienated groups.
However, such liberalizations have since been effectively negated by most
Arab regimes (though some do still exist, as in Jordan and Egypt). Much of the
clampdown on the reform processes can be traced back to the popularity of
Islamic groups and their increasing strength in civil society. They have become
the most robust source of opposition to the Arab regimes; in response, these
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regimes halted or slowed the liberalization process (Ghadbian, 1997), and many
adopted harsh measures against the Islamic movements, which has an oppres-
sive effect on the rest of civil society as well (see Kienle, 1998).
Preoccupied with the short-term, regime security remains the overriding
priority for most, if not all, of the Arab states in the region, with the result that
society’s insecurities are significantly increased beyond ‘normal’ levels. Tracing
Syria’s process of state-building and national security, Volker Perthes draws 
the conclusion that the state’s ‘prime function, if not its raison d’être for those
who control it, has been to serve . . . regime security more than anything else’,
and that ‘economic rationalities . . . have regularly been subordinated to the
rationality of regime maintenance and control’ (Perthes, 2000: 149); in other
words, domestic socio-economic concerns are of secondary importance to
regime security. In the case of Iraq, as another example, ‘the sheer pervasive-
ness of coercion as an instrument of governance has . . . erased the boundary
between external and internal threats’ (al-Khafaji, 2000: 259). This is evident
in the circumstances that occurred after the 1991 Gulf War, when various 
segments of society attempted to rise up against Saddam Hussein, but ended up
facing a Republican Guard that effectively defended the regime.
Regime legitimacy for Arab governments remains elusive, and indeed is
coming increasingly under fire, as socio-economic problems continue to crop up
or worsen, the answers to which regimes seem unable to provide and are
increasingly unable to handle. Entrenched government corruption and ineffi-
ciency is only part of this: increasing globalization, through growing trade,
increased availability of international, especially Western, television, use of
technology – such as the Internet – and ease of travel, have contributed to 
the spread of alternative ideas from other parts of the world – including more
politically and economically liberal ones. Moreover, Arab governments face a
younger population than ever before, as well as one that is much better edu-
cated, more open to alternative ideas and more determined to demand change
and effect it. At bottom, societies desire change, and many regimes in the Middle
East are unwilling to grant it.
The discussion now turns to the case of the Palestinians to illustrate the
arguments presented above.
The Palestinians
Many observers contend that despite their lack of statehood the Palestinians
have a vibrant sense – and set – of democratic values and institutions, built 
up over the years in spite of conditions that might be expected to prohibit 
such institutions (in particular the Israeli occupation: see, for example, Brynen,
1995: 185; Shain and Sussman, 1998). The beginning of Palestinian self-rule
in the mid-1990s also seemed to presage a healthy liberal-style democracy.
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Conditions have changed, however, since that period, and many analysts have
pointed to a growing authoritarianism in the Palestinian areas that increasingly
negates or ignores the political and civil rights of Palestinians under its rule.
Although the Palestinian Authority25 has not conformed to Western stand-
ards of democracy, including the social and economic dimensions normally
attributed to ‘real’ democracy, it has adopted some of the liberalization efforts
on which democracies are based – elections to the legislature, for example. In
January 1996, elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) took place;
approximately 90 per cent of voters in the Gaza Strip and 70–80 per cent in the
West Bank exercised their electoral rights, choosing an 88-member chamber
whose power, it was believed, would be able to balance the PA’s executive branch.
These elections induced wide-ranging debate on a number of issues, a healthy
sign of political liberalization (Abu-Amr, 1996: 83). The fact that Yasser Arafat
did have a competitor in the presidential elections, despite his overwhelming
victory, furthered this assessment.
Basing itself on authority through the people, the general view adopted by
the PLC was that it would be in the vanguard of Palestinian democracy, and
although it did not, or could not, always dissent from the PA’s and Arafat’s own
policy decisions, it did qualify as an independent pole of opposition (Rubin,
1999: 27–44) – another hallmark of Western-style democracy.
Since then, however, political conditions have deteriorated into authori-
tarianism and suppression of efforts at political liberalization. There is no doubt
that the Palestinian Authority has had, and will continue for the near future, 
to deal with very serious difficulties, any of which could easily hamper its con-
tinued development. These include: economic development; creating stable state
and social structures and institutions; achieving unquestioned legitimacy in 
the eyes of its citizens; and, perhaps most importantly, genuine peace and
normal relations with its historical enemy, the State of Israel. These are not 
easy tasks, but to succeed in them requires the PA to both maintain popular
support and to build its state through progress in the peace process and by
meeting its constituents’ needs (see Rubin, 1999: 2 and chapter 1 generally for
a fuller discussion on this). These tasks are difficult for any newly emerging state,
but they are complicated in this instance by the fact that a state of Palestine 
does not yet exist: it does not have a territorially-defined mass, nor does it 
have the international recognition crucial for any new state to prosper in the
international arena.
To succeed in these matters, some Palestinians have argued, the Palesti-
nians would have to forgo some democratic aspects for the time being, in order
to effectively mobilize its human and material resources to construct its state
(see, for example, Rubin, 1999: 3; Brynen, 1995: 194). This seems to be the
direction in which the PA is headed. Numerous examples support this. A restric-
tive Press and Publications Law was enacted by decree in 1995.26 Opposition
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and human rights activists and journalists have arbitrarily been arrested and
detained without due process of law; newspapers have been shut down or
heavily censored; and a High State Security Court impinges on a ‘regular’ 
judicial system. The PA has proposed a draft law that would constrain NGO 
independence and hamper their activities. In addition, several independent
security agencies obstruct democratic practices. As well, the despotic tendencies
of Arafat and the PA have hampered the effectiveness of Palestinian civil society.
Women’s groups, for instance, are very well organized in the Palestinian areas.
Yet the PA has been ambivalent at best towards them, if not outright hostile,
thus weakening them and their activities (Jamal, 2001). Some observers now
believe that Palestinian politics is becoming increasingly authoritarian and
despotic, as a result of the PA’s attempts to consolidate its own power at the
expense of political freedoms (Robinson, 1997).27
Similar to the methods employed by Arab regimes in the past, Arafat has
asserted executive control in the name of achieving national goals, particularly
against Israel (Shain and Sussman, 1998). The effort to write a ‘basic law’ for
the expected Palestinian state is a good example of the PA’s, particularly Arafat’s,
attempts to deflect political liberalizations and keep control within the executive.
Since the lack of any constitution or, in the meantime, a transitional/provisional
document, frees the PA from any institutional constraints on its powers, Arafat
and the PA have resisted attempts to write one.28
An Amnesty International report contends that, since its very inception,
the PA has ‘progressively restricted the right to freedom of expression through
a variety of means’ (Amnesty International, 2000). Real or perceived criticism
of the regime is often an excuse for harsh measures to be taken against the
offending person or group. A November 1999 petition signed by twenty
Palestinians, including members of the PLC and academics, for example, 
severely criticized the PA; as a result, eight of the signatories were detained,
some for long periods of time, without any official reason (see Kershner, 2000: 
26–8).
Faced with political stagnation and declining popular support, the PA has
become less willing to support political liberalization and more willing to resort
to authoritarian measures to enhance its position and implement its deci-
sions (Brynen, 1995: 193–4). Such liberalization poses a threat to its decision-
making capacity, and in response the PA (or, more appropriately, Arafat) has
adopted a leadership style that has served to de-institutionalize Palestinian 
politics (Sayigh, 2001: 52).29
Rule by decree is still the most common form of policy making, the PLC
having been sidelined and its role in the decision-making process cut out.30 It
has, in effect, become ‘a debating club whose resolutions are routinely ignored
by the PA’ (Robinson, 1997: 45).31 The PA has also lobbied to have international
donors channel money through the PA itself, instead of through Palestinian
163
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 163
Brent E. Sasley
164
NGOs, which would have the effect of negating any transparency in financial
matters.
Because Palestinian society does not provide the PA with its income, as
empirical examples from the rest of the Arab world have shown, the oppor-
tunities for demands for political participation are lessened due to a lack of
necessary accountability. This has helped lead to near-complete control for
Arafat – as one Palestinian magazine wrote: ‘Arafat is the chairman of the PLO,
the president of the PA; he holds all the reins, he controls all the money, he takes
all the decisions . . . and he, by and large, is the only law, whose authority is
respected, established and enforced’ (cited in Rubin, 1999: 4).32
The relationship between regime and society is tempered by the experiences
of the forerunner of the PA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
because of the impact of war and external rents that allowed the Palestinian
leadership to neglect ‘domestic’ societal needs; and also because the PLO’s 
particular system of political management until 1993 ‘means that a key strug-
gle since 1994 has been over the definition (or restriction) of civil society and
citizenship rights, leading to deepening schisms not only over constitutional
arrangements but also over formal and informal mechanisms of social dispute
resolution, gender and labor issues, and religion’ (Sayigh, 2000: 234).
Hillel Frisch argues that the Palestinian regime is unlikely to last, on the
basis of the conditions just outlined allied to the experience of other developing
world countries: the authoritarian nature of the PA, he asserts, will suffer a
long-term decline because of conflicts between regime and society, predicated
on the growing demands of civil society and the regime’s attempts to control or
co-opt it (Frisch, 1998: 146).
This section was not intended as a judgement on the extent of liberalization
achieved thus far in Palestinian politics; nor was its purpose to predict what a
future Palestinian state would look like. This is too difficult a task, given the
many and enormous undertakings faced by both society and polity in the years
ahead and the constraints on their ability to perform these tasks. This includes
a lack of finances, a lack of a contiguous territorial unit, an Israeli security 
presence in much of the West Bank, and ongoing (though at the time of writ-
ing, seemingly halted) peace negotiations with Israel on the very future of a
Palestinian state. It can, however, be used as barometer for the theoretical 
arguments presented in the sections above.
Conclusion
This chapter does not intend to suggest that all authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East, or the developing world as whole for that matter, will automati-
cally take harsher repressive measures once demands for political liberalization
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are made and acceded to. Such an assertion is far too deterministic and ethno-
centric, and is reminiscent of the political culture arguments against demo-
cratization in the Arab world.33 Rather, the purpose is to highlight the need 
to explain why some regimes act as they do (i.e. with repression), and why this 
is an important aspect for any understanding of security in the Middle East.
Societies cannot be secure if their governments do not allow them to be. It is 
difficult to know in advance whether a regime that opens up the political arena
will survive the process, for example, by being voted back into office. Some
regimes might be; others might share some aspects of their current systems with
newer, more liberalized, ones (for example, a monarchy in Jordan co-existing
with a directly elected legislature with real powers to make laws and determine
policy). Clearly, though, conditions cannot remain as they are if what this
chapter argues is true: regimes will continue to feel insecure because of increas-
ing demands by society, and, if they do not initiate political liberalizations to
appease such demands or ease the political conditions within their countries,
then they will respond with repression, which negates the security of societies.
As noted in the Introduction to this volume, many believe there is a danger
of diluting the term ‘security’ so that it ceases to hold any analytical usefulness,
and hence practical usefulness. Mohammed Ayoob points out that this danger
can be somewhat avoided by arguing that issues only really become security
issues when they ‘demonstrate the capacity to immediately affect political out-
comes’ (Ayoob, 1997: 125). Although he does not specify what ‘immediate’
means, his argument can be taken to support the contention put forward here
that societal and regime security, two factors that do affect political outcomes
because of their linkage and their effects on the political process within states,
should be considered part of the security lexicon.
The shift from a state-centric to individual- or group-centric analysis is not
without its theoretical or practical problems.34 However, the purpose of this
chapter is not to resolve all issues arising from redefining security, but rather to
highlight the necessity of doing so. As chapter 1 argued, our purpose here is to
act partly as a stepping-stone in the quest for epistemological and practical ends,
and for others to build on such analyses to better understand security and con-
tribute to resolving such complex conflicts as the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the
end, despite the questions that some of the theoretical conceptions might raise
in this chapter, and in the book as a whole, this is not an argument for retain-
ing the traditional security studies concepts; it is, rather, an argument for more
discussion and examination, in order to build better theories and understand-
ings. As Kenneth Waltz (the most effective proponent of the realist paradigm – 
and the most criticized for it) said, ‘a theory applies only so long as the condi-
tions it contemplates endure in their essentials’ (Waltz, 1986: 340). Given the
changed circumstances of the international system, and the distinctive nature
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of security in the developing world, a new theoretical understanding of secu-
rity is necessary.
Two authors believe that Middle Eastern conflicts will now be primarily
internal, pitting societies against their governments over social, economic and
political empowerment (Norton and Wright, 1994–95: 7). At the same time, no
study on Middle Eastern politics has concluded that regimes will give up their
powers and positions in the near future, at least willingly; in fact, most observers
believe the opposite.
Regime security is not usually thought to belong to the same class as other,
more ‘serious’, security threats, such as the drug trade, global environmental
problems, economic insecurity, and so on, because it refers to smaller groups 
of people, and generally applies to ‘bad’ objects, such as regimes that oppress or
constrain their populations from actively participating in the full political, social
and economic rights due them as citizens. But regime security is important, not
only because it helps clarify the referent object of security, but also because
regime insecurity leads to threats to societal security, in the form of oppression
and violence against the populace, or at least certain segments of it (usually
those individuals or groups demanding change or those communal groups 
different from the ruling clique).
As mentioned above, the difficulty in broadening a concept like security is
recognized. In some cases, resistance to the inclusion of other referents and
sources of security is justified, because of the inherent questions about what
constitutes a security threat and how should it be responded to by policy
makers.35 But this does not automatically preclude the broadening or deepen-
ing of the concept, since the concept as it developed during the Cold War era
has become straight-jacketed into a typology that cannot account for conditions
in the developing world. Traditional conceptions of security cannot account for
individual or group security, thus such theories cannot account for what has
been happening in states in the developing world, what has been a major feature
of international politics since the end of the Cold War, including the Balkans,
Africa, and the Middle East – where in many cases the state is ‘captured’ by
various groups for their own use, which often results in increased insecurity for
societal members who are not part of the dominant group.36 Realist attempts to
explain these events often end up by describing such groups in state-like forms
(see, for instance, Posen, 1993). Such analyses ignore not only the reasons
behind such conflict (i.e. communal identity or societal insecurity), but even the
effects of such security conceptions on society. Understanding how and why
such shifts have taken place is part of redefining security. All this helps to provide
different ways of looking at conflicts and how and why they begin, with the
attendant hope that this will provide newer ideas for resolving such conflicts.
Given the proliferation of intra-state security conflicts since the beginning of the
1990s, it is obvious that realist ideas have been sufficient neither to explain them
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nor to resolve them. That should be reason enough for attempts to redefine
‘security’.
notes
1 Barry Buzan adds that this type of conceptualization also served American ideological
and foreign policy agendas (1991: 11).
2 Larbi Sadiki points out that democratization in the Arab world has ‘almost invariably’
meant ‘electoralization’, without the corresponding benefits that are meant to accrue to
societies with democratic systems (2000: 71).
3 It is recognized here that the level of political rights, hence of political liberalization, in
Israel is open to debate, particularly regarding the non-Jewish citizens of the country.
However there can be no doubt that this level is still much higher than in the Arab world,
and for that reason Israel is not the focus of this chapter.
4 Critical security studies literature emphasizes the importance of the difference in
processes of state formation in the West and in the developing world. In the former, hun-
dreds of years of war making culminated in the nation state, the core of all practical and
theoretical analyses of political entities since then. In the latter, it is pointed out, states’
existence can be measured only in decades, and were usually not the result of warfare,
but rather had their territory and boundaries drawn by inter-European politics, European
strategic necessities, or European economic considerations.
5 The ‘security dilemma’, the result of the anarchic nature of the international system,
was how realists formulated the link between states and security. Conditions of anarchy
prompt states to seek to enhance their own security vis-à-vis other states; this in turn
creates insecurity for other states. For a fuller explanation, see Robert Jervis (1978),
‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30:1 ( January), 167–214.
6 By ‘developed’ is meant the advanced industrial democracies of the West – Canada, the
United States, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
7 In Latin America, for instance, these circumstances are referred to as political pacts. 
See Frances Hagopian (1990), ‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political
Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil’, Comparative Political Studies, 23:2 ( July), 147–
70.
8 This is not to say that the state cannot be understood also as an actor in international
relations; but it is to say that the sameness of regime and state is more important for
understanding security in the developing world than in the developed areas.
9 For an argument about this concerning Africa, see Booth and Vale, 1997.
10 Although this formulation implies that peoples without states (such as the Palestinians,
as yet) cannot ever be secure, this chapter does not focus on this particular, albeit very
important, criticism.
11 Ayoob’s definition of ‘regime security’ is somewhat different from that used here. For
Ayoob, a security threat is so if it affects the regime’s ability to carry out domestic or inter-
national politics (1997: 130). His focus is different from this project’s: he reformulates
the state and security to remain within a realist paradigm of security as threats that affect
the state itself. Although his theoretical conceptions are precise, they do not conform 
to the understanding of security that this volume asserts, which is that there are 
various ways of understanding security, and all are important.
12 Most regime changes in the Middle East resulted in the deaths of former regime members;
this is due to the nature of these changes, primarily by coups or revolutions.
13 For a good account of the types of economic and political liberalization methods regimes
might employ, see Norton and Wright, 1994–95.
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14 Societal security is different from social security. The latter connotes public welfare service,
while the former refers more appropriately to the subject of this chapter. Buzan, Waever
and de Wilde also make this distinction (1998: 120).
15 See Ken Booth 1991 for a discussion on communal group security and a suggested 
solution – emancipation. Resolution of the insecurities examined here cannot be resolved
as easily, since they are caught in a complex cycle of both the regime and the society.
16 Such arguments provide the basis for international humanitarian interventions. See, for
example, Adam Roberts (1993), ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human
Rights,’ International Affairs, 69:3 (July), 429–49.
17 Numerous studies have used the Turkish example, in particular, in support of these 
arguments to explain the rise of political Islam and its successes. The conclusion is appro-
priate, however, for the entire region.
18 For an early account of these conditions, see Michael Hudson’s seminal 1977 book Arab
Politics, which argues that Arab politics is formed around growing societal demands and
the inability of regimes to adequately respond to them, thus engendering a continual
search for legitimacy.
19 Saad Eddin Ibrahim also points out that regional conflicts have also weakened the regime
– not only by draining resources, but by exposing its impotence in handling these 
conflicts (1998: 377).
20 United Nations’ estimates are that Egypt will almost double in population, to 120 million,
by the middle of the century; Saudi Arabia will triple to 61 million in that time, and Syria
and Iraq will hit 50 million. Cited in Maynes, 1998: 10.
21 For the Persian Gulf states, such rents came primarily from oil; for other Arab countries,
these rents were procured mainly through dependence on one of the two superpowers
or from other Arab states (primarily in return for being a ‘front-line’ state in the conflict
with Israel).
22 This is basically an extension of ‘rentier state’ arguments that explain the lack of politi-
cal participation as a result of the population’s willingness (forced or otherwise) to forgo
such participation because the government, through revenue (or rents) generated
outside of the state, supplies its citizens with welfare services. Since the population does
not produce the revenue that is used to implement state policy, it is assumed, it has no
right to claim a role in determining policy. See, for example, Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo
Luciani (eds) (1987), The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm).
23 Another study argues that more democratic governments in the Arab world would
decrease the intensity of the Arab–Israeli conflict and contribute to its peaceful 
resolution – though at the same time, the authors do agree that this is not the only cause
for the continuation of the conflict. The fault lies on both sides of the conflict, they
contend, and there are numerous complex issues such an analysis ignores. But they do
claim that increased liberalization would temper the hostility and create conditions for
resolution. See Tessler and Grobschmidt, 1995.
24 For an account of Syrian strategies in this regard, see Perthes, 2000; for Iraq, see 
al-Khafaji, 2000.
25 When referring to the PA, this chapter points to the executive branch of the decision-
making polity, for two reasons: one, it has usurped most of the powers granted originally
to the Palestinian Legislative Council and makes most of the decisions that take place 
in Palestinian society, polity and economy; and, two, since the PA is the government 
of the (as-yet-undefined) Palestinian state, as is traditional in political science usage 
when discussing decisions of a political entity, the executive branch is the one mainly
referred to.
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26 The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights has sharply criticized this law. See
www.pchrgaza.org
27 Robinson reconfirmed this analysis a few years later, predicting that ‘continued and
strengthened authoritarianism is the most likely result in Palestine’ (2000: 89).
28 For a good account of this, see Brown 2000. At the time of writing, no such document
had yet been approved and ratified.
29 Palestinians themselves are aware of these constraints: A poll found that 60 per cent of
Palestinians who had dealt with the PA believed it to be governed by ‘favoritism, con-
nection, bribery and other forms of corruption’ (Robinson, 1997: 43; see also Shikaki,
1998: 39).
30 It does not, for example, have any control over the budget – traditionally a staple of
legislative power.
31 For more examples of the struggle between Arafat and the PLC, and Arafat’s repeated 
triumphs over the PLC’s own proposed policies, see Rubin, 1999: chapter 2.
32 This is not the result of Arafat’s tyrannical tendencies, Rubin goes on to write, but rather
is due to his indecisive, yet impulsive, anti-institutional decision-making style (1999: 4).
See also Sayigh, 2001; Abu-Amr, 1996: 91; and Rubinstein, 1995.
33 See Anderson, 1995a.
34 See Krause and Williams 1997: 46–7 for more explanation of some of these issues.
35 The literature on environmental security is a case in point, since ‘environment’ can
include numerous sources of concern that might not be security threats, and the diffi-
culty sometimes lies in where to delineate the two. For an account of these theoretical
and practical problems (and a proposed solution), see Marc Levy (1995), ‘Is the
Environment a National Security Issue?’, International Security, 20:2 (Autumn), 35–62.
36 See, for example, Douglas Chalmers, 1977. Although Chalmers was discussing Latin
America, his idea of the politicized state can also be applied to the Middle East, where
royal families or other groups tied together for various reasons have seized control of the
state and held on to power with no intention of giving it up willingly.
references
Abu-Amr, Ziad. (1996), ‘Pluralism and the Palestinians’, Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (July),
83–93.
Amnesty International. (2000), ‘The Palestinian Authority: Silencing Dissent’, (September).
Available online: http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/mde210162000?opendocument
&of=countries\palestinian+authority
Anderson, Lisa. (1995a), ‘Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture
Approach’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 77–92.
Anderson, Lisa. (1995b), ‘Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft
Budgets’, Journal of International Affairs, 49:1 (Summer), 25–44.
Ayoob, Mohammed. (1997), ‘Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective’, in Keith
Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 121–46.
Ayoob, Mohammed. (1995), The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional
Conflict and the International System, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Azar, Edward E. and Chung-in Moon. (1988a), ‘Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity:
The “Software” side of Third World National Security’, in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in
169
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 169
Brent E. Sasley
170
Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External
Threats, Chelteuham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 77–101.
Azar, Edward E. and Chung-in Moon. (1988b), ‘Rethinking Third World National Security’,
in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The
Management of Internal and External Threats, Chelteuham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Limited, 1–13.
Booth, Ken. (1991), ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17:4
(October), 313–26.
Booth, Ken and Peter Vale. (1997), ‘Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case
of Southern Africa’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security
Studies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 329–58.
Brown, Nathan J. (2000), ‘Constituting Palestine: The Effort to Write a Basic Law for the
Palestinian Authority’, Middle East Journal, 54:1 (Winter), 25–43.
Brumberg, Daniel. (1995), ‘Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab 
World’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 229–59.
Brynen, Rex. (1995), ‘From Occupation to Uncertainty: Palestine’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat
Korany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World,
Volume 2: Comparative Experiences, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 185–202.
Brynen, Rex. (1992), ‘Economic Crises and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World:
The Case of Jordan’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25:1 (March), 69–97.
Brynen, Rex. (1991), ‘Palestine and the Arab State System: Permeability, State Consolidation
and the Intifada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24:3 (September), 595–621.
Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble. (1995), ‘Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives
on Arab Liberalization and Democratization’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul
Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1:
Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 3–27.
Buzan, Barry. (1991), People, States and Fear, 2nd edn., Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis,
Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Chalmers, Douglas. (1977), ‘The Politicized State in Latin America’, in James Malloy (ed.),
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 23–45.
Dahl, Robert A. (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Dalby, Simon. (1997), ‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in
Contemporary Security Discourse’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical
Security Studies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–31.
Denoeux, Guilain P. (1996), The United States and the Challenge of Democratization in the Arab
World, Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.
Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. (1993), ‘Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Arab World’, in
Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (eds), The Many Faces of National Security in
the Arab World, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 76–90.
Frisch, Hillel. (1998), Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and
Gaza, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Ghadbian, Najib. (1997), Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World, Boulder
CO: Westview Press.
Halliday, Fred. (1995), ‘International Relations and its Discontents’, International Affairs, 71:4
(October), 733–46.
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 170
Effects of political liberalization
Hoffmann, Stanley. (1977), ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus,
51, 41–59.
Holsti, Kalevi. (1991), Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hudson, Michael. (1991), ‘After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab
World’, Middle East Journal, 45:3 (Summer), 407–26.
Hudson, Michael. (1977), Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, New Haven CT: Yale
University Press.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. (1998), ‘The Troubled Triangle: Populism, Islam and Civil Society in the
Arab World’, International Political Science Review, 19:4 (October), 373–85.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. (1995), ‘Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An
Overview’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 29–57.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. (1993), ‘Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World’, Middle
East Journal, 47:2 (Spring), 292–305.
Jamal, Amal. (2001), ‘Engendering State-Building: The Women’s Movement and Gender-
Regime in Palestine’, Middle East Journal, 55:2 (Spring), 256–76.
Job, Brian. (1992), ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the
Third World’, in Brian Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World
States, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 11–35.
Kazemi, Farhad and Augustus Richard Norton. (1999), ‘Political Challenges to Middle East
Governments in the Twenty-First Century’, in Lenore G. Martin (ed.), New Frontiers in
Middle East Security, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 79–104.
Kershner, Isabel. (2000), ‘Sounding the Alarm’, The Jerusalem Report, 31 January, 26–8.
al-Khafaji, Isam. (2000), ‘War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-
Controlled Society: The Case of Bathist Iraq’, in Steven Heydemann (ed.), War,
Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press,
258–91.
Kienle, Eberhard. (1998), ‘More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of
Egypt in the 1990s’, Middle East Journal, 52:2 (Spring), 219–35.
Korany, Bahgat. (1994), ‘Arab Democratization: A Poor Cousin?’, PS: Political Science & Politics,
27:3 (September), 511–13.
Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. (1997), ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations 
of Critical Security Studies’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical
Security Studies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 33–59.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. (1996), ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’, Journal of
Democracy, 7:2 (April), 14–33.
Maynes, Charles Williams. (1998), ‘The Middle East in the Twenty-First Century’, Middle East
Journal, 52:1 (Winter), 9–16.
Middle East Report. (1998), ‘Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World’,
by Marsha Pripstein-Posusney (Winter). Available online: http://www.merip.org/mer/
mer209/marsha.htm
Norton, Augustus Richard. (1995), ‘Introduction’, in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil
Society in the Middle East, Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1–25.
Norton, Augustus Richard and Robin Wright. (1994–95), ‘The Post-Peace Crisis in the Middle
East’, Survival, 36:4 (Winter), 7–20.
Perthes, Volker. (2000), ‘Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum: State Building, National Security, and
War Preparation in Syria’, in Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions, and Social Change
in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 149–73.
171
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 171
Brent E. Sasley
172
Posen, Barry. (1993), ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35:1 (Spring),
27–47.
Rath, Katherine. (1994), ‘The Process of Democratization in Jordan’, Middle Eastern Studies,
30:3 (July), 530–57.
Robinson, Glenn E. (2000), ‘Palestine After Arafat’, The Washington Quarterly, 23:4 (Autumn),
77–90.
Robinson, Glenn E. (1997), ‘The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime’, Survival,
39:2 (Summer), 42–56.
Rubin, Barry. (1999), The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-
Building, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rubinstein, Danny. (1995), The Mystery of Arafat, trans. Dan Leon, Vermont: Steerforth Press.
Sadiki, Larbi. (2000), ‘Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 32:1 (February), 71–95.
Sayigh, Yezid. (2001), ‘Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt’, Survival, 43:3 (Autumn), 47–60.
Sayigh, Yezid. (2000), ‘War as Leveler, War as Midwife: Palestinian Political Institutions,
Nationalism, and Society Since 1948’, in Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions, and
Social Change in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 200–39.
al-Sayyid, Mustapha Kamel. (1999), ‘Legitimacy and Security in Arab Countries,
1989–1996’, in Lenore G. Martin (ed.), New Frontiers in Middle East Security, New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 47–77.
Schwedler, Jillian. (1995), ‘Introduction: Civil Society and the Study of Middle East Politics’,
in Jillian Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? A Primer, Boulder CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1–30.
Sela, Avraham. (1998), The Decline of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest
for Regional Order, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Shain, Yossi and Gary Sussman. (1998), ‘From Occupation to State-Building: Palestinian
Political Society Meets Palestinian Civil Society’, Government and Opposition, 33:3
(Summer), 275–306.
Shikaki, Khalil. (1998), ‘Peace Now or Hamas Later?’, Foreign Affairs, 77:4 (July–August),
29–43.
Sivan, Emmanuel. (1997), ‘Constraints and Opportunities in the Arab World’, Journal of
Democracy, 8:2 (April), 103–13.
Tessler, Mark and Marilyn Grobschmidt. (1995), ‘Democracy in the Arab World and the
Arab–Israeli Conflict’, in Mark Tessler and David Garnham (eds), Democracy, War, and
Peace in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 135–69.
Walt, Stephen M. (1991), ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly,
35:2 (June), 211–39.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1986), ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My
Critics’, in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University
Press.
DEF8  7/31/02  10:38 PM  Page 172
Afghanistan 74
al-Aqsa intifada 59, 69, 72
see also second intifada
Algeria 74, 75, 154, 159
Arab–Israeli Wars
1967 War 88, 108, 117
1973 War 91
1982 War 94, 99
see also Lebanon War
Sinai Campaign 42, 50, 51






Ben-Gurion, David 42, 44–51, 58
Bethlehem 120
Bin Laden, Usamah 74
Christopher, Warren 56
‘citizen warrior’ 83, 92
civil society 130, 157, 158
clash of civilizations 63
Cold War 1, 2, 3, 5, 66, 79n.15, 166
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Water Courses
110
Dayan, Moshe 45, 47, 49, 51
Declaration of Principles 7
see also Oslo process
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP) 25, 135, 
140




Egypt 74, 120, 154, 159, 160
Eshkol, Levi 45
Euphrates 115
Fatah 25, 135, 140, 141
final status issues 7
fundamentalism 69–70, 71, 77
Ganges 110
Gaza Raid 50






Gulf Co-operation Council 29
see also Persian Gulf, states
Gulf War (1991) 108, 159
Gush Emunim 58, 59
Haganah 88
Hamas 16, 25, 26, 33, 63, 128, 145n.6




creation of rejectionist front 135–6
divisions within 141–4
Islamic Bloc 139, 141
and the Oslo Accords 137, 138, 140,
143
participation in elections 133
political movement 129, 132–4
support for 138–41
terrorist attacks; suicide bombings
27, 57













International Court of Justice 110
international institutions 109, 116
international water law 116
intifada 5, 6, 7, 17n.2, 17n.3, 72, 94,
105, 117, 120, 133
water scarcity 117, 120–3
see also al-Aqsa intifada
Iraq 155, 161
Iranian Revolution 74
Islam 15, 62, 64, 66–78 passim,
129–30
and democracy 62
Islamophobia 62, 63, 68, 69, 71
see also Islamic movements; Islamism
Islamic Jihad 25, 33
Islamic movements 62
Islamism 62, 63, 64, 66, 70, 72, 
73–8
Islamic fundamentalism 66
in the Maghreb 71–6
Islamic fundamentalists 68, 69
see also political Islam
Israel 25, 167n.3, 84
abortion 89
and Arab incursions into Israeli
territory 47
biblical Land of Israel 89
elites 42
gender equality myth 86
military 32





nuclear deterrent 43, 52
occupation 131
Palestinian population 25, 27–8, 34
see also Palestinian minority within
Israel
Parliamentary Committee on the
Status of Women 90, 93
religion and statehood 88
settlers 118, 121
the ‘status quo’ 88
water policy 116–22
water shortage 122
Women’s Corps (Chen) 92
women’s peace movement 85, 93–8
and motherhood 96–7
women’s right to fight 85, 90–3
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) 6, 84
and changes in the 1990s; selective
service 99
Israeli Communist Party 25
Israeli Women’s Network 90, 93, 99
Jerusalem Link 97
jihad 71, 77
Jordan 119, 120, 154, 159, 160





Labour Party (Israel) 52, 57, 117, 118
Land Day 25
Land of Israel 54





liberalization 151–2, 154, 155, 157,
160, 162, 163
see also democratization
Likud 52, 56, 58, 118, 120
policy 119
Madrid Peace Conference (1991) 6
Maghreb 71–6





Mekorot 118, 120, 122




Muslim Brotherhood 133, 138, 141,
143, 145n.10
National Religious Party 58
neorealist 1




see also renewable resources
North Africa 75
Operation Black Arrow 50
Oslo Accords 6, 24, 57, 132, 137, 140
Oslo II Accord 7, 30, 123
Oslo process 6, 7, 140
see also Oslo Accords; Oslo II Accord
Palestinian Authority (PA) 22, 123,
128, 162–4 passim, 168n.25
Arafat regime 24
dependence on Israeli-controlled water
30
economy 28
General Security Service (GSS) 31
sources of opposition to 24–5
leftist nationalist opposition 25
radical Islamists 25
‘insiders’ 25, 33
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
162, 163, 168n.25
Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) 6, 16, 54, 56, 72, 117,
128, 131, 132, 138, 146n.19,
164
and the Gulf War 135
see also Hamas, alternative to the PLO
Palestinian minority within Israel 26
Palestinian refugees 7
Palestinians 6, 161–4
water 117, 119, 120, 121–3
see also Palestinian refugees
Peace Now 94
Peres, Shimon 42, 55–7, 59, 72
Persian Gulf 112
states 119, 135
see also Gulf Co-operation Council
political Islam 15, 62, 63–5, 73, 128,
129–31
see also Islamism
Popular Front for the Liberation of





Rabin, Yitzhak 7, 25, 54, 56, 57
realism 1, 152, 153
realist 1, 2, 3, 4, 152, 156, 165,
167n.11
see also structural realism
regime security 14, 150, 153–6, 161
regime–societal insecurity loop 158–61
renewable resources 108–9, 114
Sabra and Shatilla 94
Saudi Arabia 135
second intifada 23, 25, 31, 32





Sharett, Moshe 42, 44–51, 56, 58
Sharon, Ariel 58, 59, 77
social security 168n.14




Syria 74, 155, 161






United States (US) 1, 2, 4, 32, 55, 110,
111, 120
water 16, 108, 111–13
West Bank 5, 6, 16, 162, 164
water 116–22
Women against the Invasion of Lebanon
94
Women against the Occupation (Shani)
94, 95
Women in Black 96
Wye River Accords 7
Yasin, Ahmad, Shaykh 133, 137
Yemen 154
Yishuv (the Jewish community in
Palestine) 41, 45
DEFINDEX  7/31/02  10:39 PM  Page 176
